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ABSTRACT
Three essays on fair division and decision making under uncertainty
by
Jingyi Xue
The first chapter is based on a paper with Jin Li in fair division. It was recently dis-
covered that on the domain of Leontief preferences, Hurwicz (1972)’s classic impossibility
result does not hold; that is, one can find efficient, strategy-proof and individually rational
rules to divide resources among agents. Here we consider the problem of dividing l divisi-
ble goods among n agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and char-
acterize the class of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-
proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, envy-freeness and
consistency. On the Leontief domain, our rules generalize the egalitarian-equivalent rules
with reference bundles. We also extend our rules to agent-specific and endowment-specific
egalitarian rules. The former is a larger class of rules satisfying all the previous properties
except anonymity and envy-freeness. The latter is a class of efficient, group strategy-proof,
anonymous and individually rational rules when the resources are assumed to be privately
owned.
The second and third chapters are based on two working papers of mine in decision
making under uncertainty. In the second chapter, I study the wealth effect under uncer-
tainty — how the wealth level impacts a decision maker’s degree of uncertainty aversion.
I axiomatize a class of preferences displaying decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion,
which allows a decision maker to be more willing to take uncertainty-bearing behavior
when he becomes wealthier. Three equivalent preference representations are obtained. The
first is a variation on the constraint criterion of Hansen and Sargent (2001). The other two
respectively generalize Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s maxmin criterion and Maccheroni,
Marinacci and Rustichini (2006)’s variational representation. This class, when restricted
to preferences exhibiting constant absolute uncertainty aversion, is exactly Maccheroni,
Marinacci and Rustichini (2006)’s ariational preferences. Thus, the results further enable
us to establish relationships among the representations for several important classes within
variational preferences.
The three representations provide different decision rules to rationalize the same class
of preferences. The three decision rules correspond to three ways which are proposed in
the literature to identify a decision maker’s perception about uncertainty and his attitude
toward uncertainty. However, I give examples to show that these identifications conflict
with each other. It means that there is much freedom in eliciting two unobservable and
subjective factors, one’s perception about and attitude toward uncertainty, from only his
choice behavior. This exactly motivates the work in Chapter 3.
In the third chapter, I introduce confidence orders in addition to preference orders. Ax-
ioms are imposed on both orders to reveal a decision maker’s perception about uncertainty
and to characterize the following decision rule. A decision maker evaluates an act based
on his aspiration and his confidence in this aspiration. Each act corresponds to a trade-off
line between the two criteria: The more he aspires, the less his confidence in achieving the
aspiration level. The decision maker ranks an act by the optimal combination of aspiration
and confidence on its trade-off line according to an aggregating preference of his over the
two-criterion plane. The aggregating preference indicates his uncertainty attitude, while
his perception about uncertainty is summarized by a generalized second-order belief over
the prior space, and this belief is revealed by his confidence order.
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1Chapter 1
Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
1.1 Introduction
In the fair division literature, efficiency and strategy-proofness typically imply totally unfair
outcomes. For example, Zhou (1991) shows that an efficient and strategy-proof allocation
rule must be dictatorial already in a two-agent economy with continuous, strictly monotonic
and strictly convex preferences. Such negative result has been extended to several more
restricted domains by many researchers. Serizawa and Weymark (2003) further shows that
in a many-agent many-good economy no efficient and strategy-proof rule can guarantee
every agent a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. (Additional discussion
of related literature is given at the end of this section.)
However, the picture changes a lot if we assume full complementarity among the goods
and consider the domain of Leontief preferences. On the Leontief domain, for most ef-
ficient divisions of a given set of resources, some of the resources are redundant1. Thus,
it makes sense to give the agents only the least amount of goods to achieve given wel-
fare levels, while transferring the redundant resources to other potential users outside the
rule2. We speak in this case of a non-wasteful rule. In addition to the normative concern of
parsimony, the restriction to non-wasteful rules reduces the possibility of strategic manip-
1For example, in a two-agent two-good economy, both agents have the same preference represented by
the utility function u(x) = min{ x12 , x2}, and the endowment vector is (2,2). Then 1 unit of good 2 is redundant
in any efficient allocation which divides up all the resources.
2Notice that here withholding the redundant resources does not affect efficiency since they are useless to
the agents. It is different from the budget loss in VCG mechanisms which directly reduce the welfare of the
agents.
2
ulation. It turns out that then there exist rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness and
many fairness axioms.
The Leontief preferences and the corresponding non-wasteful rules are of natural practi-
cal interests, as shown in the computer science literature like Ghodsi et al. (2010), Hindman
et al. (2011), Bodwin et al. (2011), Joe-Wong et al. (2011), Dolev et al. (2012), etc. For
example, they consider multiple resource sharing problems in cloud computing systems.
The users are allocated with computing resources like CPU, memory and I/O resources to
do their different jobs with heterogeneous demands. In such circumstance, each user needs
the resources in a customized proportion while redundant resources should not be allocated
in order to avoid waste.
Two earlier papers inspire our work. Ghodsi et al. (2010) are the first to propose
non-wasteful rules for the Leontief domain. They prove that in a many-agent many-good
economy the egalitarian-equivalent (EE) rule proposed by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978)
(they call it the Dominant Resource Fairness mechanism) is efficient, strategyproof, envy-
free and satisfies several other fairness axioms. Prior to them, Nicolò (2004) characterizes
in a two-agent two-good economy with generalized Leontief preferences, a class of rules
which are efficient, fully implementable in truthful strategies (a requirement stronger than
strategy-proofness) and individually rational. However, Nicolò’s rules are wasteful, and he
finds it difficult to generalize his result to an economy with more agents and more goods.
Our contribution is to bring the existing results to a much more general level. Under
Leontief preferences, we propose a class of non-wasteful rules which generalize the EE
rules with reference bundles (see Section 3 for the relation of the EE rule and those with
reference bundles). They satisfy efficiency, (group) strategy-proofness and almost all the
fairness axioms in the literature (see below for further discussion). We also characterize
our rules by these axioms. Moreover, the characterization works as well on a much larger
3
preference domain — the generalized Leontief preference domain, which we shall discuss
later. Lastly, we provide two natural extensions of our rules.
The rules we propose are called generalized egalitarian rules (defined in Section 3).
A generalized egalitarian rule assumes that there is a continuous monotonic “benchmark
preference” on the commodity space owned by the society. It looks for the non-wasteful
efficient allocation where all the agents get the bundles among which the society is indif-
ferent according to its benchmark preference. In another way, we can visualize that in
the commodity space, the agents walk on their own “minimum-demand” paths associated
with their Leontief preferences at some given speeds which guarantee that at any time they
all simultaneously stand on the same indifference curve of the benchmark preference, and
then our rule picks the end points where they reach the endowment feasibility constraints.
Essentially, egalitarian rules set a standard for society to measure different ordinal prefer-
ences of the agents so that they are treated equally by this standard. While a classical EE
rule makes the agents feel indifferent between their allocations and the same fraction of the
social endowment, our rule gives the agents “equal” bundles according to a utility function
of the society. It turns out that when the social endowment is fixed, a classic EE rule on the
Leontief domain is one of our rules with a particular benchmark preference. We discuss
about it in detail in Example 2 of Section 3.
There is another interpretation of generalized egalitarian rules. Thomson (1994) pro-
poses a concept of equity to capture the notion of equal opportunities. Given a family C
of choice sets, he defines an equal opportunity allocation relative to C as one giving every
agent his optimal bundle from a common choice set in C. Since such an allocation is ob-
tained by having the agents choose in a common choice set, they can be viewed to get equal
opportunities. It turns out that a general egalitarian rule always picks the Pareto optimal
equal opportunity allocation relative to a corresponding family of nested choice sets.
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Our first main result (Theorem 1) shows that a generalized egalitarian rule satisfies
efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, population mono-
tonicity, envy-freeness and consistency; and conversely, given an efficient, resource mono-
tonic and consistent rule, if it is either strategy-proof and anonymous, or envy-free, then it
must be a generalized egalitarian rule.
All these axioms are very familiar in the fair division literature. Among the incentive
compatibility axioms, group strategy-proofness is a very strong one. It allows no group of
agents to misreport their preferences together and achieve Pareto improvement within the
group (see Pattanaik (1978), Barberà (1979), Moulin and Shenker (2001), Juarez(2008)).
For the fairness axioms, anonymity simply rules out the discrimination of the agents by
their names; resource monotonicity guarantees that every agent benefits from the growth
of the social endowment (see Roemer (1986a,b), Chun and Thomson (1988)); population
monotonicity ensures that no agent will get worse off when less agents join in the division
(see Thomson (1983)); and envy-freeness makes every agent weakly prefer his own allo-
cation to anybody else’s (see Foley (1967), Varian (1974, 1976)). The consistency axiom
has also played an important role in the fair division literature, in particular, the rationing
(or bankruptcy) problems (see Aumann and Maschler (1985), Young (1987), Thomson
(1988)). It requires that when some agents leave first with their allocated bundles, if we
apply the rule again to the reduced economy, the rest of the agents will still be allocated
with the same bundles as in the original economy. For a survey of these and some other
axioms in the fair division literature, see Thomson (2010).
Many of the axioms above are known to be very demanding and typically incompatible.
For example, Moulin and Thomson (1988) show that any efficient and resource monotonic
rule must generate envy in an economy with continuous, monotonic, convex and homo-
thetic preferences. However, generalized egalitarian rules under Leontief preferences sur-
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prisingly satisfy them all.
Our rules and characterization apply for a much larger preference domain — the do-
main of generalized Leontief preferences (see Theorem 2). While for a standard Leontief
preference, the set of minimum commodity bundles that achieve given utility levels, which
we called the critical set, is a ray from the origin in the commodity space, the critical set
of a generalized Leontief preference can be an arbitrary strictly increasing curve starting
from the origin. In real life, generalized Leontief preferences are relevant when the agents
are production units and the goods are inputs. For example, a group of people are divid-
ing some cotton, silk and lace to make clothes. They would like to use these materials
in different proportions according to their own tastes. Given the precise combination of
the materials to make some pieces of clothes, more material of one kind is useless, which
captures the essence of a Leontief preference. Moreover, when the amount of all materials
increases, one might be able to make a dress instead of a shirt which requires different pro-
portion of materials. There might also exist different types of returns to scale which alter
the input proportion. Hence, one’s critical set is an increasing curve, as exhibited in the
generalized Leontief preferences.
Our results crucially depend on the restriction to non-wasteful rules. We give an exam-
ple in Section 3 showing that our results do not hold without this restriction. Our charac-
terization is tight with respect to all the axioms.
Our next two results (Theorem 3 and 4) extend the generalized egalitarian rules in two
directions. First, instead of using one single benchmark preference to measure all agents’
utilities, a rule may assign to each agent a personal welfare index and equalize their utilities
according to these agent-specific welfare indices. This family of rules is a much larger and
non-anonymous class. Naturally, we do not expect envy-freeness in this case. However, all
the other good properties are preserved.
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The second extension is motivated when the resources are assumed to be privately,
rather than commonly, owned by the agents. A compelling requirement here is the volun-
tary participation of the agents in the social reallocation. This is ensured by the individual
rationality axiom, which requires the allocation to an agent to be no worse (for this agent)
than his initial endowment. In this case, we can set the welfare indices such that it is always
an “equal treatment” allocation to give every agent the minimum bundle that provides him
the same welfare level as his private endowment. The welfare indices then depend on the
endowment profile. By slightly modifying the argument in Moulin and Thomson (1988),
one can check that efficiency, resource monotonicity and individual rationality are also
incompatible in our context. We show that our endowment-specific egalitarian rules are
efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous, consistent and individually rational.
For both agent-specific and endowment-specific rules, our results are one-sided and we
leave the characterizations as open questions.
After the literature review below, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the basic model and the axioms. Section 3 defines the generalized egalitarian rules
under Leontief preferences and gives the characterization result. Section 4 introduces
the generalized Leontief preference domain, on which the characterization still holds.
Section 5 contains the main proofs. Section 6 checks the tightness of our characterization.
Section 7 and 8 provide two extensions of the generalized egalitarian rules: agent-specific
and endowment-specific egalitarian rules. Section 9 provides concluding remarks. The
appendix contains some supporting proofs.
Related Literature
For the incompatibility of efficiency and strategy-proofness with fairness properties
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in exchange economies, Hurwicz (1972) first proves that any efficient and individually
rational rule is manipulable in two-agent, two-good economies where both agents have
continuous, strictly convex, and strictly monotonic preferences. Dasgupta et al. (1979)
replace individual rationality with non-dictatorship, while allowing discontinuous prefer-
ences. Zhou (1991) shows that in two-agent many-good exchange economies with the
same preference domain as in Hurwicz (1972), a strategy-proof and efficient rule has to be
inverse-dictatorial3, and hence dictatorial. From then on, many authors consider various
restricted domains, either obtain similar impossibility results or compromise with weak-
ened axioms, such as Schummer (1997, 2004), Ju (2003), Hashimoto (2008), and Momi
(2011a) for two-agent cases, Barberà and Jackson (1995), Kato and Ohseto (2002, 2004),
Amorós (2002), Serizawa (2002), Serizawa and Weymark (2003), Ju (2004), Morimoto
et al. (2010) and Momi (2011b) for many-agent cases. As we mentioned before, both
Nicolò (2004) and Ghodsi et al. (2010) study the Leontief preference domain and achieve
positive results. The main difference between their works is that Nicolò (2004) studies a
two-agent two-good economy with generalized Leontief preferences and gives a character-
ization, while Ghodsi et al. (2010) study a many-agent many-good economy with standard
Leontief preferences and give several one-sided results. In this paper, we consider gener-
alized Leontief preferences and get very positive characterization results for many-agent
many-good economy, without weakening any axioms. We would also like to mention that
there is a large part of literature studying allocation rules for economies with public goods,
such as Hurwicz and Walker (1990), Schummer (1999), Serizawa (1999) and Moreno and
Moscoso (2011).
3A rule is inverse-dictatorial if there exists some agent who always gets nothing. In a two-agent economy,
it is equivalent to a dicatorial rule.
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1.2 The Model
Throughout this paper, for all x, y ∈ Rm where m ∈ N, x ≥ y means that xk ≥ yk, ∀k =
1, ...,m; x > y means that xk > yk, ∀k = 1, ...,m. The latter will be the order that we refer to
when we consider totally ordered sets in Rm. Let Rm+ = {x ∈ Rm|x ≥ 0}, R˚m+ = {x ∈ Rm|x >
0}, and ∂Rm+ = Rm+\R˚m+ . For any subsets S 1 and S 2 ofRm+ , S 1+S 2 = {s1+s2|s1 ∈ S 1, s2 ∈ S 2},
and similarly S 1 − S 2 = {s1 − s2|s1 ∈ S 1, s2 ∈ S 2}.
Fix the set of perfectly divisible goods L = {1, ..., l}, l ∈ N. Let Rl+ be the commodity
space. Up to Section 3, every agent is assumed to have a standard Leontief preference on
Rl+, which can be represented by a utility function u(x) = mink∈L
{ xk
λk
}, ∀x ∈ Rl+, where xk
denotes the amount of the k-th good, λk > 0, ∀k ∈ L, and ∑
k∈L
λk = 1 for normalization. Let
U denote the set of all such utility functions4. We will generalize this preference domain
in Section 4.
Definition 1. Let u ∈ U with u(x) = min
k∈L
{ xk
λk
} be given. We call γ = {(λ1t, ..., λlt) ∈ Rl+|t ∈
R+} the critical set of the preference u.
A critical set of a preference u ∈ U consists of all the minimum commodity bundles
required to achieve given utility levels. It is a ray starting from the origin, and thus a
connected, totally ordered and closed subset in Rl+. It is easy to see that γ is uniquely
defined for each u ∈ U. Hence, in the following, we will interchangeably use u and γ as
needed.
An economy E is a triple (N, uN , ω) where N ⊆ N is a nonempty finite set of agents,
uN = (ui)i∈N with ui ∈ U, ∀i ∈ N, is a preference profile, and ω ∈ Rl+ is the social
endowment of the economy. Up to Section 7, the resources are assumed to be collectively
4We normalize the utility functions so that our rules only care about the ordinal properties. However, it is
not necessary for our result. It can be easily shown that any rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness and
consistency only takes into account the ordinal properties.
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owned. In Section 8, we consider the case where every agent has a private endowment and
their endowments are put together to be divided. Let E denote the set of all economies.
Given (N, ω), the set of all feasible allocations is usually defined as A(N, ω) = {x ∈
R|N |×l+ | ∑
i∈N
xi ≤ ω}, where xi is the l dimensional bundle for agent i. We further require that
the bundle of each agent is in his critical set. The reason is that the Leontief preferences are
not strictly monotone, so society would like to keep the redundant goods in this economy
for alternative use, in the spirit of non-wastefulness. Note that our main result does not
hold when the allocations are allowed to be wasteful. A counter-example will be given at
the end of Section 3.
Formally, for any economy E = (N, uN , ω), we consider the restriction of A(N, ω) on the
critical sets, A∗(E) = A(N, ω) ∩∏
i∈N
γi where γi is the critical set of ui. LetA∗ = {A∗(E)|E ∈
E}.
Definition 2. An allocation rule (or rule for simplicity) is a mapping µ : E → A∗ with
µ(E) ∈ A∗(E), assigning to each economy a non-wasteful feasible allocation. For any
i ∈ N, µi(E) denotes the bundle allocated to agent i.
For notational simplicity, we write µ(uN) (or µ(ω)) to denote µ(N, uN , ω), when (N, ω)
(or (N, uN)) is fixed.
Our normative requirements on rules are all very familiar in the literature (see the
Introduction).
(I) Efficiency
Efficiency naturally requires that a rule always assigns Pareto optimal allocations.
Given E = (N, uN , ω), an allocation x ∈ A(N, ω) is efficient if there exists no y ∈ A(N, ω)
such that ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N, and u j(y j) > u j(x j) for some j ∈ N. A rule µ is efficient
(EFFN) if µ(E) is efficient for every E ∈ E.
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Lemma 1. Given E = (N, uN , ω), an allocation x ∈ A∗(E) is efficient if and only if ∑
i∈N
xki =
ωk for some k ∈ L, where xki denotes the amount of good k given to agent i.
Proof. For sufficiency, suppose the contrary that there exists y ∈ A(N, ω) such that ui(yi) ≥
ui(xi) for all i ∈ N, and u j(y j) > u j(x j) for some j ∈ N. Then yi ≥ xi for all i ∈ N and y j > x j
for some j ∈ N, since xi ∈ γi, ∀i ∈ N. Hence, ∑
i∈N
yi >
∑
i∈N
xi, and thus
∑
i∈N
yki >
∑
i∈N
xki = ω
k,
which contradicts feasibility. For necessity, suppose the contrary that
∑
i∈N
xi < ω. Then
consider the allocation y ∈ A(N, ω) such that yi = xi, ∀i ∈ N\{ j}, and y j = x j+ω−∑
i∈N
xi > x j.
Clearly, it implies that x is not efficient, which is a contradiction.
(II) Incentive compatibility
We require the familiar strategy-proofness and its strengthening as group strategy-
proofness.
Let US = U |S |, ∀S ⊆ N, and UN is the set of all preference profiles. For any S ⊆ N,
we denote by (u′S , u−S ) the vector uN ∈ UN with ui replaced by u′i , ∀i ∈ S . If S = {i}, we
simply write (u′i , u−i).
A rule µ is strategy-proof (SP) if ∀(N, uN , ω), ∀i ∈ N, ∀u′i ∈ U, ui(µi(uN)) ≥
ui(µi(u′i , u−i)).
A rule µ is group strategy-proof (GSP) if ∀(N, uN , ω), there does not exist S ⊆ N and
u′S ∈ US such that ui(µi(uN)) ≤ ui(µi(u′S , u−S )), ∀i ∈ S , and at least one inequality is strict.
(III) Fairness
There are four classic fairness axioms: anonymity, envy-freeness, resource monotonic-
ity and population monotonicity. Envy-freeness and resource monotonicity are known to
be very demanding and usually incompatible.
Let pi be a bijection on N. A rule µ is anonymous (ANON) if ∀pi, ∀(N, uN , ω), ∀i ∈ N,
µi(N, uN , ω) = µpi(i)(pi(N), (upi( j))pi(N), ω) where upi( j) = u j, ∀ j ∈ N.
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Remark 1. If µ is ANON, then for any (N, uN , ω) such that ui = u j, i, j ∈ N, µi(N, uN , ω) =
µ j(N, uN , ω).
A rule µ is envy-free (EF) if ∀(N, uN , ω), ∀i, j ∈ N, ui(µi(N, uN , ω)) ≥ ui(µ j(N, uN , ω)).
A rule µ is resource monotonic (RM) if ∀(N, uN), ∀ω,ω′ ∈ Rl+, ω > ω′ implies that
ui(µi(ω)) > ui(µi(ω′)), ∀i ∈ N.
There is another version of resource monotonicity. It states that ∀(N, uN), ∀ω,ω′ ∈ Rl+,
ω ≥ ω′ implies that ui(µi(ω)) ≥ ui(µi(ω′)), ∀i ∈ N. In general, these two versions do not
imply each other. However, our rules below satisfy both of them, and the first one combined
with the other axioms implies the second by our characterization result.
A rule µ is population monotonic (PM) if ∀(N, uN , ω), ∀N′ ⊆ N and N′ , ∅, ∀i ∈ N′,
ui(µi(N′, uN′ , ω)) ≥ ui(µi(N, uN , ω)).
(IV) Consistency
Consistency has played an important role in the rationing literature and also in the fair
division problems of discrete goods.
A rule µ is consistent (CST) if ∀(N, uN , ω), ∀N′ ⊆ N and N′ , ∅, ∀i ∈ N′, µi(N, uN , ω) =
µi(N′, uN′ , ω − ∑
j∈N\N′
µi(N, uN , ω)).
Note that to check consistency, it is equivalent to check whether the corresponding
condition holds when |N′| = |N | − 1.
Remark 2. It is easy to see that if a rule is consistent and resource monotonic (no matter
which version of resource monotonicity is adopted), then it must be population monotonic.
In the following, if a rule is CST and RM, we will just keep in mind that it is also PM
without even mentioning in the theorems.
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1.3 Generalized Egalitarian Rules
Let f : D → Rn where D ⊆ Rm and m, n ∈ N be an arbitrary function. We say f is strictly
increasing if ∀x, y ∈ Rm, x > y implies that f (x) > f (y).
Suppose that W : R˚l+∪{0} → R+ is a strictly increasing and continuous function. Given
an economy E = (N, uN , ω), let AW(E) = {x ∈ A∗(E)|W(xi) = W(x j),∀i, j ∈ N}.
Lemma 2. AW(E) is a totally ordered and closed set in R|N|×l. In particular, max AW(E)
exists.
Proof. To show that AW(E) is totally ordered, let x, y ∈ AW(E) such that x , y be given.
Suppose without loss of generality (WLOG) that x j < y j for some j ∈ N. By the definition
of AW(E) and the properties of W, we know that ∀i ∈ N, xi, yi ∈ γi, and W(xi) = W(x j) <
W(y j) = W(yi). Since the γi’s are totally ordered sets and W is strictly increasing, then
xi < yi, ∀i ∈ N, and thus x < y.
To see that max AW(E) exists, note that A∗(E) is closed and W is continuous. Moreover,
AW(E) is nonempty and bounded. Thus, max AW(E) exists.
Lemma 2 guarantees that the following rule is well-defined.
Definition 3. A rule µ is called a generalized egalitarian rule, if there is a strictly increas-
ing continuous function W : R˚l+ ∪ {0} → R+ such that for all E ∈ E, µ(E) = max AW(E).
LetM denote the class of generalized egalitarian rules. We write µW when we want to
indicate that µ is generated by W.
We give two interpretations of our rules. One is in terms of a benchmark preference on
the commodity space. The other is related to “equal opportunity allocations”.
First, suppose that society has a benchmark preference over the commodity space
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which is represented by W.5 Then µW assigns to each agent the same welfare level
according to this benchmark preference of society. We use two examples to explain.
Example 1 : Equalizing total wealth.
Fix a price vector p ∈ R˚l+. Let W(x) = p·x, ∀x ∈ R˚l+∪{0}. In this case, society wants the
agents to get the same total wealth. The indifference classes of the benchmark preference
are just the budget lines. See Figure 1 for an illustration in a two-good economy.
Figure 1.1 : Equalizing total wealth
Example 2 : Egalitarian − equivalent (EE) rules.
The spirit of the classic EE rule is that every agent should get “equal” share of the
social endowment. The difficulty is to find a way of measuring these shares in a world
of ordinal preferences (Moulin, 1995). Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) were the first to
propose a solution. It assigns an allocation at which the agents are indifferent between their
bundles and the same fraction of the social endowment. In our context, that is, µ(E) =
max{x ∈ A∗(E)|ui(xi) = ui(tω),∀i ∈ N, t ∈ R+}. However, the classic EE rule is not resource
monotonic. Then the e-EE rule is proposed to overcome this drawback. The e-EE rule fixes
5The value of W on ∂Rl+\{0} is irrelevant, since A∗(E) ∩ ∂Rl+ = {0}. More rigorously, W represents a
benchmark preference on the interior and the origin of the commpodity space.
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an arbitrary reference bundle e ∈ R˚l+, and gives the agents the shares between which and te
they feel indifferent, where t is taken as high as possible. Even more generally, fix a strictly
increasing continuous function ϕ : R+ → Rl+ such that limt→∞ϕk(t) = ∞,∀k ∈ L, and ϕ(0) = 0.
We can define the ϕ-EE rule by µ(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|ui(xi) = ui(ϕ(t)),∀i ∈ N, t ∈ R+}.
The ϕ-EE rule makes all agents indifferent between their shares and the same commodity
bundle on the reference curve, i.e., ϕ(t∗) for some t∗ ∈ R+. Hence, these shares are “equal”
as viewed by society. Note that the e-EE rule is the ϕ-EE rule with ϕ(t) = te.
We check that on the domain of Leontief preferences, the ϕ-EE rule is a special case
of the generalized egalitarian rules. Note that when ω is fixed, the classic EE rule with
ϕ(t) = tω is also a special case.
Lemma 3. Let µ be a ϕ-EE rule. Define for all y ∈ R˚l+ ∪ {0}, W(y) = t if and only if
y ∈ {ϕ(t)} − ∂Rl+. Then µ = µW .
Proof. First, since ϕ is continuous and strictly increasing, W is well-defined, and moreover,
continuous and strictly increasing.
Next, fix E = (N, uN , ω). Observe that ∀x ∈ A∗(E) and ∀i ∈ N, W(xi) = t if and only if
xi ∈ {ϕ(t)} − ∂Rl+, which is equivalent to ui(xi) = ui(ϕ(t)) since xi ∈ γi. Hence, µ = µW by
the definitions.
Figure 2 shows in a two-commodity space the indifference classes of the benchmark
preference W which is defined from ϕ.
The second interpretation relates to “equal opportunity allocations” proposed by Thom-
son (1994). Such an allocation is obtained by having each agent choose by himself in a
common choice set. In this way, it gives the agents equal opportunities. We reformulate the
definition in our context.
Let C be a family of choice sets, where each C ∈ C is a nonempty subset of Rl+.
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Figure 1.2 : ϕ-EE rules
Definition 4. (Thomson, 1994) Given an economy E = (N, uN , ω), a feasible allocation x
is an equal opportunity allocation relative to the family C if there exists C ∈ C such that
∀i ∈ N, xi ∈ arg max
y∈C
ui(y).
Lemma 4. Let µW be given. Suppose C(t) = {y ∈ R˚l+ ∪ {0}|W(y) ≤ t}
where t ∈ R+. Let C = {C(t)|t ∈ R+}. Then µW(E) = max{x ∈
A∗(E)|x is an equal opportunity allocation relative to C} for all E ∈ E.
Proof. Let E be given. We only need to show that if x ∈ A∗(E), then W(xi) = W(x j),∀i, j ∈
N is equivalent to that x is an equal opportunity allocation relative to the family C. If
W(xi) = W(x j),∀i, j ∈ N, then let t = W(xi), and thus xi is the optimal bundle in C(t) for
all i since both ui and W are strictly increasing. Conversely, suppose that xi is the optimal
bundle in C(t) for all i. If WLOG there exist x1 and x2, such that W(x1) > W(x2), then
we must have t ≥ W(x1) > W(x2). Thus there must exist x′2 ∈ γ2 such that x′2 > x2 and
W(x′2) < t. It contradicts that x2 is the optimal bundle in C(t).
Hence, a generalized egalitarian rule always picks the Pareto optimal equal opportunity
allocation relative to the family of nested choice sets generated by W. In example 1, C is
the class of all budget sets with a fixed price. In example 2, C is the class of box-shaped
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sets C with C = {y|y ≤ ϕ(λ)}.
Our first main result is a characterization of generalized egalitarian rules.
Theorem 1. (i) If a rule µ is inM, then it is efficient, resource monotonic, consistent, group
strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free.
(ii) Let a rule µ be efficient, resource monotonic and consistent. If µ is either strategy-
proof and anonymous, or envy-free, then µ ∈ M.
In fact, Theorem 1 also holds for a much larger preference domain which is the object
of the next section.
The requirement of non-wasteful allocation is very important for Theorem 1. Consider
a natural extension of our rules to those which divide up every good. That is, first apply a
generalized egalitarian rule µW and then allocate the remaining goods equally among the
agents. More precisely, this extended rule µ¯ assigns for all E = (N, µN , ω) and for all i ∈ N,
µ¯i(E) = µWi (E) +
1
|N| (ω −
∑
i∈N
µWi (E)). We show that µ¯ is not SP by a counter-example. For
simplicity suppose that W = p · x where p > 0. Let E = ({1, 2}, (u1, u2), ω) where (i) ω ∈ R2+
and ω2 is large enough so that good 2 is always available in the following discussion; (ii)
the slope of the critical set of u1 is greater than that of u2. Let u′1 be such that the slope of
its critical set is in between those of u1 and u2. See Figure 3 for an illustration. Let E′ be
E with u1 replaced by u′1. Suppose that µ
W(E) = (x1, x2), µW(E′) = (y1, y2), µ¯(E) = (x¯1, x¯2)
and µ¯(E′) = (y¯1, y¯2). Since ω2 is large enough, then it is always good 1 that is divided up.
We check that y11 > x
1
1. If y
1
1 ≤ x11, then W(y2) = W(y1) < W(x1) = W(x2). Hence, y2 < x2,
and thus y11 + y
1
2 < x
1
1 + x
1
2 = ω1, which violates the efficiency of µ
W . Once again let ω2 be
large enough such that y¯21 = y
2
1 +
1
2 (ω2 − y21 − y22) > x21. Then after dividing the remaining
good 2, y¯1 > x1, and thus u1(y¯1) > u1(x1) = u1(x¯1). This example can be easily extended to
economies with more goods.
Hence, if one wants a rule to allocate all the goods and be EFFN and SP, then one
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Figure 1.3 : A counter-example for wasteful allocation
must carefully design the way that the useless goods are divided. Nicolò (2004) provides
such a rule in a two-agent two-good economy. However, there is no result yet in a general
economy.
Remark 3. In the characterization of Nicolò (2004), he introduces an incentive compatibil-
ity axiom stronger than strategy-proofness — fully implementability in truthful strategies.
It requires that a rule is strategy-proof and moreover when a misreport of an agent does
not change his own utility, the whole allocation is unaffected. Our rules satisfy this axiom
if and only if ∀x, y ∈ R˚l+ ∪ {0}, x ≥ y and x , y imply that W(x) > W(y).
1.4 Generalized Leontief Preferences
All the proofs of the results in this section are in the Appendix.
Let % be a complete and transitive binary relation on Rl+,  and ∼ be the corresponding
strict and indifferent relations. For all x ∈ Rl+, denote by U % (x) = {y ∈ Rl+|y % x} the upper
contour set of x, and I % (x) = {y ∈ Rl+|y ∼ x} its indifference class.
Definition 5. The set of generalized Leontief preferences is defined byD = { % on Rl+| %
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is continuous and locally non-satiated, and ∀x ∈ Rl+,U % (x) = {a} + Rl+ for some a ∈ Rl+}.
Lemma 5. If % ∈ D, then
(i) % is monotone, i.e., ∀x, y ∈ Rl+, x > y implies that x  y;
(ii) for any x ∈ Rl+, U % (x) = {a} + Rl+ implies that I % (x) = {a} + ∂Rl+.
Definition 6. For any % ∈ D, define γ % = {a ∈ Rl+ : U % (x) = {a} + Rl+ for some x ∈ Rl+}
to be the critical set of the preference % .
Clearly, Definition 6 generalizes Definition 1 on the domain of generalized Leontief
preferences.
Lemma 6. For any % ∈ D,
(i) 0 ∈ γ % , and γ % is unbounded;
(ii) if a, b ∈ γ % and a , b, then either a < b or a > b, i.e., γ % is totally ordered;
(iii) γ % is connected;
(iv) γ % is closed.
Figure 4 shows the typical upper contour set, the indifference class and the critical set
of a generalized Leontief preference in a two-good economy.
Figure 1.4 : A generalized Leontief preference in a two-good economy
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Proposition 1. For any % ∈ D, % is represented by u(x) = max{t ∈ R+|x ≥ ζ(t)},
∀x ∈ Rl+, where ζ : R+ → γ % is a strictly increasing homeomorphism such that
∑
k∈L
ζk(t) =
t, ∀t ∈ R+.
For any x ∈ γ % , x = ζ(t) for some t, and thus u(x) = t = ∑
k∈L
xk. Hence, u restricted on
γ % is a strictly increasing continuous function.
Let U˜ be the set of all utility functions representing generalized Leontief prefer-
ences in the way specified in Proposition 1. Note that U˜ is a generalization of U,
since for any standard Leontief preference represented by u ∈ U with u(x) = min
k∈L
{ xk
λk
},
ζ(t) = (λ1t, ..., λlt), ∀t ∈ R+, and thus u(x) = max{t ∈ R+|x ≥ ζ(t)}, ∀x ∈ Rl+, as well.
It is easy to see that under the larger preference domain U˜, all the previous notions such
as economy, rule and generalized egalitarian rule are still well-defined. Moreover, as we
mentioned before, Theorem 1 still holds whenU is replaced by U˜.
Let M˜ denote the class of generalized egalitarian rules under the domain U˜. For sim-
plicity, we will still use notations such as E, A∗(E) and µ to denote the corresponding
notions under the generalized preference domain.
Theorem 2. (i) If a rule µ is in M˜, then it is efficient, resource monotonic, consistent, group
strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free.
(ii) Let a rule µ be efficient, resource monotonic and consistent. If µ is either strategy-
proof and anonymous, or envy-free, then µ ∈ M˜.
1.5 The Proofs
Generally speaking, the structure of our problem has some resemblance to the “fixed path”
methods in the rationing literature, such as the parametric method in Young (1987), and
the fixed path rationing method in Moulin (1999). The essential idea of the proof is to
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investigate how the given axioms impact the range of the rules. We find that the range can
be identified with some features which enable us to construct a benchmark preference.
Here we prove Theorem 2. In fact, the result of every step in the following is
true under both preference domains. The proofs under U just involve less cases to
check. For the simplicity of presentation, we assume that a rule assigns to every
agent an unbounded bundle when the endowment increases, i.e., ∀(N, uN), ∀i ∈ N,
µi(N, uN ,Rl+)= {xi ∈ Rl+|µi(N, uN , ω) = xi for some ω ∈ Rl+} is an unbounded subset in Rl+.
This assumption is not necessary. The relaxation of it will be discussed in the Appendix.
Step 1. If µ is EFFN and RM, then
(i) ∀(N, uN), ∀x, x′ ∈ µ(N, uN ,Rl+) such that x , x′, either xi < x′i , ∀i ∈ N, or xi > x′i ,
∀i ∈ N;
(ii) ∀(N, uN), ∀i ∈ N, µi(N, uN ,Rl+) = γi.
Proof. Let (N, uN) be given. Suppose WLOG that N = {1, ..., n}.
(i) Assume that µ(ω) = x, µ(ω′) = x′, ω,ω′ ∈ Rl+, and x , x′.
First observe that if x j < x′j for some j ∈ N, then xi ≤ x′i for all i ∈ N. Suppose
the contrary WLOG that x1 < x′1 and x2 > x
′
2. Then
∑
i∈N
min{xi, x′i} <
∑
i∈N
xi ≤ ω, and∑
i∈N
min{xi, x′i} <
∑
i∈N
x′i ≤ ω′. Since µ is RM, then µi(
∑
i∈N
min{xi, x′i}) < min{xi, x′i}, ∀i ∈ N,
which violates the efficiency of µ.
Next note that if y ∈ µ(Rl+), then µ(
∑
i∈N
yi) = y. Suppose the contrary WLOG that
µ(
∑
i∈N
yi) = y′ and y1 < y′1. By our previous result, yi ≤ y′i , ∀i ∈ N. Thus
∑
i∈N
y′i >
∑
i∈N
yi, which
violates feasibility.
Hence, we can take ω =
∑
i∈N
xi and ω′ =
∑
i∈N
x′i . Suppose WLOG that x1 , x
′
1. If x1 < x
′
1,
then we know that xi ≤ x′i , ∀i ∈ N. Thus, ω < ω′. Since µ is RM, then xi < x′i , ∀i ∈ N.
Similarly, if x1 > x′1, then xi > x
′
i , ∀i ∈ N.
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(ii) Suppose the contrary WLOG that a ∈ γ1 \ µ1(Rl+). Since 0 ∈ µ1(Rl+) and µ1(Rl+) is
unbounded, then ν = {x ∈ µ(Rl+)|x1 < a} and ν¯ = {x ∈ µ(Rl+)|x1 > a} are nonempty. Let
ω = sup{∑
i∈N
xi|x ∈ ν} 6 and ω¯ = inf{∑
i∈N
xi|x ∈ ν¯}. By (i), ν ∪ ν¯ = µ(Rl+) is totally ordered,
so ω and ω¯ are well-defined, and ω ≤ ω¯. If ω < ω¯, then pick ω such that ω < ω < ω¯. By
the choice of ω, µ(ω) < ν ∪ ν¯, which is a contradiction. If ω = ω¯, let y = sup ν = inf ν¯, and
then y1 = a. Let (y′i)i∈N = µ(
∑
i∈N
yi). By assumption y′1 , y1. If y1 < y
′
1, then y
′ ∈ ν¯ and thus
y′i ≥ yi, ∀i ∈ N. Hence,
∑
i∈N
y′i >
∑
i∈N
yi, which violates the feasibility. If y1 > y′1, then by a
similar argument the efficiency is violated.
Step 2. If µ ∈ M˜ is EFFN, RM and CST, then
(i) ∀(N, uN), ∀N′ ⊆ N, (xi)i∈N ∈ µ(N, uN ,Rl+) implies that (xi)i∈N′ ∈ µ(N′, uN′ ,Rl+);
(ii) ∀(N1, uN1) and (N2, uN2) such that N1 ∩ N2 = ∅, ∀(xi)i∈N1 ∈ µ(N1, uN1 ,Rl+) and (xi)i∈N2 ∈
µ(N2, uN2 ,R
l
+), if for some i1 ∈ N1 and i2 ∈ N2, (xi1 , xi2) ∈ µ({i1, i2}, (ui1 , ui2),Rl+), then
(xi)i∈N ∈ µ(N, uN ,Rl+) where N = N1 ∪ N2 and uN = (uN1 , uN2).
Proof. Obviously, (i) follows from Step 1 (i) and the definition of consistency.
For (ii), suppose the contrary that under the required condition, (xi)i∈N < µ(N, uN ,Rl+).
Then assume that µ(N, uN ,
∑
i∈N
xi) = (x′i)i∈N , (xi)i∈N . Thus, there must exist some j ∈ N such
that x′j < x j. Suppose WLOG that j ∈ N1. By (i), we know that (x′i)i∈N1 ∈ µ(N1, uN1 ,Rl+),
(x′i1 , x
′
i2) ∈ µ({i1, i2}, (ui1 , ui2),Rl+), and (x′i)i∈N2 ∈ µ(N2, uN2 ,Rl+). From our assumption and
Step 1, we have that x′i < xi, ∀i ∈ N1, and thus x′i2 < xi2 , and finally x′i < xi, ∀i ∈ N2. Hence,∑
i∈N
x′i <
∑
i∈N
xi, which violates that µ is EFFN.
Remark 4. It can also be shown that if µ is EFFN and RM, then both (i) and (ii) of Step 2
are sufficient conditions for µ to be CST.
6For all A ⊆ Rm, m ∈ N, (sup A)k = sup{ak : a ∈ A}, k = 1, ...,m; inf A is similarly defined.
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Step 3. Suppose that µ is EFFN, RM and CST. Then µ is SP if and only if ∀(N, uN) such
that |N| = 2, ∀i ∈ N, ∀u′i ∈ U˜, if (xi, x−i) ∈ µ(N, uN ,Rl+) and (x′i , x−i) ∈ µ(N, u′N ,Rl+) where
u′N = (u
′
i , u−i), then xi ≮ x
′
i .
Proof. For necessity, suppose the contrary WLOG that N = {1, 2}, and under the required
condition, x1 < x′1. Since γ
′
1 is connected, we can find y
′
1 ∈ γ′1 such that y′1 ∈ {x1} + ∂Rl+.
See Figure 5 for an illustration in a two-good economy.
Figure 1.5 : Necessity for Step 3 (strategy-proofness)
Let ω = y′1 + x2. By Step 1 (i), µ(N, uN , ω) = (x1, x2). We assume that µ(N, u
′
N , ω) =
(y1, y2). Since (x′1, x2) ∈ µ(N, u′N ,Rl+) and x′1 + x2 > x1 + x2, then y1 < x′1 and y2 < x2.
Thus by efficiency, y1 > y′1 ≥ x1. This means that in the economy (N, uN , ω), agent 1 has
incentive to misreport his preference, which violates that µ is SP.
For sufficiency, given the required assumption, we want to show that µ is SP. WLOG
let (N, uN , ω) where N = {1, ..., n}, and u′1 ∈ U˜ be given. Let µ(N, uN , ω) = (xi)i∈N , and
µ(N, u′N , ω) = (x
′
i)i∈N where u
′
N = (u
′
1, u−1). See Figure 6.
We can find y1 ∈ γ′1 such that (y1, x2) ∈ µ({1, 2}, (u′1, u2),Rl+). By consistency,
(x1, x2) ∈ µ({1, 2}, (u1, u2),Rl+). By the required assumption, x1 ≮ y1. Hence, if x′1 ≤ y1,
then x1 ≮ x′1. Consider the other case that x
′
1 > y1. By consistency, (x2, ..., xn) ∈
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Figure 1.6 : Sufficiency for Step 3 (strategy-proofness)
µ(N \{1}, uN\{1},Rl+). From Step 2, consider (N1, uN1) = ({1}, u′1), (N2, uN2) = (N \{1}, uN\{1}),
and thus (y1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ µ(N, u′N ,Rl+). Hence, x′i > xi, ∀i = 2, ..., n. If x′1 > x1, then
ω ≥ ∑
i∈N
x′i >
∑
i∈N
xi, which violates the efficiency. Hence, x1 ≮ x′1 and agent 1 has no
incentive to misreport his preference.
Step 4. A rule µ ∈ M˜ if and only if µ is EFFN, RM, CST, SP and ANON.
Proof. For necessity, let µ ∈ M˜ and (N, uN , ω) be given. To check efficiency, by Lemma
1, we only need to check that some commodity is divided up. Suppose the contrary that
µ(N, uN , ω) = x and
∑
i∈N
xi < ω. We can find for each i ∈ N x′i ∈ γi such that x′i > xi and∑
i∈N
x′i ≤ ω, since γi’s are connected. Pick t ∈ R+ such that W(xi) < t < W(x′i), ∀i ∈ N. Since
W is continuous and γi’s are connected, then W(γi)’s are connected. Thus for each i ∈ N
there exists yi ∈ γi such that W(yi) = t. Clearly, ∑
i∈N
yi <
∑
i∈N
x′i ≤ ω, which contradicts that
µ(N, uN , ω) = x by the definition of µ.
To verify that µ is RM, fix ω′ such that ω′ > ω. Then use the similar argument as above,
we can show that the bundle allocated to every agent is strictly increased.
Consistency follows from the definition of µ, the efficiency of µ, and the assumption
that W is strictly increasing.
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Strategy-proofness follows from Step 3 and strict increasingness of W.
Lastly, anonymity is simply because µ does not depend on agents’ names, but their
preferences.
For sufficiency, suppose that µ is EFFN, RM, CST, SP and ANON. Fix u¯ ∈ U˜. Define
W : R˚l+ ∪ {0} → R+ as follows. For any x ∈ R˚l+ ∪ {0}, choose ux ∈ U˜ such that its
critical set γx contains x. Choose N = {1, 2}, u1 = u¯, and u2 = ux. From Step 1, we
know that there uniquely exists x¯ ∈ γ¯ such that (x¯, x) ∈ µ(N, uN ,Rl+). Define W(x) = u¯(x¯).
The choice of ux does not matter, since for any other u′x ∈ U˜ such that x ∈ γ′x and the
corresponding x¯′ , x¯, WLOG say x¯′ < x¯, then there must be an x′ ∈ γx such that x′ < x
and (x¯′, x′) ∈ µ(N, (u¯, ux),Rl+), which contradicts that µ is SP by Step 3. See Figure 7 for an
illustration in a two-good economy. Hence, W is well-defined. Note that for any x ∈ γ¯, we
can pick ux = u¯. Since µ is ANON, then µi(N, uN , 2x) = x, i = 1, 2, and thus W(x) = u¯(x)
for all x ∈ γ¯.
Figure 1.7 : Independence of the choice of ux
To check that W is strictly increasing, let x, y ∈ Rl+ such that x < y. We can find
u ∈ U˜ whose critical set contains both x and y. Find x¯, y¯ ∈ γ¯ such that (x, x¯), (y, y¯) ∈
µ({1, 2}, (u¯, u),Rl+). Clearly, x¯ < y¯, and thus W(x) = u¯(x¯) < u¯(y¯) = W(y).
To verify that W is continuous, we only need to check that W−1((t,∞)) and W−1([0, s))
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are open sets in R˚l+ ∪ {0} when t ≥ 0 and s > 0. Let t ≥ 0 and x ∈ W−1((t,∞)) be given. Let
ux and x¯ be correspondingly given. By Proposition 1, we can find x¯t ∈ γ¯ such that u¯(x¯t) = t.
By Step 1 (ii), there exists xt ∈ γx such that W(xt) = t. See Figure 8. Since x ∈ γx and
W(x) > t, then x > xt. Thus there exists  > 0 such that B(x) = {y ∈ Rl+| ||y − x|| < } ⊆
{xt}+ R˚l+. For all y ∈ B(x), y > xt, and thus W(y) > W(xt) = t. Hence, B(x) ⊆ W−1((t,∞)),
which implies that W−1((t,∞)) is open. Similarly, we have that W−1([0, s)) is open for all
s > 0.
Figure 1.8 : The continuity of W
Finally, we check that ∀E = (N, uN , ω), µ(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|W(xi) = W(x j), ∀i, j ∈
N}. Suppose that µ(E) = (x∗i )i∈N . Fix i, j ∈ N, and i , j. Assume WLOG that
1 < N. By the construction of W and the anonymity of µ, there exists x¯ such that
(x¯, x∗i ) ∈ µ({1, i}, (u¯, ui),Rl+). Since µ is CST, (x∗i , x∗j) ∈ µ({i, j}, (ui, u j),Rl+). Using Step
2 (ii), consider N1 = {1}, N2 = {i, j}, we get that (x¯, x∗i , x∗j) ∈ µ({1, i, j}, (u¯, ui, u j),Rl+). By
the consistency of µ, (x¯, x∗j) ∈ µ({1, j}, (u¯, u j),Rl+). Since µ is ANON, W(x∗i ) = W(x∗j).
Since µ is EFFN, (x∗i )i∈N = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|W(xi) = W(x j), ∀i, j ∈ N}.
Step 5. If µ is in M˜, then µ is GSP.
Proof. Let (N, uN , ω), S ⊆ N, and u′N = (u′S , u−S ) where u′S ∈ U˜S be given. Assume that
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µ(N, uN , ω) = x and µ(N, u′N , ω) = x
′. Suppose the contrary that ∀i ∈ S , ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi), and
∃ j ∈ S such that u j(x′j) > u j(x j). Hence, ∀i ∈ S , x′i ≥ xi and x′j > x j. Thus W(x′j) > W(x j),
which by the definition of µ implies that ∀i ∈ N \ S , x′i > xi. Therefore,
∑
i∈N
xi <
∑
i∈N
x′i ≤ ω,
which contradicts the efficiency of µ.
Step 6. A rule µ is in M˜ if and only if µ is EFFN, RM, CST and EF.
Proof. For necessity, let µ ∈ M˜ be given. We only need to check that µ is EF. This simply
follows from the definition of µ and the assumption that W is strictly increasing.
For sufficiency, suppose that µ is EFFN, RM, CST and EF. First we show that µ is
ANON. Let a bijection pi on N, and an economy E = (N, uN , ω) be given. Let E′ =
(pi(N), (upi(i))pi(N), ω) where ui = upi(i), ∀i ∈ N. Assume that µ(E) = x and µ(E′) = x′.
Suppose the contrary WLOG that 1, 2 ∈ N and x1 < x′pi(1) and x2 > x′pi(2). We can find x′1 ∈ γ1
such that (x′1, x
′
pi(2)) ∈ µ({1, 2}, (u1, u2),Rl+). Note that x′1 < x1 < x′pi(1) since x′pi(2) < x2. See
Figure 9.
Figure 1.9 : The anonymity of µ
Suppose that {1, 2} ∩ {pi(1), pi(2)} = ∅. Since µ is EFFN and EF, then
µ({2, pi(2)}, (u2, u2), 2x′pi(2)) = (x′pi(2), x′pi(2)). Thus by Step 2 (ii), (x′1, x′pi(2), x′pi(2), x′pi(1)) ∈
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µ({1, 2, pi(2), pi(1)}, (u1, u2, u2, u1),Rl+), and agent 1 will envy agent pi(1) which is a contra-
diction. If {1, 2}∩{pi(1), pi(2)} , ∅, then pick i1, i2 ∈ N such that {1, 2, pi(1), pi(2)}∩{i1, i2} = ∅.
From the above result, we know that (x′pi(1), x
′
pi(2)) ∈ µ({i1, i2}, (u1, u2),Rl+). Applying the
same argument to the agents 1, 2, i1, i2 with the preferences u1, u2, u1, u2 respectively, we
again will get a contradiction.
Now we only need to show that µ is SP. By Step 3, suppose WLOG that
µ({1, 2}, (u1, u2), ω) = (x1, x2) and µ({1, 2}, (u′1, u2), ω′) = (x′1, x2), and we want to check
whether x1 ≮ x′1. Let u3 = u
′
1. Since µ is ANON, then µ({3, 2}, (u3, u2), ω) = (x′1, x2). Since
µ is CST, then by Step 2 µ({1, 2, 3}, (u1, u2, u3), ω′′) = (x1, x2, x′1) for some ω′′ ∈ Rl+. Since
µ is EF, then u1(x1) ≥ u1(x′1), and thus x1 ≮ x′1.
1.6 Tightness of the Characterization
By Theorem 2, a rule is in M˜ if and only if one of the following equivalent conditions
holds:
(i) it is EFFN, RM, CST, ANON and SP;
(ii) it is EFFN, RM, CST, ANON and GSP;
(iii) it is EFFN, RM, CST and EF.
Our characterization is tight with respect to all these axioms when there are at least two
goods in the economy.7 The tightness result for Theorem 1 is the same.
Drop the efficiency, and consider the rule µ¯ such that for all E = (N, uN , ω), µ¯(E) =
max{x ∈ A∗(E)|W(xi) = t,∀i ∈ N; ∑
i∈N
xi ≤ ω − te} where W is as in Example 1, and e
is the unit vector in the commodity space. It can be checked that µ¯ is well-defined, and
is RM, CST, ANON, GSP and EF. The key fact used to verify these properties is that if
7It is easy to see that if there is only one good in the economy, then efficiency and either anonymity or
envy-freeness will suffice to characterize the rules tightly.
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W(µ¯i(E)) = t, ∀i ∈ N, then ∑
i∈N
µ¯ki (E) = ω
k− t for some k ∈ L. However, the allocation given
by this rule is never efficient when ω > 0.
Drop the resource monotonicity, and the following rule µ¯ is EFFN, CST, ANON, GSP
and EF. Here we define µ¯ in a two-good economy for simplicity, and it can be easily ex-
tended to the economies with more than two goods. Consider for each t ∈ R+, a param-
eterized indifference curve q(t) such that: q(t) = {x ∈ R2+|x1 + x2 = t} when t ∈ [0, 2];
q(t) = {x ∈ R2+|x1 + (t − 1)x2 = t, where x1 ≥ 1 or (t − 1)x1 + x2 = t, where x1 ≤ 1}
when t ∈ [2, 4], and q(t) = {x ∈ R2+|x1 + 3x2 = t, where x1 ≥ t4 or 3x1 + x2 = t, where
x1 ≤ t4 } when t ∈ [4,+∞). Let W : R2+ → R+ be a set-valued correspondence such that
W(x) = {t|x ∈ q(t)}. Notice that W(x) is always single-valued except for W(1, 1) = [2, 4].
For each E = (N, uN , ω), let µ¯(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|∏
i∈N
IW(xi)(t) , 0 for some t ∈ R} where
IW(xi)(t) = 1 when t ∈ W(xi), and IW(xi)(t) = 0 when t ∈ R\W(xi) for all i. It is a well-defined
rule, satisfies all the axioms except for resource monotonicity. For a counter-example, con-
sider a preference profile (u1, u2) such that γ2 contains x2 = (1, 1), as shown in Figure 10.
Let x1 ∈ γ1 ∩ q(2) and x′1 ∈ γ1 ∩ q(t) for some t ∈ (2, 4). Then µ¯(x1 + x2) = (x1, x2),
µ¯(x′1 + x2) = (x
′
1, x2). In this case, x1 + x2 < x
′
1 + x2 but agent 2 is not better off. Note that
this rule still satisfies the second version of resource monotonicity.
Figure 1.10 : Tightness of resource monotonicity
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Drop the consistency, and consider the rule µ¯ such that for all E = (N, uN , ω), µ¯(E) =
µW1(E) if |N| is even and µ¯(E) = µW2(E) if |N| is odd where W1 and W2 are as in Example 1
with different p’s. Obviously, µ¯ is EFFN, RM, ANON, GSP and EF, but not CST.
Drop the anonymity, and consider the rule µ¯ such that for all E = (N, uN , ω) with
1 < N, µ¯(E) = µW(E) where W is as in Example 1, and for all E = (N, uN , ω) with 1 ∈ N,
µ¯(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|2W(x1) = W(xi), ∀i ∈ N \ {1}}. It is a well-defined rule, and is
EFFN, RM, CST, GSP, but not ANON. We will prove this result for a general class of such
rules in the next section.
Drop the strategy-proofness (and thus the group strategy-proofness), and consider the
following rule µ¯ which is EFFN, ANON, RM and CST. Let u¯ ∈ U˜ be fixed. For all
E = (N, uN , ω), µ¯(E) = µW(E) if ∀i ∈ N, ui , u¯, and if S = { j ∈ N|u j = u¯} , ∅, µ¯(E) =
max{x ∈ A∗(E)|2W(x j) = W(xi), j ∈ S , i ∈ N \S } where W is as in Example 1. It is easy to
check that µ¯ is well-defined and satisfies the above axioms. Figure 11 illustrates that µ¯ is not
SP (and thus not GSP) in a two-commodity space. Consider a two-agent economy where
their utility profile is as given in Figure 11. Suppose that µ¯({1, 2}, (u1, u2), ω) = (x1, x2) for
some ω ∈ R2+. Then agent 1 prefers to report u′1 which is very “close" to u1. The point on γ′1
“moves" faster than on γ1, so after agent 1’s misreport, it must be that his allocated bundle
x′1 > x1.
Drop the envy-freeness, the above two rules also work as counter-examples. This is
because envy-freeness implies anonymity and strategy-proofness when a rule is EFFN,
RM and CST.
1.7 Agent-specific Egalitarian Rules
Now we consider a natural extension of M˜ to a class of non-anonymous rules. While gen-
eralized egalitarian rules equalize the agents’ final welfare levels according to a benchmark
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Figure 1.11 : Tightness of strategy-proofness
preference over the commodity space, society may measure the welfare of each agent dif-
ferently. It may attach to each agent i a utility function Wi and equalize the agents’ final
welfare according to these agent-specific utility functions.
Formally, for all i ∈ N, let Wi : R˚l+ ∪ {0} → R+ be a strictly increasing continuous
function such that Wi(0) = 0. LetWa = {Wi|i ∈ N} be a set of all agents’ welfare indices.
Definition 7. A rule µ is called an agent-specific egalitarian rule if there existsWa such
that for all E ∈ E,
µ(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|Wi(xi) = W j(x j), ∀i, j ∈ N}
where Wi ∈ Wa, ∀i ∈ N. LetMa denote the class of agent-specific egalitarian rules.
Using the similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 2, it is easy to see that the analo-
gous result holds, andMa is well-defined.
Theorem 3. If µ is in Ma, then µ is efficient, resource monotonic, consistent and group
strategy-proof.
Proof. The proof is almost the same as what we did for generalized egalitarian rules. Just
by replacing W(xi) with Wi(xi) in Step 4 and 5 of Section 5, we can get the desired results.
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1.8 Endowment-specific Egalitarian Rules and Private Property
Another extension of M˜ is natural when we drop the common property assumption. We
first introduce the model where every agent has a private endowment. For notational sim-
plicity, we will abuse the previous symbols again to denote the corresponding notions in
the model with private property.
An economy E is a triple (N, uN , ωN) where N ⊆ N is a nonempty finite set of agents,
uN = (ui)i∈N with ui ∈ U˜, ∀i ∈ N, is a preference profile, and ωN = (ωi)i∈N with ωi ∈ Rl+,
∀i ∈ N, denotes a vector of private endowments of the agents. Let E be the set of all
economies.
Given (N, ωN), the set of all feasible allocations is A(N, ωN) = {x ∈ R|N|×l+ | ∑
i∈N
xi ≤∑
i∈N
ωi}. For any economy E = (N, uN , ωN), the set of non-wasteful feasible allocations is
A∗(E) = A(N, ωN) ∩∏
i∈N
γi where γi is the critical set of ui. LetA∗ = {A∗(E)|E ∈ E}. A rule
is a mapping µ : E → A∗ such that µ(E) ∈ A∗(E) for all E ∈ E.
When the private property is introduced, an important problem is whether the agents
are willing to put their own endowments together and participate in the social reallocation.
Hence, here we need the individual rationality axiom to guarantee the voluntary participa-
tion.
A rule µ is individually rational (IR) if ∀(N, uN , ωN), ∀i ∈ N, ui(µi(N, uN , ∑
i∈N
ωi)) ≥
ui(ωi).
The efficiency, incentive compatibility and fairness axioms are defined in the same way
as the previous ones, except a little modification on anonymity and resource monotonicity.
Let pi be a bijection on N. A rule µ is anonymous if ∀pi, ∀(N, uN , ωN), ∀i ∈ N,
µi(N, uN , ωN) = µpi(i)(pi(N), (upi( j))pi(N), (ωpi( j))pi(N)) where u j = upi( j) and ω j = ωpi( j), ∀ j ∈ N.
A rule µ is resource monotonic if ∀(N, uN), ∀ωN , ω′N ∈ R|N|×l+ , ωi > ω′i for all i ∈ N
implies that ui(µi(ωN)) > ui(µi(ω′N)).
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Resource monotonicity is shown to be incompatible with efficiency and individual ra-
tionality in Moulin and Thomson (1988). Although they assume a larger preference domain
and use another version of resource monotonicity, it is easy to check that with a slight mod-
ification their counter-example still works in our context.
Our last result shows that when we allow the welfare index of an agent to depend on
his private endowment, we obtain a class of rules which is EFFN, GSP, ANON and IR.
For all x ∈ Rl+, let Wx : R˚l+ ∪ {0} → R+ be a strictly increasing and continuous function
such that for all y ∈ R˚l+ ∪ {0} with y ≤ x and yk = xk for some k ∈ L, Wx(y) = 1.8 Let
We = {Wx|x ∈ Rl+}.
Definition 8. A rule µ is called an endowment-specific egalitarian rule, if there existsWe
such that for all E ∈ E,
µ(E) = max{x ∈ A∗(E)|Wωi(xi) = Wω j(x j), ∀i, j ∈ N}
where Wωi ∈ We, ∀i ∈ N. Let Me denote the class of endowment-specific egalitarian
rules.
By the analogous result of Lemma 2,Me is well-defined.
Theorem 4. If a rule µ is inMe, then it is efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous and
individually rational.
Proof. The proof of efficiency, group strategy-proofness and anonymity is basically the
same as in Step 4 and 5 of Section 5.
To see that µ is IR, note that for all E = (N, uN , ωN), there exists the allocation x ∈ A∗(E)
such that ∀i ∈ N, ui(xi) = ui(ωi) and Wωi(xi) = 1. Hence, ∀i ∈ N, µi(E) ≥ xi and then
ui(µi(E)) ≥ ui(ωi).
8Essentially, what we need is that Wx(y) is some constant which is independent of x.
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1.9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study fair allocation rules on the generalized Leontief preference domain
and achieve very positive results. Nevertheless, there are still some immediate open ques-
tions. The characterization of the agent-specific and endowment-specific egalitarian rules
remains open. Another intriguing question is how we could drop the non-wastefulness
assumption of the rules and still get some positive results. We also observe that recently
de Castro et al. (2011) find nice properties of consumption allocation in asymmetric in-
formation economies under Maximin preferences, which has some structural resemblance
to Leontief preferences without uncertainty. We would like to investigate the relationship
between the two problems in the future.
1.10 Appendix
1. The proofs of the results in Section 3
Lemma 5. If % ∈ D, then
(i) % is monotone, i.e., ∀x, y ∈ Rl+, x > y implies that x  y;
(ii) for any x ∈ Rl+, U % (x) = {a} + Rl+ implies that I % (x) = {a} + ∂Rl+.
Proof. Let % ∈ D be given.
(i) Suppose that x, y ∈ Rl+ and x > y. Since % is locally non-satiated, we can find
y′ < x such that y′  y. Let U % (y′) = {a}+Rl+, a ∈ Rl+. Since y′ ∈ U % (y′) and x > y′, then
x ≥ a, and thus x ∈ U % (y′). Hence, x % y′  y.
(ii) Suppose that x ∈ Rl+ and U % (x) = {a} + Rl+. By (i), ∀y ∈ {a} + R˚l+, y  x. Now let
y ∈ {a} + ∂Rl+. Since % is continuous, if y  x, then there exists y′ < y such that y′  x,
which contradicts that U % (x) = {a} + Rl+. Hence, I % (x) = {a} + ∂Rl+.
Lemma 6. For any % ∈ D,
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(i) 0 ∈ γ % , and γ % is unbounded;
(ii) if a, b ∈ γ % and a , b, then either a < b or a > b, i.e., γ % is totally ordered;
(iii) γ % is connected;
(iv) γ % is closed.
Proof. Let % ∈ D be given.
(i) To see 0 ∈ γ % , it suffices to show that U % (0) = {0}+Rl+. Suppose the contrary that
U % (0) = {a} + Rl+ where a , 0. Then it implies that 0 < U % (0), a contradiction.
For unboundedness, suppose the contrary that there exists y ∈ Rl+ such that ∀a ∈
γ % , a < y. Suppose U % (y) = {b} + Rl+. Then b ∈ γ % and I % (y) = {b} + ∂Rl+. Thus b ≤ y
and yk = bk for some k ∈ {1, ..., l}, which is a contradiction.
(ii) Let a, b ∈ γ % and a , b. Suppose that U % (x) = {a} + Rl+ and U % (y) = {b} + Rl+,
x, y ∈ Rl+. It is not true that x ∼ y, otherwise a = b. By Lemma 5 (ii), a ∼ x and b ∼ y. If
x  y, then a  y and thus a ∈ {b}+ R˚l+, which means a > b. Similarly, if y  x, then a < b.
(iii) Define ρ : γ % → R+ such that ρ(x) = ∑
k∈L
xk, ∀x ∈ γ % . It suffices to show that ρ is
a homeomorphism.
The injectivity of ρ follows from (ii). We first prove that ρ is surjective. Suppose the
contrary that there exists t ∈ R+ \ ρ(γ % ). Then γ % = α ∪ β where α = {a ∈ γ % |ρ(a) < t}
and β = {b ∈ γ % |ρ(b) > t}. By (i) we know that ρ(0) = 0, and sup ρ(γ % ) = ∞. Hence,
α, β , ∅. Let a¯ = supα and b = inf β. Clearly, a¯, b ∈ Rl+ and a¯ ≤ b. If there exists
h ∈ L such that a¯h < bh, then pick x ∈ Rl+ such that a¯ < x and xh < bh. Suppose
I % (x) = {c} + ∂Rl+. Thus c ∈ β and x ≥ c, which contradicts that xh < bh. Hence, a¯ = b.
Then by (ii), I % (a¯) = {a¯} + ∂Rl+. Thus, either a¯ ∈ α or a¯ ∈ β. If a¯ ∈ α, then ρ(a¯) < t. We
can choose b ∈ β such that ρ(b) is arbitrarily close to ρ(a¯), and this contradicts that ρ(b) > t.
Similarly, if a¯ ∈ β, we can also get a contradiction.
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Next observe that for any x, y ∈ γ % , ||x − y|| ≤ |ρ(x) − ρ(y)| ≤ l||x − y|| 9, since either
x < y or x > y. Hence, ρ is a continuous open mapping.
(iv) Let {an}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in γ % such that limn→∞ an = a. If a < γ % , then
γ % = [γ % ∩ ({a}+Rl+)]∪ [γ % ∩ ({a} −Rl+)], since γ % is totally ordered and a is the limit
of a sequence of elements in γ % . This contradicts that γ % is connected.
Proposition 1. For any % ∈ D, % is represented by u(x) = max{t ∈ R+|x ≥ ζ(t)},
∀x ∈ Rl+, where ζ : R+ → γ % is a strictly increasing homeomorphism such that
∑
k∈L
ζk(t) =
t, ∀t ∈ R+.
Proof. Let % ∈ D be given. Suppose that ρ is defined as in the proof of Lemma 6 (iii).
Clearly, ρ is strictly increasing since γ % is totally ordered. Let ζ = ρ−1. Hence, all the
properties of ζ follows from those of ρ. Since ζ(R+) is unbounded and ζ is continuous, then
{t ∈ R+|x ≥ ζ(t)} is bounded and closed for any x ∈ Rl+, and thus u : Rl+ → R+ is well
defined.
Now we show that u represents % . If x ∼ y and I % (x) = {a} + ∂Rl+, then u(x) = u(y) =∑
k∈L
ak, since ζ is strictly increasing. If x  y, I % (x) = {a} + ∂Rl+ and I % (y) = {b} + ∂Rl+,
then by Lemma 6 (ii) and Lemma 5 (i), a > b. Thus u(x) =
∑
k∈L
ak >
∑
k∈L
bk = u(y).
2. The relaxation of the unbounded allocation assumption
There are several places in the steps of the proofs to be modified when we drop the
assumption that ∀(N, uN), ∀i ∈ N, µi(N, uN ,Rl+) is unbounded.
Step 1. (ii) Suppose that µ is EFFN and RM. If for (N, uN) and i ∈ N, µi(N, uN ,Rl+) is
bounded, then µi(N, uN ,Rl+) = {xi ∈ γi|xi < x∗i } for some x∗i ∈ γi, and moreover, there exists
j ∈ N such that µ j(N, uN ,Rl+) = γ j.
9|| · || is the standard Euclidean norm.
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Proof. Let (N, uN) and i ∈ N be given. Suppose that µi(Rl+) is bounded. Let x∗i = sup µ(Rl+).
Since γi is closed, then x∗i ∈ γi. Note that if xi ∈ µi(Rl+), then xi +  ∈ µi(Rl+) for some  > 0,
since µ is RM. Hence, x∗i < µi(R
l
+). Then using the similar argument as in the proof of Step
1, we get that ∀xi ∈ γi such that xi < x∗i , xi ∈ µi(Rl+). If ∀i ∈ N, µi(Rl+) is bounded, then
pick ω ≥ ∑
i∈N
x∗i , and thus
∑
i∈N
µi(ω) <
∑
i∈N
x∗i ≤ ω, which contradicts that u is EFFN.
Step 3. The sufficiency part.
Proof. Let all the assumptions as in the sufficiency proof of Step 3 be given. we only need
to check the case when there does not exist y1 ∈ γ′1 such that (y1, x2) ∈ µ({1, 2}, (u′1, u2),Rl+).
Pick y′1 ∈ γ′1 such that y′1 > x1. By the modified Step 1 (ii), we can find y2 ∈ γ2 such that
(y′1, y2) ∈ µ({1, 2}, (u′1, u2),Rl+), and y2 < x2. Since µ is CST, (x1, x2) ∈ µ({1, 2}, (u1, u2),Rl+).
Again by the modified Step 1, there exist y1 ∈ γ1 such that (y1, y2) ∈ µ({1, 2}, (u1, u2),Rl+).
Since y2 < x2, then y1 < x1, and thus y1 < y′1, which contradicts our assumption.
Step 4. The sufficiency part.
Proof. We first show the following two statements:
(i) If µ is EFFN, RM and ANON, then ∀(N, uN) such that ∀i ∈ N, ui =
u, µi(N, uN ,Rl+) = γi, ∀i ∈ N;
(ii) If µ is EFFN, RM, ANON and SP, then ∀(N, uN) such that |N | = 2 and γi is un-
bounded in every commodity for some i ∈ N, µ j(N, uN ,Rl+) = γ j where j ∈ N and j , i.
The result (i) follows from Remark 1 and the modified Step 1.
For (ii), let (N, uN) which satisfies the required conditions be given. By the modified
Step 1, suppose the contrary that µ j(Rl+) is bounded where j ∈ N and j , i. Thus when
ω is big enough, agent j would pretend to have agent i’s preference, since his allocation
would be unbounded in every dimension by statement (i) and the assumption on γi. This
contradicts that µ is SP.
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Then the construction of W is basically the same except that u¯ should be chosen such
that its critical set is unbounded in every dimension. By statement (ii), W is well-defined.
The rest of the proof is the same.
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Chapter 2
Three representations of preferences with decreasing
absolute uncertainty aversion
2.1 Introduction
It is a well-known economic phenomenon that people’s risk aversion decreases with wealth.
For example, consider a risk of winning or losing $500 with equal probability. A person
with initial wealth $550 should be willing to pay more for insurance than should a person
with wealth $50, 000. In this case, his preference is said to display decreasing absolute risk
aversion (Arrow (1963), Pratt (1964)).
When applying this theory to macroeconomics and finance models, researchers typi-
cally assume either that the risk is objectively given, or that the decision maker has a sub-
jective probability. However, empirical evidence shows that in real-life settings uncertainty
is more relevant than risk.1 That is, the probability distribution governing the potential out-
comes is often unknown to the decision maker (Knight, 1921). Moreover, although the
subjective probability assumption finds its axiomatic foundation in Savage (1954), Ells-
berg (1961)’s famous thought experiments and many subsequent field experiments reveal
that people’s behavior violates Savage’s axioms, suggesting that decision makers do not
have a subjective probability.
Nevertheless, the wealth effect on uncertainty has not been sufficiently studied. Most
1For example, an investor chooses the optimal amount of investment in the presence of unknown random
shocks that impinge on production, people decide how much to spend on health insurance without knowing
exactly the chance of getting sick, and the environmental department makes regulations for a new technology
based only on an estimation of the pollution rate.
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commonly used models of preferences under uncertainty impose the restrictive assumption
that the degree of a decision maker’s uncertainty aversion is constant. However, it might
be expected that wealthier people are more willing to take uncertainty-bearing behavior. If
in the opening example the probability of winning and losing is unknown to the decision
maker, he may still be willing to pay more for insurance when he has initial wealth $550
than when he has initial wealth $50, 000. In this case, the decision maker’s preference
exhibits decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion.
This paper studies the effect of wealth on uncertainty aversion. Our first main result
axiomatizes a class of preferences that display decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion.
Three equivalent representations are obtained.2
All axioms considered in this paper are standard in the literature, with one important in-
novation — an axiom called decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion (hereafter DAUA).3
Consider an act f as a state-contingent payoff profile, and call an act constant if it gives the
same payoff in each state. The DAUA axiom requires that if an act f is weakly preferred
to a constant act, then it is still weakly preferred after a common improvement in every
state for both acts. This implies that a decision maker becomes weakly more tolerant to the
uncertainty of f as he gets wealthier. The DAUA axiom weakens Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)’s certainty independence axiom and Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006)’s
weak certainty independence axiom. Preferences satisfying our axioms are called DAUA
variational preferences. DAUA variational preferences include several important classes
of preferences which display constant absolute uncertainty aversion (see the second main
result).
We obtain three different yet equivalent representations for DAUA variational
2The results for preferences with increasing absolute uncertainty aversion are analogously obtained.
3Note that throughout the paper, “decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion" means “non-increasing abso-
lute uncertainty aversion".
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preferences.4 The first representation is a variant constraint representation:
V( f ) = min
p∈{p∈∆|d(p,B)≤η(u( f ))}
Epu( f ). (2.1)
It models situations in which the decision maker has a set B of best-guess priors but does
not fully trust these priors. He considers all priors p within η distance of B, and evaluates
f by its minimum expected utility over such neighborhood of B. The bound constraint η is
a function of utility profiles. In particular, it weakly decreases in the ensured (or baseline)
utility level of an act. This means that the decision maker becomes less concerned with
robustness — equivalently, more tolerant to uncertainty — as he becomes better off overall.
The variant constraint representation in (2.1) is a variation on the constraint criterion
introduced by Hansen and Sargent (2001) as a robust decision rule. A constraint criterion
evaluates an act by
V( f ) = min
p∈{p∈∆|R(p||q)≤η}
Epu( f ),
where q is a best-guess prior and R(p||q) is the relative entropy of p with respect to q.
An important difference when compared to (2.1) is that here, η is constant over all the
utility profiles, which implies that the degree of the decision maker’s uncertainty aversion
is fixed. While an axiomatization of the constraint criterion is still an open question, our
result provides an axiomatic foundation for a variant constraint criterion which is of the
same spirit and allows decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion.
4A representaion for a preference % over acts is a function V of acts such that f % g ⇔ V( f ) ≥ V(g) for
all acts f , g.
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The second representation is a weighted maxmin representation:
V( f ) = λ(u( f )) min
p∈C Epu( f ) + (1 − λ(u( f ))) maxp∈C Epu( f ). (2.2)
The decision maker considers C as the set of all possible priors and evaluates an act by a
weighted average of the minimum and maximum expected utility over C. The weight λ
on the worst case weakly decreases in the baseline utility, meaning that the decision maker
becomes more optimistic (less uncertainty averse) with the increase of his ensured payoffs.
The third representation is the DAUA variational representation:
V( f ) = min
p∈∆
[Epu( f ) + c(Epu( f ), p)], (2.3)
where c is a cost function of expected utilities and priors. The cost function basically plays
the role of restricting the priors under consideration. In particular, c weakly increases in
the utility term. It turns out that when the baseline utility of an act rises, it will be evaluated
by a more “favorable” prior. When c is constant in utility, (2.3) is reduced to Maccheroni,
Marinacci and Rustichini (2006)’s variational representation, which represents the class of
variational preferences that display constant absolute uncertainty aversion.
The three representations relate to each other in a nice way. The set of the priors with
zero cost at any utility level is exactly the set B, while the set C contains precisely the
priors that have finite cost at some utility level. The set B is a subset of C. They provide,
respectively, an upper and lower bound for the evaluation. The value of each act is below
the worst expected utility over B and above that over C. Moreover, the bounds are tight. At
best, the decision maker considers only the priors in B; at worst, he considers all the priors
in C. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s maxmin preferences are exactly characterized by the
condition B = C.
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Figure 2.1 : Relations of preferences that display constant absolute uncertainty aversion
Our second main result is to establish relationships among the representations for sev-
eral important classes of preferences in the literature, when we restrict our attention to
preferences displaying constant absolute uncertainty aversion. One finding is that the rep-
resentations for three nested classes of preferences — variational, maxmin and constraint
preferences — in fact “commute" with each other. More precisely, while Maccheroni,
Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) build the connection between maxmin preferences (and
thus its subclass, constraint preferences) and multiplier preferences by showing that both
belong to a larger class of variational preferences, our result suggests that the converse is
true as well. That is, variational preferences also live in a class of generalized maxmin
preferences and in a class of a constraint type of preferences (see Figure 1).
This result comes from the following observation. The subclass of DAUA variational
preferences with constant absolute uncertainty aversion is exactly the class of variational
preferences. The three representations above, when restricted to variational preferences,
also give three equivalent representations. In the first two representations, the distance
constraint η and the weight function λ become constant in the baseline utility of an act.
Representation (2.3), with the cost function c no longer depending on the utility term, is
43
reduced to the variational representation obtained by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini
(2006).
The other finding is an equivalent representation for the multiplier criterion5 introduced
by Hansen and Sargent (2001) as the second robust decision rule. This representation
closely resembles the constraint criterion and clearly shows the relationships between the
two criteria. Hansen and Sargent (2001) establish the “equivalence" between constraint and
multiplier criteria in a dynamic resource allocation problem by showing that both rules im-
ply the same optimal solution. However, they generally give different rankings of acts other
than the optimal one. we further clarify their relationship by an equivalent representation
for multiplier criterion:
V( f ) = min
p∈{p∈∆|R(p||q)≤η(u( f ))}
Epu( f ),
where η is a function of utility profiles corresponding to the parameter in the multiplier
criterion. This shows that the difference between the constraint and multiplier criteria lies
in the distance constraint η. For the constraint criterion, η is a constant function. For the
multiplier criterion, η is a particular function which is constant only if it is constantly 0.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the axioms. Section 3 presents the
three representations. Section 4 studies several subclasses of DAUA variational preferences
and provides another representation for multiplier preferences. Section 5 concludes.
2.1.1 Related literature
Although decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion is a natural analogy of the classic con-
cept of decreasing absolute risk aversion, there are only two recent papers addressing this
issue. Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) characterize a class of preferences such
5The multiplier criterion evaultes an act by V( f ) = min
p∈∆
[Epu( f )+θR(p||q)], where θ ∈ (0,∞] is a parameter.
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that a decision maker has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility over the outcomes and treats
each act as a prior-contingent expected utility function. The decision maker has a second-
order belief over all priors and evaluates an act by the expectation of an increasing trans-
formation of its prior-dependent expected utility function. The expectation is taken with
respect to his second-order belief over priors, and the increasing transformation is viewed
as a second-order utility function. They characterize preferences with decreasing absolute
uncertainty aversion by the properties of a second-order utility function, analogous to the
approach used with decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Chambers, Grant, Polak and Quiggin (2012) study a two-parameter model where a
decision maker has a baseline prior and a measure of dispersion of acts. The decision maker
evaluates an act based on its mean with respect to the baseline prior and its dispersion. They
represent preferences with decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion by the property of an
aggregating function of mean and dispersion. Their DAUA axiom is stronger than the one
in this paper. Their axiom compares the effects of improving a certainty part on all pairs of
acts where one act is more dispersed than the other.
Our paper adopts a different approach and studies a different model of preferences with
decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion. This approach accommodates situations where
the decision maker does not have a second-order belief or a baseline prior, but only a range
of estimated priors.
2.2 Setup
We denote by R the set of all the reals, and R+ the set of all the non-negative reals. Let S
be a set of states of the world. A subset of S is called an event. We assume that S is finite
and has cardinality n. The set of all probabilities on S is denoted by ∆. We identify ∆ with
the unit simplex in Rn, i.e., the set {(p1, ..., pn) ∈ Rn|
n∑
i=1
pi = 1 and pi ≥ 0 for all i}, and ∆ is
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regarded as a metric space with the Euclidean metric.
Let X be a set of outcomes. We follow Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006)
to assume that X is a convex subset of some vector space. Note that it includes Anscombe
and Aumann (1963)’s classic setting where X is the set of all lotteries on a set of prizes.
An act is a function f : S → X. Let F = XS be the set of all acts. Given an outcome
x ∈ X, with a slight abuse of notation, we also denote by x the constant act which assigns
x to all s ∈ S , and identify X with the set of all constant acts. Given f , g ∈ F and
α ∈ [0, 1], we define the convex combination α f + (1 − α)g as an act in F such that
[α f + (1 − α)g](s) = α f (s) + (1 − α)g(s) for all s ∈ S .
A decision maker’s preference is a binary relation % on F . Let  and ∼ denote re-
spectively the asymmetric and symmetric parts of % as usual. Given f ∈ F , an element
x f ∈ X is a certainty equivalent of f if x f ∼ f . A function V : F → R represents % on F
if f % g⇔ V( f ) ≥ V(g) for all f , g ∈ F .
2.3 Axioms
Consider the following axioms for % .
A.1. Weak Order. (1) For all f , g ∈ F , either f % g or g % f .
(2) For all f , g, h ∈ F , if f % g and g % h, then f % h.
A.2. Decreasing Absolute Uncertainty Aversion. For all f ∈ F , x, y, z ∈ X and α ∈
(0, 1), if either f is a constant act or y % x, then
α f + (1 − α)x % αz + (1 − α)x
⇒ α f + (1 − α)y % αz + (1 − α)y.
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A.3. Continuity. For all f , g, h ∈ F , the set {α ∈ [0, 1]|α f + (1 − α)g % h} and the set
{α ∈ [0, 1]|h % α f + (1 − α)g} are closed in R.
A.4. Monotonicity. For all f , g ∈ F , if f (s) % g(s) for every s ∈ S , then f % g.
A.5. Uncertainty Aversion. For all f , g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1), if f ∼ g, then α f + (1 −
α)g % f .
A.6. Unboundedness. There exist x, y ∈ X such that (1) x  y, and (2) for each α ∈
(0, 1), there are z, z′ ∈ X satisfying αz + (1 − α)y % x  y % αz′ + (1 − α)x.
A preference % on F is called a DAUA variational preference if it satisfies Axiom A.1
- A.6.
Axiom A.1, A.3, A.4 and A.5 are standard in the literature (see e.g. Anscombe and Au-
mann (1963), Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). Weak order requires
preferences to be complete and transitive. Continuity states that preferences are continu-
ous with respect to the coefficients of convex combination of acts. Monotonicity assumes
that the decision maker ranks the outcomes as constant acts, and that an act is weakly pre-
ferred if it assigns a weakly better outcome in each state. Uncertainty aversion captures the
decision maker’s preference for hedging under uncertainty.
Axiom A.6 is stronger than the usual non-degeneracy axiom. The non-degeneracy ax-
iom asks that there exists at least one act which is strictly preferred to some other. Axiom
A.6 enforces the obtained utility function on X representing % on constant acts to range
over all the reals. This axiom is commonly used in the recent literature (see e.g. Kopylov
(2001), Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006), Strzalecki (2011b) and Grant and
Polak (2011)). In some places it is a technical assumption which simplifies the analysis,
while in the other places it is indispensable for some desirable results. In this paper, A.6 is
necessary since our representation crucially relies on the preference for the “limiting acts",
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i.e., the acts causing extremely good or bad outcomes in all the states.
The rest of this section is devoted to A.2. Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006)
introduce the weak certainty independence axiom which weakens the certainty indepen-
dence axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Our A.2 is a further weakening of the weak
certainty independence.
A.2.1. Certainty Independence. For all f , g ∈ F , x ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1),
f % g⇔ α f + (1 − α)x % αg + (1 − α)x.
A.2.2. Weak Certainty Independence. For all f , g ∈ F , x, y ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1),
α f + (1 − α)x % αg + (1 − α)x
⇒ α f + (1 − α)y % αg + (1 − α)y. (2.4)
Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) show that a preference % satisfies A.2.1
if and only if for all f , g ∈ F , x, y ∈ X and α, β ∈ (0, 1],
α f + (1 − α)x % αg + (1 − α)x
⇒ β f + (1 − β)y % βg + (1 − β)y.
Thus A.2.2 weakens A.2.1 to require that the preference of two acts is only independent
of the constant acts that they are mixed with, but not the weights in the mixing. Grant and
Polak (2011) show that under the previous axioms, A.2.2 is equivalent to their constant
absolute uncertainty aversion axiom which assumes the same condition (2.4) to hold only
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when g is constant.6
A.2.3. Constant Absolute Uncertainty Aversion. For all f ∈ F , x, y, z ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1),
α f + (1 − α)x % αz + (1 − α)x
⇒ α f + (1 − α)y % αz + (1 − α)y. (2.5)
Our Axiom A.2 naturally extends A.2.3 to decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion by
assuming (2.5) to hold either when f is constant or y % x. In this way, it differentiates the
effect of changing a certainty part on constant acts and that on non-constant acts.
First suppose that f is constant. Then A.2 is essentially von Neumann-Morgenstern’s
independence axiom on constant acts. It is the key to get an affine utility function, say u,
to represent a preference on constant acts. Hence, changing a certainty part in any constant
act, say from x to y by 1 − α proportion, the change in its utility is (1 − α)(u(y) − u(x)). In
this sense, changing a certainty part generates the same effect on all constant acts. Thus,
the preference is preserved under such a change.
Second, if f is not constant, then the preference is preserved only when y % x. While
the effect of increasing a certainty part on constant acts can be normalized by the analysis
above, (2.4) means that increasing a certainty part creates weakly larger improvement on a
non-constant act than on a constant act. Equivalently, if the uncertainty of a non-constant
act is tolerable when compared to a constant act, then it is even more tolerable as the
certainty part grows.
The following example is a variation on Ellsberg (1961)’s thought experiment. It shows
different behavioral implications of A.2 and the three axioms above.
6Actually Grant and Polak (2011) show the equivalence under A.1, A.3, a weaker version of A.4 and A.6.
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Example 1. An urn contains 100 balls, of which 33 are red, and 67 are either black or
yellow. A ball is drawn from the urn. For each t ≥ 0, rt denotes the act “betting on red". It
pays 100 + t dollars if the ball is red and t dollars otherwise. Let bt denote the act “betting
on black", and its payoff is analogously given. See the table below.
Table 2.1 : Payoffs of rt and bt
t ≥ 0 Red Black Yellow
rt 100+t t t
bt t 100+t t
For instance, t = 0 and t = 104.
Table 2.2 : Payoffs of r0 and b0
t = 0 Red Black Yellow
r0 100 0 0
b0 0 100 0
Table 2.3 : Payoffs of r104 and b104
t = 104 Red Black Yellow
r104 10,100 10,000 10,000
b104 10,000 10,100 10,000
Suppose that the decision maker’s preference % satisfies A.1, A.3, A.4 and A.6, and
assume for simplicity that he is risk neutral. Then A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.2.3 each implies that
either rt % bt for all t, or bt % rt for all t.
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However, our A.2 allows the existence of a threshold t¯ such that
rt % bt for all t ≤ t¯, and bt % rt for all t ≥ t¯.
Hence, A.2 accommodates the phenomenon that people become more willing to take
uncertainty-bearing behavior as the baseline wealth increases.
2.4 Representations
Let u : X → R be a utility function of outcomes. Given f ∈ F , let u( f ) denote a function
in RS assigning u( f (s)) to each s ∈ S . Thus u( f ) transfers each act f to a state-contingent
utility function. Let I : u(X)S → R be a functional on all state-contingent utility functions.
We say that I is weakly increasing if I(ϕ) ≥ I(ψ) whenever ϕ, ψ ∈ u(X)S and ϕ(s) ≥ ψ(s)
for all s ∈ S . Let 1 denote a function in RS such that 1(s) = 1 for all s ∈ S . Similarly, for
any t ∈ R, t1 denotes a function in RS that gives t to each state s ∈ S . Define R1 = {t1 ∈
RS |t ∈ R} to be the set of all constant utility functions on S .
Given ϕ ∈ RS , p ∈ ∆, we denote by Epϕ the expected value of ϕ with respect to p. Let
d(p, q) denote the Euclidean distance between two priors p, q ∈ ∆, d(p, A) that between a
prior p ∈ ∆ and a set A ⊆ ∆, and d(A, B) that between two sets A, B ⊆ ∆. Lastly, we equip
the space RS with the topology induced by the supremum norm.
2.4.1 Variant constraint representation
Definition 9. A variant constraint representation of a preference % is a triple 〈u, B, η〉
such that
(1) u : X → R is a non-constant affine utility function, B is a non-empty closed convex
subset of ∆, and η : u(X)S → R+ is a distance constraint function;
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(2) for I : u(X)S → R defined as
I(ϕ) = min
p∈{p∈∆|d(p,B)≤η(ϕ)}
Epϕ, ∀ϕ ∈ u(X)S , (2.6)
I is weakly increasing and quasi-concave;
(3) for V : F → R defined as
V( f ) = I(u( f )), ∀ f ∈ F , (2.7)
V represents % .
The interpretation is that the decision maker considers each act as a state-contingent
utility function. He has a set B of approximating or best-guess priors, but he does not fully
trust them. To make decisions robust to prior misestimation, he evaluates an act by the
minimum expected utility over all the priors within η distance of the approximating ones.
The distance constraint η measures the degree of his concern for prior misestimation, and
it is a function of utility profiles.
Theorem 5. The following statements are equivalent.
(1) A preference % satisfies A.1 - A.6.
(2) There exist an affine onto function u : X → R, a non-empty closed convex set B ⊆ ∆
and a function η : RS → R+ such that
(i) 〈u, B, η〉 is a variant constraint representation of % ;
(ii) η is continuous on RS \ R1, η(ϕ + t1) weakly decreases in t for all ϕ ∈ RS , and
lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞ η(kϕ + t1) = 0.
Moreover, if 〈u′, B′, η′〉 also satisfies the conditions in (2), then u′ = au + b for some
a > 0 and b ∈ R, B′ = B, and η′(aϕ + b) = η(ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ RS such that I(ϕ) , min
s∈S ϕ(s)
where I is given by 〈u, B, η〉 as in (2.6).
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The distance constraint function η has three properties. First, η is continuous at every
non-constant ϕ ∈ RS . When ϕ is constant, the value of I(ϕ) is identical for any distance
constraint. However, I is still continuous on the whole domain RS of state-contingent utility
functions.
The second property of η is exactly the result of A.2. As the certainty utility increases,
the decision maker may become more tolerant to prior misestimation, and thus reduces the
range of priors under consideration. This implies that for I in (2.6), I(ϕ + t1) ≥ I(ϕ) + t
for all ϕ ∈ RS and t ≥ 0. Clearly, the equality holds when ϕ is constant. This shows that
increasing the baseline utility generates weakly more improvement on a non-constant act
than on a constant one.
The third property of η reveals the decision maker’s uncertainty aversion in the limiting
case. It says that the decision maker tends not to consider any prior outside the best-guess
set in the “extremely good" situation where first the baseline utility increases to ∞, and
second the scale of the uncertain part diminishes to 0. To understand the latter, see the
following example. It is a variation on Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006)’s
Example 2.
Example 2. An urn contains 100 balls, of which 33 are red, and 67 are either black or
yellow. A ball is drawn from the urn. For each t > 0, the act rt, betting on red, pays t
dollars if the ball is red, and t cents otherwise. The act bt, betting on black, is defined
analogously. See the following table of payoffs.
Table 2.4 : Payoffs of rt and bt
t > 0 Red Black Yellow
rt t 0.01t 0.01t
bt 0.01t t 0.01t
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For example, t = 10 and t = 104.
Table 2.5 : Payoffs of r10 and b10
t = 10 Red Black Yellow
r10 10 0.1 0.1
b10 0.1 10 0.1
Table 2.6 : Payoffs of r104 and b104
t = 104 Red Black Yellow
r104 10,000 100 100
b104 100 10,000 100
The scale of money payment is measured by t. Assume for simplicity that the decision
maker displays constant relative risk aversion ρ ∈ (0, 1). Then t is basically the same as
the utility scalar k in Theorem 1 (2/ii). The decision maker may become more willing to
take the uncertainty-bearing behavior when the payoff scale t decreases. As a result, there
may exist a threshold value t¯ such that
bt % rt for all t ≤ t¯, and rt % bt for all t ≥ t¯.
This can be the case when his preference satisfies A.1, A.3 - A.6, and A.2.2 — the weak
certainty independence7. In this case, I(kϕ) ≤ kI(ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ RS and k ≥ 1. Alternatively,
in our representation, it means that η(ϕ) ≤ η(kϕ) for all ϕ ∈ RS such that I(ϕ) , min
S
ϕ(s)
and k ≥ 1. If I(ϕ) = min
S
ϕ(s), then η(ϕ) and η(kϕ) can take any value which is above
some lower bound. This property is referred as increasing relative uncertainty aversion
7See Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006).
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(see e.g. Strzalecki (in press), Chateauneuf and Faro (2009); see also Section 5.2 for
more discussion). It is basically the result of A.2.2 and A.5. If A.2.2 is weakened to A.2,
then this property holds only when the certainty utility decreases to −∞. More precisely,
lim
t→∞ η(ϕ−t1) ≤ limt→∞ η(kϕ−t1) for all ϕ ∈ R
S such that I(ϕ) , min
S
ϕ(s) and k ≥ 1. Intuitively,
it says that the payoff scale becomes an issue when the baseline utility is sufficiently low.
2.4.2 Weighted maxmin representation
Definition 10. A weighted maxmin representation of a preference % is a triple 〈u,C, λ〉
such that
(1) u : X → R is a non-constant affine utility function, C is a non-empty closed convex
subset of ∆, and λ : u(X)S → [0, 1] is a weight function;
(2) for I : u(X)S → R defined as
I(ϕ) = λ(ϕ) min
p∈C Epϕ + (1 − λ(ϕ)) maxp∈C Epϕ ∀ϕ ∈ u(X)
S , (2.8)
I is weakly increasing and quasi-concave;
(3) for V : F → R defined as
V( f ) = I(u( f )) ∀ f ∈ F ,
V represents % .
The interpretation is that the decision maker considers each act f as a utility profile
u( f ). He believes that C is the set of all possible priors, and evaluates an act by a weighted
average of the best and worst expected utility over the priors in C. The weight λ that he
puts on the worst case is a function of utility profiles.
Theorem 6. The following statements are equivalent.
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(1) A preference % satisfies A.1 - A.6.
(2) There exist an affine onto function u : X → R, a non-empty closed convex set C ⊆ ∆
and a function λ : RS → [0, 1] such that
(i) 〈u,C, λ〉 is a weighted maxmin representation of % ;
(ii) λ is continuous on {ϕ ∈ RS |min
p∈C Epϕ < maxp∈C
Epϕ}, λ(ϕ + t1) weakly decreases in t for
all ϕ ∈ RS , and lim
k→∞
lim
t→∞ λ(kϕ − t1) = 1.
Moreover, if 〈u′,C′, λ′〉 also satisfies the conditions in (2), then u′ = au+b for some a >
0 and b ∈ R, C′ = C, and λ′(aϕ + b) = λ(ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ RS such that min
p∈C Epϕ < maxp∈C
Epϕ.
The properties of the weight function λ are analogous to those of η. The limiting con-
dition of λ says that the decision maker exhibits significant uncertainty aversion in the
“extremely bad" situation, so that he tends to consider only the worst case. The “extremely
bad" situation means that first, the baseline utility drops to −∞, and second, the scale of the
uncertain part expands to∞.
Next we give a short discussion about the relationship between the variant constraint
representation in Theorem 1 and the weighted maxmin representation in Theorem 2. In fact,
they are dual to each other in the sense that they respectively describe a decision maker’s
behavior in the “extremely good" situation and in the “extremely bad" situation. The set
B in Theorem 1 reveals the priors that the decision maker always consider in minimizing
expected utilities. He would never be “bold" enough to ignore any of them in any situation.
The set C in Theorem 2 reveals the priors that the decision maker would minimize over
when evaluating some act.
Corollary 1. Let 〈u, B, η〉 be the variant constraint representation as in Theorem 1 and
〈u,C, λ〉 the weighted maxmin representation as in Theorem 2. Then B ⊆ C.
These two sets respectively provide an upper and lower bound for the evaluation. The
value of any act is below the worst expected utility over B and above that over C. The two
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bounds are tight. At best, the decision maker only considers the priors in B; at worst, he
considers all the priors in C.
2.4.3 DAUA variational representation
Definition 11. A DAUA variational representation of a preference % is a pair < u, c >
such that
(1) u : X → R is a non-constant affine utility function, and c : u(X)×∆→ [0,∞] is a lower
semicontinuous cost function satisfying that (i) the function c(t, p)+t : u(X)×∆→ (−∞,∞]
is quasi-convex, (ii) c(t, p) is weakly increasing in t for each p ∈ ∆, and (iii) inf
p∈∆
c(t, p) = 0
for each t ∈ u(X);
(2) for I : u(X)S → R defined as
I(ϕ) = min
p∈∆
[Epϕ + c(Epϕ, p)], ∀ϕ ∈ u(X)S , (2.9)
I is continuous;
(3) for V : F → R defined as
V( f ) = I(u( f )), ∀ f ∈ F ,
V represents % .
The DAUA variational representation generalizes Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rusti-
chini (2006)’s variational representation.
Definition 12. A variational representation of a preference % is a pair 〈u, c〉 such that
(1) u : X → R is a non-constant affine utility function, and c : ∆ → [0,∞] is a lower
semicontinuous convex cost function satisfying inf
p∈∆
c(p) = 0;
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(2) for I : u(X)S → R defined as
I(ϕ) = min
∆
[Epϕ + c(p)], ∀ϕ ∈ u(X)S ,
and for V : F → R defined as
V( f ) = I(u( f )), ∀ f ∈ F ,
V represents % .
A preference % admitting a variational representation is called a variational prefer-
ence.
The DAUA variational representation generalizes the cost function in the variational
representation by allowing a prior to have different costs at different utility levels. In par-
ticular, the cost of a prior weakly increases in utility, which corresponds to the DAUA
axiom. Indeed, when the certainty utility of an act increases, say by t, the expected utility
with respect to every prior is increased by t. Moreover, the cost of each prior is measured
at a higher utility level and thus also weakly increases. As a result, the value of the act
is increased by at least t, or equivalently, the act is evaluated by a more “favorable" prior.
This means that decision maker becomes less averse to uncertainty when he becomes bet-
ter off overall. With the cost function being constant in the utility term, the variational
representation implies constant absolute uncertainty aversion.
Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Montrucchio (2011) obtain a general rep-
resentation for a class of uncertainty averse preferences. The DAUA variational prefer-
ences include variational preferences, and are contained in this class of uncertainty averse
preferences. By restricting the result of Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Mon-
trucchio (2011) to the preferences displaying decreasing absolute uncertainty aversion, we
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obtain the following representation.
Proposition 2. The following statements are equivalent.
(1) A preference % satisfies A.1 - A.6.
(2) There exist an affine onto function u : X → R and a function c : R × ∆ → [0,∞]
such that 〈u, c〉 is a DAUA variational representation of % .
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation. For each u, c is uniquely
given by c(t, p) = sup{u(x f ) − t|Epu( f ) ≤ t, f ∈ F } where (t, p) ∈ R × ∆.
Lastly, let B and C be given as in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 respectively. Then B =
{p ∈ ∆|c(t, p) = 0 for all t ∈ R}, and C = {p ∈ ∆|c(t, p) < ∞} for any t ∈ R.
This representation is related to the previous two via the cost function. The set of priors
with zero cost at any utility level coincides with the set B of all best-guess priors. Both sets
reveal the priors which are always considered in the evaluation.
Besides, for any utility level t ∈ R, the set of priors that have finite cost at t coincides
with C. This means two things. First, if a prior has a finite cost at some utility level, then it
has a finite cost at all utility levels. This property is not obvious. It basically comes from
the interaction of A.2, A.5 and A.6. Second, the set of all priors that have finite cost at
some utility level coincides with C. They reveal the priors that the decision maker would
consider in some situation.
It follows that if a prior has an infinite cost at some utility level, then it has an infinite
cost at all utility levels. The set of priors that have infinite cost at all utility levels is exactly
∆ \C. Those priors are always excluded from consideration. No act is evaluated below the
expected utility over C.
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2.5 Special cases
2.5.1 Variational preferences
The class of variational preferences introduced by Maccheroni, Marrinacci and Rustichini
(2006) is a subclass of DAUA variational preferences. They satisfy the stronger A.2.2 and
thus display constant absolute uncertainty aversion. When restricting the previous results
to this subclass, we again get three equivalent representations. The last representation is re-
duced to the variational representation. Hence, we find two other equivalent representations
for variational preferences.
Proposition 3. Suppose that % is a DAUA variational preference. Let 〈u, B, η〉 be the
variant constraint representation as in Theorem 1, 〈u,C, λ〉 the weighted maxmin represen-
tation as in Theorem 2, and 〈u, c〉 the DAUA variational representation as in Proposition 1.
Then the following statements are equivalent.
(1) The preference % satisfies A.2.2.
(2) For the distance constraint function η, η(ϕ + t1) = η(ϕ) for all t ∈ R and ϕ ∈ RS .
(3) For the weight function λ, λ(ϕ + t1) = λ(ϕ) for all t ∈ R and ϕ ∈ RS .
(4) For the cost function c, c(t, p) = c(t′, p) for all t, t′ ∈ R and p ∈ ∆.
When the three representations are restricted to variational preferences, the distance
constraint function η and the weight function λ do not change with the baseline utility, and
the cost function c does not depend on the utility term. This implies for the functional form
I in either (2.6), (2.8) or (2.9) that I(ϕ + t1) = I(ϕ) + t for all ϕ ∈ RS and t ∈ R. It means
that adding t units of utility in each state for any utility profile ϕ, the change of the value is
always t, which is independent of ϕ. Thus, changing the certainty part generates the same
effect on all acts. Hence, the degree of the decision maker’s uncertainty aversion is fixed.
Proposition 2 shows that the variant constraint representation satisfying condition (2)
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and the weighted maxmin representation satisfying condition (3) are equivalent to the vari-
ational representation. The two equivalent representations provide different perspectives
on variational preferences which are not obvious from the variational representation.
Corollary 2. Suppose that % is a variational preference. Let 〈u, B, η〉, 〈u,C, λ〉 and 〈u, c〉
be the three equivalent representations for % as in Proposition 2. Then the following
statements hold.
(1) For the distance constraint function η, η(kϕ) ≥ η(ϕ) for all k ≥ 1 and ϕ ∈ RS such
that I(ϕ) , min
s∈S ϕ(s) where I is given as in (2.6), and limk↘0
η(kϕ) = 0 for all ϕ ∈ RS .
(2) For the weight function λ, λ(kϕ) ≥ λ(ϕ) for all k ≥ 1 and ϕ ∈ RS , and lim
k→∞
λ(kϕ) = 1
for all ϕ ∈ RS .
(3) The set B = {p ∈ ∆|c(p) = 0} and the set C = {p ∈ ∆|c(p) < ∞}.
The first two representations directly show that variational preferences exhibit relative
increasing uncertainty aversion. This property has been discussed in Section 4.1. It mainly
comes from the interaction of A.2.2 and A.5. As a result, when the size of ϕ is scaled up,
the decision maker becomes weakly more averse to uncertainty. Thus he considers more
priors which are farther away from the best-guess ones, or he puts more weight on the
worst case. Moreover, as the wealth effect is assumed away, only the scale effect plays a
role in the limiting conditions. When the scalar k of a utility profile diminishes to 0, then
the decision maker tends to evaluate an act by the worst expected utility over only the priors
in B. When k expands to∞, he tends to consider all the priors in C.
Lastly, the set of zero-cost priors and the set of finite-cost priors in the variational
representation coincide respectively with B and C. This provides a further understanding
of the cost function c.
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2.5.2 Maxmin preferences
Definition 13. A maxmin representation of a preference % is a pair 〈u,C〉 such that
(1) u : X → R is a non-constant affine utility function, and C is a non-empty closed convex
subset of ∆;
(2) for V : F → R defined as
V( f ) = min
p∈C Epu( f ), ∀ f ∈ F ,
V represents % .
A preference % admitting a maxmin representation is called a maxmin preference.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s maxmin preferences are special cases of variational
preferences. Maxmin preferences satisfy the stronger A.2.1. They display not only constant
absolute uncertainty aversion, but also constant relative uncertainty aversion.
The maxmin representation can be viewed as a variational representation with the cost
function satisfying that c(p) = 0 for all p ∈ C and c(p) = ∞ otherwise. The following
result shows how the maxmin model fits in our representations.
Proposition 4. Suppose that % is a DAUA variational preference. Let 〈u, B, η〉 be the
variant constraint representation as in Theorem 1, 〈u,C, λ〉 the weighted maxmin represen-
tation as in Theorem 2, and 〈u, c〉 the DAUA variational representation as in Proposition 1.
Then the following statements are equivalent.
(1) The preference % satisfies A.2.1.
(2) For the distance constraint function η, η(ϕ) = 0 for all ϕ ∈ RS such that I(ϕ) ,
min
s∈S ϕ(s) where I is given as in (2.6).
(3) For the weight function λ, λ(ϕ) = 1 for all ϕ ∈ RS .
(4) The set B coincides with the set C.
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(5) For the cost function c, c(t, p) = 0 for all t ∈ R and p ∈ B, and c(t, p) = ∞ for all
t ∈ R and p ∈ ∆ \ B.
If a decision maker has a maxmin preference, then the set of best-guess priors is the
set of all possible priors. He always evaluates an act by the worst expected utility over this
set. Moreover, at any utility level, the priors with finite cost are exactly those with zero
cost. The equivalence between (1) and (5) is essentially Proposition 19 of Maccheroni,
Marinacci and Rustchini (2006).
2.5.3 Constraint preferences and multiplier preferences
Hansen and Sargent (2001) introduce two robust decision rules to model the situation where
a decision maker facing uncertainty has an approximating probabilistic model and is also
concerned about prior misestimation. The two rules are the constraint criterion and the mul-
tiplier criterion. Before giving their formulas, we first introduce the definition of relative
entropy.
Given p, q ∈ ∆, p  q denotes that p is absolutely continuous with respect to q.
Definition 14. Given p, q ∈ ∆, the relative entropy R(p||q) of p with respect to q is defined
by
R(p||q) =

∑
S
pi log
pi
qi
if p  q
∞ otherwise.
Relative entropy is a measure of the “difference" or “distance" between two probabili-
ties. Note that R(·||q) : ∆ → [0,∞] is a lower semicontinuous convex function satisfying
that R(p||q) = 0 if and only if p = q.
Definition 15. A constraint representation of a preference % is a triple 〈u, q, η〉 such that
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(1) u : X → R is a non-constant affine utility function, q ∈ ∆ is an approximating prior,
and η ∈ [0,∞) is a parameter;
(2) for V : F → R defined as
V( f ) = min
p∈{p∈∆|R(p||q)≤η}
Epu( f ), ∀ f ∈ F , (2.10)
V represents % .
A preference % admitting a constraint representation is called a constraint preference.
Constraint representation differs from variant constraint representation in three respects.
First, the decision maker has a single best-guess prior q instead of a set of them. Second,
the “distance" between two priors is measured by relative entropy instead of the Euclidean
metric. Third, the distance constraint η is a constant rather than a function of utility profiles.
The parameter η measures the degree of his concern with prior misspecification. Larger
values of η correspond to less trust in q.
Because of the properties of relative entropy, {p ∈ ∆|R(p||q) ≤ η} is a non-empty closed
convex set. Thus, constraint preferences are maxmin preferences with the constraint set
being specified in a concrete way.
Definition 16. A multiplier representation of a preference % is a triple 〈u, q, θ〉 such that
(1) u : X → R is a non-constant affine utility function, q ∈ ∆ is an approximating prior,
and θ ∈ [0,∞) is a parameter;
(2) for V : F → R defined as
V( f ) = min
p∈∆
[Ep(u( f )) + θR(p||q)], ∀ f ∈ F , (2.11)
V represents % .
A preference % admitting a multiplier representation is called a multiplier preference.
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The multiplier representation is a special variational representation with the cost func-
tion being θR(p||q). A decision maker with a multiplier preference has an approximating
prior q. He considers each prior p, but this incurs a cost which is proportional to the “dis-
tance" between p and q. The parameter θ measures the degree of his concern with prior
misspecification. In contrast to η in (2.10), Larger values of θ correspond to more trust in
q. If θ = ∞, then with the convention that 0 · ∞ = 0, the decision maker evaluates each act
by the expected utility with respect to q.
Hansen and Sargent (2001) establish the connection between constraint and multiplier
criteria. They show in a dynamic resource allocation problem that under some conditions,
for each η in (2.10), there exists a θ in (2.11) such that (2.11) implies the same optimal
solution as (2.10), and vise versa. However, as preference orderings, constraint criterion
and multiplier criterion give totally different rankings of acts other than the optimal one. We
obtain a constraint type of representation for multiplier preferences, which clearly shows
the relationship between the two criteria.
Given f , g ∈ F and A ⊆ S , define fAg to be an act in F such that fAg(s) = f (s) for
all s ∈ A, and fAg(s) = g(s) for all s ∈ S \ A. An event A ⊆ S is nonnull if there exist
f , g, h ∈ F such that fAh  gAh.
Proposition 5. Suppose that S has at least three nonnull events. Then the following two
statements are equivalent.
(1) A preference % admits a multiplier representation 〈u, q, θ〉.
(2) Define V : F → R by
V( f ) = min
p∈{p∈∆|R(p||q)≤η(u( f ))}
Epu( f ), ∀ f ∈ F ,
where η : u(X)S → R+ is given by η(u( f )) = min
p∈{p∈∆|Epu( f )=−θ log Eqe−
u( f )
θ }
R(p||q) for all f ∈ F .
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The function V represents % .
This result provides an equivalent representation for multiplier preferences which can
be directly compared with constraint representation. It shows that a multiplier preference
also admit a “constraint representation" except that the “distance" constraint is a specific
function of utility profiles rather than a fixed number. Thus, the multiplier criterion induces
the changing robustness concern for different acts, while constraint criterion assumes the
constant robustness concern for all acts.
In particular, the function η has three properties. Suppose without loss of generality
that u(X) = R. First, η(φ + t1) = η(φ) for all φ ∈ RS and t ∈ R, which shows that there
is no wealth effect for multiplier preferences. Second, η(kφ) ≥ η(φ) if k ≥ 1, which shows
that multiplier preferences display increasing relative uncertainty aversion property. Lastly,
lim
k↘0
η(kφ) = 0. This means that when the utility scale diminishes to 0, the decision maker
tends to consider only his best-guess prior q. Moreover, the later two properties in turn
imply that a multiplier preference and a constraint preference coincide if and only if both
are represented by the subjective expected utility V( f ) = Equ( f ) for all f ∈ F .
This equivalent representation of multiplier preferences closely resembles the variant
constraint representation of DAUA variational preferences. The only difference lies in
the measure of “distance" between priors. In fact, the Euclidean distance in the variant
constraint representation can be replaced with a general measures of “distance". Let l :
∆ × ∆ → R+ be a lower semicontinuous function such that l(·, q) : ∆ → R+ is convex
in the first term, and l(p, q) = 0 if and only if p = q. Define L : ∆ × {B ⊆ ∆|B ,
∅} → R+ by L(p, B) = inf
q∈B l(p, q) for any p ∈ ∆ and non-empty set B ⊆ ∆. Then all such
functions L can be used as a “distance" measure in the variant constraint representation for
DAUA variational preferences which include multiplier preferences. These measures are
equivalent in the sense that with the corresponding “distance" constraint functions η, they
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all induce the same evaluation of acts.
Although one can use the general “metric" as above to obtain another variant constraint
representation for multiplier preferences, relative entropy cannot be used in general to de-
rive the variant constraint representation of DAUA variational preferences. One feature of
relative entropy is that it assigns∞ to all the priors that are not absolutely continuous with
respect to the central prior q. This implies that the decision maker believes for sure that
the states to which q assigns zero probability would never happen, and he disregards all the
priors that assign positive probability to those states. This is not generally true for DAUA
variational preferences. A decision maker with a DAUA variational preference typically
considers all kinds of perturbation of the central prior q.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper axiomatizes a class of preferences which display decreasing absolute uncer-
tainty aversion. We obtain three equivalent representations: variant constraint representa-
tion, weighted maxmin representation, and DAUA variational representation. This class
of preferences includes variational preferences as a subclass. When restricted to this sub-
class, the first two representations are equivalent to the established variational representa-
tion. Moreover, a constraint type of representation is obtained for multiplier preferences.
This representation directly shows the relationship between multiplier and constraint pref-
erences.
In closing, we remark that three representations can be similarly obtained for the anal-
ogous class of preferences with increasing absolute uncertainty aversion. The only differ-
ence is that when the baseline utility of an act rises, the distance constraint η and the weight
function λ weakly increase, while the cost function c weakly decreases in utilities.
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2.7 Appendix: proofs
We denote by Z+ the set of positive integers, ∆◦ the interior of ∆ and ∂∆ the boundary
of ∆. Let I : RS → R be given. We say that I is normalized if I(t1) = t for all t ∈ R.
We say that I is constant superadditive if I(ϕ + t1) ≥ I(ϕ) + t for all ϕ ∈ RS and t ≥ 0.
Similarly, I is said to be constant additive if I(ϕ + t1) = I(ϕ) + t for all ϕ ∈ RS and t ∈ R.
If I(ϕ + ϕ′) ≥ I(ϕ) + I(ϕ′) for all ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS , then I is said to be superadditive.
Lemma 7. A preference % on F satisfies Axioms A.1 - A.6 if and only if there exists an
affine onto function u : X → R and a functional I : RS → R such that
(1) it is normalized, weakly increasing, quasi-concave, continuous and constant superad-
ditive;
(2) f % g⇔ I(u( f )) ≥ I(u(g)) for all f , g ∈ F .
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation, and given u, there is a
unique normalized functional I : RS → R such that the above condition (2) holds.
Proof. The necessity is easy. For the sufficed, the existence and uniqueness of the re-
quired u and I follow from Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) (Lemma 28),
Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Montrucchio (2011) (Lemma 57), and Kopy-
lov (2001), except that I is constant superadditive. We check now the constant superaddi-
tivity of I.
Let ϕ ∈ RS and t ≥ 0 be given. Suppose x, x0 ∈ X and f ∈ F such that u(x) = 2t,
u(x0) = 0 and u( f ) = 2ϕ. Then u( 12 f +
1
2 x) = ϕ + t1 and u(
1
2 f +
1
2 x0) = ϕ. Since u is an
affine onto function, then there exists z ∈ X such that 12 f + 12 x0 ∼ 12z + 12 x0 for some z ∈ X.
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Since t ≥ 0, then x % x0. By Axiom A.2, we know that 12 f + 12 x % 12z + 12 x. Thus,
I(ϕ + t1) = I(u(
1
2
f +
1
2
x)) ≥ I(u(1
2
z +
1
2
x))
=
1
2
u(z) +
1
2
u(x) =
1
2
u(z) +
1
2
u(x0) +
1
2
u(x) = u(
1
2
z +
1
2
x0) + t
= I(u(
1
2
f +
1
2
x0)) + t = I(ϕ) + t.
Checking the equalities and inequalities above mainly use the fact that I is normalized and
satisfies condition (2), and that u is affine.
Proof of Theorem 1. We check the sufficiency first. Let u : X → R and I : RS → R be
given as in Lemma 7. We define J : RS → R by
J(ϕ) = lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞
1
k
[I(kϕ + t1) − t] (2.12)
for all ϕ ∈ RS .
To check that J : RS → R is well defined, we show some stronger results.
First, for all k > 0 and t ∈ R, 1k [I(kϕ + t1) − t] is bounded in [minS ϕ(s),maxS ϕ(s)]. This
is because I is weakly increasing.
Second, fix k > 0, 1k [I(kϕ + t1) − t] weakly increases in t. Indeed, if t′ ≥ t, then by the
constant supadditivity of I, I(kϕ+ t′1)− t′ = I(kϕ+ t1+ (t′− t)1)− t′ ≥ I(kϕ+ t1)+ t′− t− t′ =
I(kϕ + t1) − t.
Third, lim
t→∞
1
k [I(kϕ + t1) − t] weakly decreases in k when k > 0. Suppose for the sake of
a contradiction that k′ ≥ k > 0 and lim
t→∞
1
k′ [I(k
′ϕ + t1) − t] > lim
t→∞
1
k [I(kϕ + t1) − t]. Hence,
there exists t¯ such that for all t, t′ ≥ t¯, lim
t→∞
1
k [I(kϕ+ t1)− t] > limt→∞
1
k′ [I(k
′ϕ+ t1)− t]. That is,
I(kϕ + t1) <
k
k′
I(k′ϕ + t′1) + t − k
k′
t′. (2.13)
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Pick t, t′ ≥ t¯ such that
k
k′
t′ + (1 − k
k′
)I(k′ϕ + t′1) = t. (2.14)
Thus, kϕ+ t1 = kk′ (k
′ϕ+ t′1) + (1− kk′ )I(k′ϕ+ t′1). Since I is normalized and quasi-concave,
then
I(kϕ + t1) ≥ k
k′
I(k′ϕ + t′1) =
k
k′
I(k′ϕ + t′1) + t − k
k′
t′,
where the equality follows from the choice of t and t′. This is a contradiction to (2.13) as
desired.
The three results above guarantee that J : RS → R is well defined. Note that I(ϕ) ≤ J(ϕ)
for all ϕ ∈ RS .
We further show some properties of J.
It is easy to see that J is normalized and weakly increasing. It directly follows from the
same properties of I.
Besides, J is constant additive. Let ϕ ∈ RS and r ∈ R be given. Then
J(ϕ + r1) = lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞
1
k
[I(k(ϕ + r1) + t1) − t]
= lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞
1
k
[I(kϕ + (kr + t)1) − (kr + t) + kr]
= lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞
1
k
[I(kϕ + (kr + t)1) − (kr + t)] + r
= lim
k↘0
lim
t′→∞
1
k
[I(kϕ + t′1) − t′] + r = J(ϕ) + r,
as desired.
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Moreover, J is positive homogeneous of degree 1. Let ϕ ∈ RS and l > 0 be given. Then
J(lϕ) = lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞
1
k
[I(klϕ + t1) − t]
= lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞
l
kl
[I(klϕ + t1) − t] = l lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞
1
kl
[I(klϕ + t1) − t]
= l lim
k′↘0
lim
t→∞
1
k′
[I(k′ϕ + t1) − t] = lJ(ϕ),
as desired.
Lastly, J is superadditive. Suppose for the sake of a contradiction that J(ϕ + ϕ′) <
J(ϕ) + J(ϕ′) for some ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS . Since J is positive homogeneous of degree 1, then
J(12ϕ +
1
2ϕ
′) < 12 J(ϕ) +
1
2 J(ϕ
′). Thus, there exsit k > 0 and t¯ ≥ 0 such that for all t, t′ ≥ t¯
and t′′ ∈ R,
1
k
[I(k(
1
2
ϕ +
1
2
ϕ′) + t′′1) − t′′] < 1
2k
[I(kϕ + t1) − t] + 1
2k
[I(kϕ′ + t′1) − t′]. (2.15)
By rearranging the terms, we get
I(
1
2
kϕ +
1
2
kϕ′ + t′′1) <
1
2
I(kϕ + t1) +
1
2
I(kϕ′ + t′1) + t′′ − t + t
′
2
. (2.16)
Pick t ≥ t¯ such that k min
S
ϕ(s) + t ≥ k max
S
ϕ′(s) + t¯. Thus I(kϕ + t1) ≥ k min
S
ϕ(s) + t ≥
k max
S
ϕ′(s) + t¯. Pick t′ ∈ R such that I(kϕ + t1) = I(kϕ′ + t′1). Thus t′ ≥ t¯. Let t′′ = t+t′2 so
that 12kϕ +
1
2kϕ
′ + t′′1 = 12 (kϕ + t1) +
1
2 (kϕ
′ + t′1). Since I is superadditive, then
I(
1
2
kϕ +
1
2
kϕ′ + t′′1) ≥ 1
2
I(kϕ + t1) +
1
2
I(kϕ′ + t′1)
which is a contradiction to (2.16), as desired.
Since the functional J : RS → R satisfies the properties above, then by Gilboa and
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Schmeidler (1989)’s Lemma 3.5, there exists a non-empty closed convex set B ⊆ ∆ such
that for all ϕ ∈ RS , J(ϕ) = min
B
Epϕ.
Define a set D(ϕ) ⊆ {p ∈ ∆|I(ϕ) = Epϕ} for each ϕ ∈ RS . Note that D(ϕ) is a non-empty
compact set for all ϕ ∈ RS . Define η : RS → R+ as η(ϕ) = d(D(ϕ), B). We want to check
that I(ϕ) = min
{p∈∆|d(p,B)≤η(ϕ)}
Epϕ for all ϕ ∈ RS .
Fix ϕ ∈ RS . Since D(ϕ) is non-empty and compact, then by the definition of η(ϕ),
there exists p∗ ∈ D(ϕ) such that d(p, B) = η(ϕ). Hence, I(ϕ) ≤ min{p∈∆|d(p,B)≤η(ϕ)} Epϕ. Now
we check that for all p ∈ ∆ with d(p, B) ≤ η(ϕ), Epϕ ≥ I(ϕ). Suppose for the sake of a
contradiction that there exists p′ ∈ ∆ such that d(p′, B) ≤ η(ϕ) and Ep′ϕ < I(ϕ). Denote by
q a prior in B such that d(p′, q) = d(p′, B). Then Eqϕ ≥ min
B
Epϕ ≥ I(ϕ) > Ep′ϕ. Thus there
exists α ∈ [0, 1) such that I(ϕ) = Eαp′+(1−α)qϕ, which means that αp′ + (1 − α)q ∈ D(ϕ). If
d(p′, q) > 0, then
d(D(ϕ), B) ≤ d(αp′ + (1 − α)q, q) = αd(p′, q)
< d(p′, q) = d(p′, B) ≤ η(ϕ)
which contradicts the definition of η. If d(p′, q) = 0, then p′ = q, and thus
Eqϕ = Ep′ϕ < I(ϕ) ≤ min
B
Epϕ
which is again a contradiction since q ∈ B.
Moreover, for all p ∈ ∆ with d(p, B) < η(ϕ), Epϕ > I(ϕ). Indeed, if d(p′, B) < η(ϕ)
and Ep′ϕ = I(ϕ) for some ϕ ∈ RS and p′ ∈ ∆, then p′ ∈ D(ϕ). Thus, η(ϕ) = min
D(ϕ)
d(p, B) ≤
d(p′, B) < η(ϕ), which is a contradiction.
Now we check the properties of η : RS → R+.
First, η is continuous on RS \ R1. Since η(ϕ) = min
D(ϕ)
d(p, B) for all ϕ ∈ RS , by the
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maximum theorem, it suffices to check that D : RS ⇒ ∆ is continuous as a correspondence.
Fix an arbitrary ϕ ∈ RS , and we check that D is upper hemicontinuous at ϕ. Let {ϕn}∞n=1 be a
sequence of elements in RS such that lim
n→∞ϕn = ϕ. Let {pn}
∞
n=1 be a sequence of elements in
∆ such that lim
n→∞ pn = p for some p ∈ ∆. Then Epϕ = limn→∞ Epnϕn = limn→∞ I(ϕn) = I( limn→∞ϕn) =
I(ϕ). Thus p ∈ D(ϕ).
Fix an arbitrary ϕ ∈ RS \ R1, and D is lower hemicontinuous at ϕ. To see it, let
{ϕn}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in RS such that limn→∞ϕn = ϕ. Fix p ∈ D(ϕ). Suppose
that p ∈ ∆◦. Let  > 0 be arbitrarily given. Define A() = {q ∈ ∆|d(q, p) ≤ }. Thus
Epϕ ∈ (min
A()
Eqϕ,max
A()
Eqϕ). There exists N ∈ Z+ such that I(ϕn) ∈ (min
A()
Eqϕn,max
A()
Eqϕn)
whenever n ≥ N. Therefore, there exists pn ∈ A() for each n ≥ N such that I(ϕn) = Epnϕn.
Now for each j ∈ Z+, pick pn j ∈ A(1j ) such that pn j ∈ D(ϕn j) and n j′ > n j for all j′ > j in
Z+. Thus we get a sequence {pn j}∞j=1 such that pn j ∈ D(n j) for all j ∈ Z+ and limj→∞ pn j = p.
Now if p ∈ ∂∆, one can find such a sequence via a sequence {pm}∞m=1 of elements in ∆◦ that
converges to p.
Second, η(ϕ + t1) weakly decreases in t ∈ R for all ϕ ∈ RS . Let ϕ ∈ RS and t ≤ t′ in
R be given. For all p ∈ D(ϕ + t1), Ep[ϕ + t′1] = I(ϕ + t1) + t′ − t ≤ I(ϕ + t′1). Suppose
that η(ϕ + t1) = d(p′, B) for some p′ ∈ D(ϕ + t1). If Ep′[ϕ + t′1] < I(ϕ + t′1), then from
the analysis above we know that d(p′, B) > η(ϕ + t′1), and thus η(ϕ + t1) > η(ϕ + t′1). If
Ep′[ϕ+t′1] = I(ϕ+t′1), then p′ ∈ D(ϕ+t′1), and thus η(ϕ+t1) = d(p′, B) ≥ min
D(ϕ+t′1)
d(p, B) =
η(ϕ + t′1).
Third, for any ϕ ∈ RS , lim
t→∞ η(kϕ + t1) weakly increases in k when k > 0. We first
show that it is equivalent to check that min
{q∈∆| lim
t→∞
1
k [I(kϕ+t1)−t]}
d(q, B) weakly increased in k when
k > 0. Let ϕ ∈ RS and k > 0 be given. Define T : [0,∞] ⇒ ∆ as a correspondence by
T (t) = {p ∈ ∆|Epϕ = 1k [I(kϕ + t1) − t]} for each t ∈ R, and T (∞) = {p ∈ ∆|Epϕ =
lim
t→∞
1
k [I(kϕ + t1) − t]}. Note that for all t ∈ [0,∞], T (t) is non-empty and compact. We
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show first that min
T (∞)
d(p, B) = lim
t→∞ θ(kϕ + t1). To do it, we check that T is continuous at
∞. For the upper hemicontinuity, let {tn}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in [0,∞] such that
lim
n→∞ tn = ∞, and let {pn}
∞
n=1 be a sequence of elements in ∆ such that pn ∈ T (tn) for all
n ∈ Z+ and lim
n→∞ pn = p for some p ∈ ∆. Then Epϕ = limn→∞ Epnϕ = limt→∞
1
k [I(kϕ + t1) − t].
Hence, p ∈ T (∞). For the lower hemicontinuous, let {tn}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in
[0,∞] such that lim
n→∞ tn = ∞. Fix p ∈ T (∞). Suppose that q ∈ ∆ and Eqϕ = minS ϕ(s). If
Epϕ = Eqϕ, then p ∈ T (tn) for all n ∈ Z+ and thus we are done. Suppose that Epϕ > Eqϕ.
Then for each n ∈ Z+, there exists a unique αn ∈ [0, 1] such that αn p + (1 − αn)q ∈ T (tn).
Therefore, lim
n→∞ λn = limn→∞
1
Epϕ−Eqϕ [
1
k I((kϕ + tn1) − tn) − Eqϕ] = 1Epϕ−Eqϕ (Epϕ − Eqϕ) = 1.
Thus, lim
n→∞[λn p + (1 − λn)q] = p. Hence, by the maximum theorem, minT (in f ty) d(q, B) =
lim
t→∞minT (t)
d(q, B) = lim
t→∞ minEq(kϕ+t1)=I(kϕ+t1)
d(q, B) = lim
t→∞ η(kϕ + t1).
Keep ϕ ∈ RS being fixed. Let k′ ≥ k > 0 be given. Let T be defined as above for k,
and T ′ be analogously defined for k′. Suppose that p ∈ T (∞) and d(p, B) = min
T (∞)
d(q, B).
Similarly, suppose that p′ ∈ T ′(∞) and d(p, B) = min
T ′(∞)
d(q, B). We would like to check
that d(p, B) ≤ d(p′, B). Note that Epϕ ≥ Ep′ϕ. If Epϕ = Ep′ϕ, then p′ ∈ T (∞), and
thus min
T (∞)
d(q, B) ≤ d(p′, B) = min
T ′(∞)
d(q, B). If Epϕ > Ep′ϕ, then pick q′ ∈ B such that
d(p′, B) = d(p′, q′). Since Eq′ϕ ≥ J(ϕ) ≥ Epϕ, then there uniquely exists α ∈ [0, 1) such
that Eαp′+(1−α)q′ϕ = Epϕ, i.e., αp′+ (1−α)q′ ∈ T (∞). Thus d(p, B) ≤ d(αp′+ (1−α)q′, B) ≤
d(αp′ + (1 − α)q′, q′) = αd(p′, q′) < d(p′, q′) = d(p′, B), as desired.
Fourth, lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞ η(kϕ + t1) = 0. Fix ϕ ∈ R
S . Let p ∈ B and p′ ∈ ∆ be given such
that Epϕ = J(ϕ) and Ep′ϕ = min
S
ϕ(s). If Epϕ = Ep′ϕ, then for all k > 0 and t ∈ R,
1
k [I(kϕ + t1) − t] = Epϕ. That is, for all k > 0 and t ∈ R, p ∈ D(kϕ + t1), and thus
min
D(kϕ+t1)
d(q, B) = 0 since p ∈ B as well. Hence, lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞ η(kϕ + t1) = 0. If Epϕ > Ep′ϕ, then
for each k > 0 there exists a unique αk ∈ [0, 1] such that Eαk p′+(1−αk)pϕ = limt→∞
1
k [I(kϕ+t1)−t].
Thus lim
k↘0
αk = lim
k↘0
1
Ep′ϕ−E′pϕ [limt→∞
1
k (I(kϕ + t1) − t) − Epϕ] = Epϕ−EpϕEp′ϕ−Epϕ = 0. Combining the
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results above, we have that for each k > 0,
0 ≤ lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞ η(kϕ + t1) ≤ limt→∞ η(kϕ + t1)
= min
{q∈∆| lim
t→∞
1
k [I(kϕ+t1)−t]}
d(q, B) ≤ d(αk p′ + (1 − αk p), p) = αkd(p′, p).
By taking the limit, we the desired result.
For necessity, we only check A.3, others are easy. Suppose that 〈u, B, η〉 is a variant
constraint representation of % satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1(2). Let I : RS → R
be defined as in (2.6). It suffices to show that I is continuous. Let ϕ ∈ RS be given. Let
{ϕn}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in RS such that limn→∞ϕn = ϕ. If ϕ is constant, then
lim
n→∞ |I(ϕn) − I(ϕ)| ≤ limn→∞ supS |ϕn(s) − I(ϕ)|
= lim
n→∞ supS
|ϕn(s) − ϕ(s)| = 0,
as desired. Suppose that ϕ is not constant. Define W : RS ⇒ ∆ as a correspondence by
W(φ) = {q ∈ ∆|d(q, B) ≤ η(φ)} for all φ ∈ RS . It suffices to show that W is continuous at
ϕ. For upper hemicontinuity, let {pn}∞n=1 be a sequence of elements in ∆ such that for each
n ∈ Z+, pn ∈ W(ϕn) and lim
n→∞ pn = p for some p ∈ ∆. Since η is continuous at ϕ, then
lim
n→∞ η(ϕn) = η(ϕ). Thus d(p, B) = limn→∞ d(pn, B) ≤ limn→∞ η(ϕn) = η(ϕ). Hence, p ∈ W(ϕ).
For lower hemicontinuity, let p ∈ W(ϕ) be given. If d(p, B) < η(ϕ), then p ∈ W(ϕn) for
all sufficiently large n, and we are done. Suppose that d(p, B) = η(ϕ). If p ∈ B, then
p ∈ W(ϕn) for all n, and we are done. If p < B, then η(ϕ) > 0. Suppose that p′ ∈ B
and d(p, p′) = η(ϕ). Let { j}∞j=1 be a sequence of real numbers such that for all j ∈ Z+,
 j ∈ (0, η(ϕ)) and lim
j→∞  j = 0. For each j ∈ Z+, pick n j ∈ Z+ such that |η(ϕn j) − η(ϕ)| <  j
and n j′ > n j for all j′ > j in Z+. Define α j = 1 −  jη(ϕ) for all j ∈ Z+. Then α j ∈ (0, 1) for all
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j ∈ Z+ and lim
j→∞α j p + (1 − α j)p
′ = p. For all j ∈ Z+, d(α j p + (1 − α j)p′, B) ≤ α jd(p, p′) =
η(ϕ) −  j < η(ϕn j), and thus α j p + (1 − α j)p′ ∈ W(ϕn j).
Lastly, for the uniqueness of the representation, let < u′, B′, η′ > be another variant
constraint representation of % satisfying Theorem 1(2). Let I′ : RS be defined as in (2.6).
Since both u and u′ are affine functions representing preferences on constant acts. Then
there exist a > 0 and b ∈ R such that u′(x) = au(x) + b and I′(aϕ + b1) = aI(ϕ) + b for all
x ∈ X and ϕ ∈ RS . Suppose for the sake of a contradiction that B , B′. Suppose further
without loss of generality that p ∈ B \ B′. Then by a standard separation theorem, there
exists ϕ ∈ RS \ R1 such that Epϕ < min
B′
Eqϕ. Because of the properties of η, we have
lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞
1
k
[I(kϕ + t1) − t] = lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞
1
k
[ min
{q∈∆|d(q,B)≤η(kϕ+t1)}
Ep(kϕ + t1) − t]
= lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞ min{q∈∆|d(q,B)≤η(kϕ+t1)}
= min
B
Eqϕ < min
B′
Eqϕ.
On the other hand,
lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞
1
k
[I(kϕ + t1) − t] = lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞
1
k
[
I′[akϕ + (at + b)1]
a
− t]
= lim
k↘0
lim
t→∞ min{q∈∆|d(q,B′)≤η′(akϕ+(at+b)1)}
= min
B′
Eqϕ
which is a contradiction. Hence, B = B′.
For the uniqueness of distance bound, let ϕ ∈ RS and p, p′ ∈ ∆ be given such that
I(ϕ) = Epϕ > min
S
ϕ(s) = Ep′ϕ, and d(p, B) ≤ η(ϕ). Suppose without loss of generality that
η(ϕ) < η′(aϕ + b). Then there exists  ∈ (0, 1) such that d(p + (1 − )p′, B) ≤ η′(aϕ + b).
Thus I′(aϕ + b) ≤ Ep+(1−)p′[aϕ + b] < aI(ϕ) + b, which is a contradiction as desired.
Proof of Theorem 2. The idea of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 1. We only check
the sufficiency, the necessity and uniqueness are easy. Let u : X → R and I : RS → R be
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given as in Lemma 7. We define J : RS → R by
J(ϕ) = lim
k→∞
lim
t→∞
1
k
[I(kϕ − t1) + t]
for all ϕ ∈ RS .
Note that for all ϕ ∈ RS , k > 0 and t ∈ R, 1k [I(kϕ − t1) + t] ∈ [minS ϕ(s),maxS ϕ(s)]. For
all ϕ ∈ RS and k > 0, 1k [I(kϕ− t1) + t] weakly decreases in t. Moreover, limt→∞
1
k [I(kϕ− t1) + t]
weakly decreases in k. To see that, let k′ ≥ k > 0 be given. Suppose for the sake of a
contradiction that lim
t→∞
1
k [I(kϕ− t1) + t] < limt→∞
1
k′ [I(k
′ϕ− t1) + t]. Thus there exists t¯ such that
for all t, t′ ≥ t¯, 1k [I(kϕ − t1) + t] < 1k′ [I(k′ϕ − t′1) + t′], that is,
I(kϕ − t1) < k
k′
I(k′ϕ − t′1) + k
k′
t′ − t. (2.17)
Pick t, t′ ≥ t¯ such that kk′ t′ + ( kk′ − 1)I(k′ϕ − t′1) = t. Thus kϕ − t1 = kk′ I(k′ϕ − t′1) + (1 −
k
k′ )I(k
′ϕ− t′1)1. Since I is quasi-concave and normalized, then I(kϕ− t1) ≥ kk′ I(k′ϕ− t′1) +
(1 − kk′ )I(k′ϕ − t′1) = kk′ I(k′ϕ − t′1), which contradicts (2.17). The above properties imply
that J is well defined.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, J is normalized, weakly increasing, constant ad-
ditive, positive homogeneous of degree 1 and superadditive. We only check superaddi-
tivity. Suppose the contrary that there exist ϕ, ϕ′ ∈ RS , J(ϕ + ϕ′) < J(ϕ) + J(ϕ′). Thus
J(12ϕ +
1
2ϕ
′) < 12 J(ϕ) +
1
2 J(ϕ
′). Hence there exists k > 0 and t¯ ∈ R such that for all t, t′ ∈ R
and t′′ ≥ t¯, 1k [I(k(12ϕ+ 12ϕ′)− t′′1)+ t′′] < 12k [I(kϕ− t1)+ t]+ 12k [I(kϕ− t′1)+ t′]. Rearranging
the terms, we get that
I(
1
2
kϕ +
1
2
kϕ′ − t′′1) < 1
2
I(kϕ − t1) + 1
2
I(kϕ′ − t′1) + t + t
′
2
− t′′. (2.18)
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Pick t, t′ ≥ t¯ such that I(kϕ − t1) = I(kϕ′ − t′1). Define t′′ = t+t′2 . Note that t′′ ≥ t¯ and
1
2kϕ +
1
2kϕ
′ − t′′1 = 12 (kϕ − t1) + 12 (kϕ′ − t′1). Since I is superadditive, then
I(
1
2
kϕ +
1
2
kϕ′ − t′′1) ≥ 1
2
I(kϕ − t1) + 1
2
I(kϕ′ − t′1),
which contradicts (2.18).
By Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), there exists a unique non-empty closed convex
set C ⊆ ∆ such that J(ϕ) = min
C
Epϕ for all ϕ ∈ RS . Fix ϕ ∈ RS . Then I(ϕ) ∈
[min
C
Epϕ,max
C
Epϕ]. We only check the upper bound. Let t ∈ R be given such that
I(ϕ) = I(−ϕ + t1). Since I is quasi-concave, then I(ϕ2 + −ϕ+t12 ) ≥ 12 I(ϕ) + 12 I(−ϕ + t1) ≥
1
2 I(ϕ) +
1
2 minC
Ep(−ϕ) + t2 . Since I is normalized, then t2 ≥ 12 I(ϕ) + 12 minC Ep(−ϕ) +
t
2 . Thus,
I(ϕ) ≤ −min
C
Ep(−ϕ) = max
C
Epϕ.
Define λ : RS → [0, 1] by λ(ϕ) = 1 if min
C
Epϕ = max
C
Epϕ, and λ(ϕ) =
max
C
Epϕ−I(ϕ)
max
C
Epϕ−min
C
Epϕ
otherwise. Note that I(ϕ) = λ(ϕ) min
C
Epϕ + (1 − λ(ϕ)) max
C
Epϕ for all ϕ ∈ RS .
Using the properties of I, it is easy to verify that λ(ϕ + t1) weakly decreasing in
t for all ϕ ∈ RS , lim
t→∞ λ(kϕ − t1) weakly increases in k when k > 0 for all ϕ ∈ R
S ,
lim
k→∞
lim
t→∞ λ(kϕ − t1) = 1, and λ is continuous on {ϕ ∈ R
S |min
C
Epϕ < max
C
Epϕ}.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof mainly makes use of Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni,
Marinacci and Montrucchio (2011)’s representation theorems for uncertainty averse pref-
erences. We first quote their result.
A.2′. Risk Independence. For all x, y, z ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1),
x ∼ y⇒ αx + (1 − α)z % αy + (1 − α)z.
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Theorem 7. 8 The following two statements are equivalent.
(1) A preference % on F satisfies A.1, A.2′, A.3 - A.6.
(2) There exists an affine onto function u : X → R, and a lower semicontinuous function
G : R × ∆→ (−∞,∞] such that
(i) G is quasi-convex on R × ∆;
(ii) G(·, p) is increasing for all p ∈ ∆;
(iii) inf
∆
G(t, p) = t for all t ∈ R;
(iv) for I : RS → R defined as
I(ϕ) = min
∆
G(Epϕ, p) f or all ϕ ∈ RS ,
I is continuous on RS ; (v) for V : F → R defined as
V( f ) = I(u( f )) f or all u ∈ F ,
V represents % .
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation. For each u, G is uniquely
given by
G(t, p) = sup
F
{u(x f ) : Epu( f ) ≤ t} f or all (t, p) ∈ R × ∆. (2.19)
For the sufficiency, suppose that % satisfies A.1 - A.6. Thus % satisfies A.2′ (see
e.g. Lemma 28 of Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006)). Hence, there exists
u : X → R and G : R×∆→ (−∞,∞] which satisfy the conditions in Theorem 7. Moreover,
u is unique up to a positive affine transformation and G is uniquely given by (2.19).
8This theorem combines Theorem 3 and Theorem 5 in Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Mon-
trucchio (2011).
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Define c : R × ∆→ [0,∞] by
c(t, p) = G(t, p) − t f or all (t, p) ∈ R × ∆.
We check that < u, c > is a DAUA variational representation of % . By definition and the
corresponding properties of G, c is lower semicontinuous on R × ∆, c(t, p) + t is quasi-
convex on R × ∆, and inf
∆
c(t, p) = 0 for each t ∈ R. Moreover, for I defined as in (2.9), I is
continuous on RS , and V : F → R represents % .
To see that c(t, p) is weakly increasing in t, let p ∈ ∆ and t′ ≥ t in R be given. For
any f ∈ F such that Epu( f ) ≤ t, there exists f ′ ∈ F such that u( f ′) = u( f ) + (t′ − t)1
and thus Epu( f ′) ≤ t′. Let I be given as in (2.9). Note that it is normalized and constant
superadditive. Thus u(x f ′) − t′ = I(u( f ′)) − t′ = I(u( f ) + t′ − t) − t′ ≥ I(u( f )) + t′ − t − t′ =
I(u( f )) − t = u(x f ) − t. Since G is given by (2.19), then by definition c(t′, p) ≥ c(t, p).
The necessity and uniqueness are routine. We only check the necessity for A.2. It
suffices to show that I is constant superadditive. Fix ϕ ∈ RS , p ∈ ∆ and t > 0. Then I(ϕ +
t1) = min
∆
[Ep(ϕ+t1)+c(Ep(ϕ+t1), p)] = min
∆
[Epϕ+c(Epϕ+t, p)]+t ≥ min
∆
[Epϕ, c(Epϕ, p)]+
t = I(ϕ) + t, as desired.
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Chapter 3
Aspiration and confidence under uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
The fundamental work of Savage (1954) establishes a beautiful theory to derive the sub-
jective probability distribution from a decision maker’s preferences.1 For example, if the
decision maker prefers to bet on event A than event B, then A is revealed to be more likely
for him than B. This approach is challenged by Ellsberg (1961)’s famous thought exper-
iments. One example of Ellsberg (1961) is to consider an urn with 90 balls in it, 30 red
and 60 either black or green. A ball is drawn from this urn. You are asked first to choose
from betting on red and betting on green. Next, you are asked to choose from betting on
“either red or green” and “either black or green”. For each draw, the payoff structure is the
same: you get 100 dollars if your bet is right and nothing if it is wrong. As Ellsberg (1961)
suggests and many later experiments confirm, most decision makers prefer to bet on red in
the first case and “either black or green” in the second. If a decision maker does have a
subjective belief, then his first choice reveals that the probability of the ball being green is
less than 13 , while the second choice reveals it more than
1
3 .
This example shows that subjective probability may not exist. In this decision problem,
there exists ambiguity, and ambiguity matters for a decision maker’s choices. Indeed, the
proportion of green balls is unknown and the decision maker has a aversion to betting on
the ambiguous events. The literature goes further by asking mainly two questions: (1)
1The early idea goes back to Ramsey (1931) and de Finetti (1937).
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Can we distinguish between ambiguous and unambiguous events, and derive a decision
maker’s subjective probability on unambiguous events from his preference? (2) How does
a decision maker make choices under ambiguity?
In responding to the first question, most studies define an ambiguous event via the “in-
consistency” or reversal of preferences in some fashion, and define unambiguous events and
acts accordingly.2 Axioms are imposed on preferences to deliver a subjective probability
over the unambiguous events and also probabilistic sophistication behavior on unambigu-
ous acts. Many criticisms arise when researchers find examples3 where some obviously
ambiguous events are identified as unambiguous and some apparently unambiguous events
are identified as ambiguous according to the definitions. One important reason for such
misidentification proposed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2011) is that some defi-
nition confounds ambiguity with ambiguity attitude. The inconsistency of preference may
result from a decision maker’s changing ambiguity attitude rather than the ambiguity of
some event. Nehring (2006) finds that even the consistency of preference may have noth-
ing to do with the existence of a subjective probability on relevant events.
In responding to the second question, many models have proposed different axioms on
preferences to characterize different decision rules.4 Implicitly or explicitly, most decision
rules base the interpretation on two factors: the ambiguity that a decision maker feels, and
his attitude toward this ambiguity. For example, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s “maxmin
expected utility” (MEU) models the ambiguity as a set of priors and presents a decision
maker’s ambiguity attitude by his taking the minimum expected utilities over these priors.
While ambiguity reflects a decision maker’s personal perception of the underlying situation,
2E.g., see Nehring (1999), Epstein and Zhang (2001), Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001), Zhang (2002),
Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005).
3E.g., see Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2011), Nehring (2006).
4E.g., see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Schmeidler (1989), Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005),
Marinacci, Maccheroni and Rustichini (2006), Strzalecki (2011).
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ambiguity attitude shows how he responds to it. His preference is determined by both fac-
tors, but they are subjective and unobservable for the outside modeler. Hence, with only the
choice data, there is some arbitrariness in explaining a decision maker’s behavior by these
two free variables. For instance, in contrast to the MEU model, the decision maker may
in reality have a larger set of priors and evaluate an act by a weighted average of the mini-
mum and maximum expected utility over this set of priors, rather than always considering
the worst scenario. Although Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004) characterize
the α-MEU representation5 and claim that their model completely separates ambiguity and
ambiguity attitude, Eichberger, Grant, Kelsey and Koshevoy (2011) shows that their iden-
tification of the set of priors summarizing a decision maker’s perceived ambiguity fails for
general α-MEU preferences with α , 0 or 1.
The difficulty of answering both questions is same. Can we identify a decision maker’s
perceived ambiguity and his ambiguity attitude with only the data of choices? Nehring
(2006) conjectures that the purely behavioral approach itself may have deep-seated limita-
tion in identifying subjective beliefs under ambiguity. Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji
(2005) represent a decision maker’s perception about ambiguity as a probability over pri-
ors, and resort to the “second-order" acts, i.e., the bets on the priors, to reveal his belief
over priors. They notice that there is a question whether the preference with respect to the
second-order acts are observable: “When it is not evident we may need something richer
than behavioral data, perhaps cognitive data or thought experiments, to help us reveal the
decision maker’s belief over ∆ [the priors].”
This paper achieves the goal of identifying a decision maker’s perceived ambiguity by
5The functional form is
V( f ) = αmin
C
Epu( f ) + (1 − α) max
C
Epu( f )
where f is an act, u( f ) is the state-contingent utility profile, Epu( f ) is the expectation of u( f ) with respect to
a prior p, C is a non-empty closed convex set of priors, and α ∈ [0, 1] is a weight parameter.
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explicitly introducing a confidence order in addition to the preference order. The con-
fidence order can be obtained from psychological data. It ranks the degree of a decision
maker’s confidence in aspiring a particular return from an act. More precisely, an act gener-
ates different expected payoffs under different priors. Given an act and an aspired expected
payoff, if the expected payoff of the act under a prior is no less than the aspiration level,
then the prior is called a supportive prior. The higher the aspiration level, the less the sup-
portive priors, and the lower the confidence in achieving the aspiration. The confidence
depends on the decision maker’s belief about the likelihood of the set of supportive priors.
It is similar to the second-order belief over priors proposed by Klibanoff, Marinacci and
Mukerji (2005). However, under the axioms imposed on this confidence order, a capacity
instead of a probability over the priors is elicited. Capacity is a generalization of proba-
bility and is accepted in the literature as a more relevant notion to model the belief under
ambiguity.6
Together with the confidence order, this paper axiomatizes a class of preferences that
base the evaluation of acts on two criteria: a decision maker’s aspiration from the act, and
his confidence in achieving this aspiration level. As discussed above, the confidence in
aspiration decreases in the aspiration level. Each act corresponds to a trade-off between
aspiration and confidence. The preferences that we characterize evaluate an act by the opti-
mal combination of aspiration and confidence according to another aggregating preference
over the two-criteria plane. The aggregating preference is endogenously determined from
the preference over acts.
Although several papers compare the degrees of decision makers’ ambiguity aversion
based only on their preferences, such comparison is meaningful only when the decision
makers perceive the same ambiguity; otherwise, ambiguity and ambiguity attitude will be
6See eg. Schmeidler (1989).
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confounded. In this paper, since decision makers’ perception about ambiguity is revealed
by confidence orders, the comparison of ambiguity attitude can be obtained. A decision
maker is more ambiguity averse than another if (1) he perceives the same ambiguity as
the other, that is, they have the identical confidence order, and (2) at each aspiration level,
according to the aggregating preference, he requires more degree of confidence to achieve
the same level of satisfaction, that is, the indifference curves of his aggregating preference
lie above those of the other.
An important feature of this class of preferences is that it allows a decision maker’s
ambiguity attitude to change across acts. Most current literature assumes to some extent
that a decision maker always display the same degree of ambiguity aversion.
3.2 Setup
We denote by R the set of all reals, R+ the set of all positive reals and Z+ the set of positive
integers. Let S be a finite set of states of the world. Suppose that |S | ≥ 2 where |·| denotes
the cardinality of a set. A subset of S is called an event. Let ∆(S ) be the set of all probability
measures on S . We identify ∆(S ) with the standard |S | −1 dimensional simplex in R|S |, i.e.,
the set {(p1, ..., p|S |) ∈ R|S | |
|S |∑
i=1
pi = 1 and pi ≥ 0 for all i}.
Let X be a set of outcomes. Suppose that X is a connected metric space. Let ∆(X) be
the set of all Borel probability measures on X. An element l ∈ ∆(X) is called a lottery on
X. For all l ∈ ∆(X) and x ∈ X, we write l(x) to denote l({x}). A lottery l ∈ ∆(X) is a simple
lottery if l(x) , 0 for finitely many x ∈ X, and ∑
x∈X
l(x) = 1. Let L0 be the set of all simple
lotteries. For all l ∈ L0, denote by supp(l) the support of l, i.e. the set {x ∈ X | l(x) > 0}.
Let f : S → X be a (Savage) act which specifies an outcome in each state. Let F0 = XS
be the set of all the (Savage) acts. Consider the set F1 = F0 × ∆(S ). A pair ( f , p) ∈ F1
is an informed act which denotes an act f with the given information that the probability
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over S is p. For example, consider an Ellsberg’s urn containing black and white balls with
known proportion. Betting on the color of a ball drawn from this urn is an act with given
probabilistic information. Alternatively, we may also think of it as an act with postulated
prior in the mind of decision maker, and he may compare the acts assoicated with different
prior information as a thought experiment.
Given ( f , p) ∈ F1, l ∈ ∆(X) is said to be generated by ( f , p) if l(x) = ∑
f (s)=x
ps for all
x ∈ X. Let L1 be the set of all the lotteries generated by some element in F1. Endow L1
with the weak topology induced by the collection of real-valued functions on L1 of the
form
∫
ηdl for all l ∈ L1, where η is a continuous real-valued function on X. Note that a
sequence {ln}∞n=1 of elements in L1 converges to l ∈ L1 with respect to this topology if and
only if lim
n→∞
∫
ηdln =
∫
ηdl for every continous real-valued function η on X.
Given l1, l2 ∈ L0 and λ ∈ [0, 1], we define their convex combination λl1 + (1 − λ)l2
as a lottery in L0 such that [λl1 + (1 − λ)l2](Y) = λl1(Y) + (1 − λ)l2(Y) for all Borel sets
Y ⊆ X. For simplicity we write l1λl2 instead of λl1 + (1− λ)l2. Note that L0 is closed under
convex combination, but L1 is not. Given l1, l2 ∈ L0 and λ ∈ (0, 1), l1λl2 ∈ L1 if and only if
|supp(l1λl2)| ≤ |S |. More precisely, L1 is the set of all simple lotteries which assign positive
probability to at most |S | elements in X.
We model a decision maker’s preference % as a binary relation on F = F0 ∪ F1. Let
 and ∼ denote respectively the asymmetric and symmetric parts of % as usual. Given
x ∈ X, let fx denote an act in F0 such that fx(s) = x for all s ∈ S , and let lx denote a lottery
in L1 such that lx(x) = 1. We call fx a constant act and lx a degenerate lottery where x ∈ X.
Given x, y ∈ X and A ⊆ S , let xAy denote an act in F0 such that xAy(s) = x for all s ∈ A
and xAy(s) = y for all s ∈ S \ A.
Lastly, given a set Z and an order D on Z, let max Z = {z ∈ Z | z D z′ for all z′ ∈ Z}. We
write max Z D z if z′ D z for all z′ ∈ max Z; min Z and z D min Z are similarly defined. A
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real-valued function T on Z is said to represent D on Z if and only if T (z) ≥ T (z′)⇔ z D z′
for all z, z′ ∈ Z.
This setup compromises the setting of Savage (1954) and that of Anscome and Au-
mann (1963). Anscome and Aumann (1963) differs from Savage (1954) in that they further
assume the set of outcomes is the set of all simple lotteries over a set of prizes. The intro-
duction of objective lotteries enlarges the alternatives of choice and significantly simplies
the analysis. However, it is under the criticism that in many real-life situations, there is no
random device to generate objective lotteries. Our model retains the advantage of Anscome
and Aumann (1963)’s setting, while we provide a way to generate lotteries endogenously.
We introduce the set of informed acts in addition to Savage acts. By imposing a neutrality
axiom (see Section 2), the informed acts in F1 are essentially regarded as lotteries by the
decision maker. Moreover, while Anscome and Aumann (1963) assume the existence of
all simple lotteries, we only need a subset — the set of generated lotteries.
3.3 Expected utility representation on informed acts
We consider the following axioms on % . In this section, we focus on the representation
for preference over informed acts.
A.1. Weak Order. % is complete and transitive.
A.2.1. Neutrality. If ( f , p), (g, q) ∈ F1 generate the same lottery, then ( f , p) ∼ (g, q).
Each lottery in L1 corresponds to a set of informed acts which generate it, and A.2.1
says that these acts are equivalent with respect to % . In the following, we would not
distinguish between F1 and L1, and will interchangeably use them for convenience. We
would like to obtain the expected utility representation for preference over informed acts.
However, as mentioned above, the set of generated lotteries is the set of simple lotteries
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which assign positive probability to at most |S | outcomes. It is not a convex set, so the
mixture space theorem (Herstein and Milnor (1953)) does not apply. Nevertheless, the
expected utility representation can still be obtained with the standard axioms (see Lemma
11 in Appendix).
A.3.1. Continuity. For any l1 ∈ L1, the sets {l ∈ L1 | l % l1} and {l ∈ L1 | l1 % l} are closed
in L1.
A.4.1. Independence. For any l1, l2, l3 ∈ L1 and λ ∈ (0, 1), l1  l2 implies that l1λl3  l2λl3
if both l1λl3 and l2λl3 exist in L1.
A.5. Unboundedness. There exist lx, ly in L1 such that (1) lx  ly, and (2) for all λ ∈
(0, 1) there are z1, z2 ∈ X satisfying ly  lz1λlx and lz2λly  lx.
Axiom A.3 strengthens the usual continuity axiom in a similar way as Grandmont
(1972), so that the obtained Bernoulli utility function is continuous. Axiom A.4 further
enforces the Bernoulli utility function to be unbounded. This axiom is commonly used
in the recent literature (see e.g. Kopylov (2001), Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini
(2006), Strzalecki (2011b) and Grant and Polak (2011)).7
Let u : X → R be a utility function of outcomes. Given f ∈ F , let u( f ) a real-valued
function on S assigning u( f (s)) to each s ∈ S . Thus, u( f ) transfers each act f to a state-
contingent utility function. Given f ∈ F0, u : X → R and p ∈ ∆(S ), let Epu( f ) denote the
expected value of u( f ) with respect to p, i.e., Epu( f ) =
∑
s∈S
u( f (s))ps. Given l ∈ L0 and
u : X → R, let Elu denote the expected value of u with respect to l, i.e., Elu = ∑
x∈X
u(x)l(x).
Note that if ( f , p), (g, q) ∈ F1 generate the same lottery l ∈ L1, then Elu = Epu( f ) = Equ(g).
7They impose unboundedness on the preference over constant acts. Our unboundedness axiom is the same
as theirs since later we will also impose a neutrality axiom to “equalize" degenerate lotteries and constant
acts (see Axiom A.2.2).
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Lemma 8. Suppose that % satisfies A.1. Then % satisfies A.2.1, A.3.1 and A.4.1 if and
only if there is a continuous function u : X → R such that for all ( f , p), (g, q) ∈ F1,
( f , p) % (g, q) ⇔ Epu( f ) ≥ Equ(g). Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transfor-
mation. The set u(X) is R if and only if % satisfies A.5 in addition.
3.4 Confidence order
Consider another binary relation % ′ onM = (L1×X)∪ (F0×L1), with ′ and ∼′ denoting
its asymmetric and symmetric parts respectively. A pair (l, x) ∈ L1 × X stands for the
confidence that a decision maker has in aspiring a lottory l to achieve an outcome at least
as good as x. A pair ( f , l) ∈ F0 × L1 stands for the confidence that he has in aspiring an
act f to be at least as good as l. The confidence order compares the confidence levels that
a decision maker has to aspire l from f or x from l for all ( f , l) ∈ F0 × L1, (l, x) ∈ L1 × X.
To reflect the nature of a confidence order, consider the axioms below.
Given l ∈ L1, let Ll : X → [0, 1] denote the decumulative distribution function such
that Ll(x) =
∑
ly % lx
l(y) for all x ∈ X.
A.1′. Order. % ′ is complete and transitive.
A.2′. Continuity. For any x ∈ X, f ∈ F0 and l1, l2, l3 ∈ L1 such that l1λl3 ∈ L1 for some
λ ∈ (0, 1),
(1) if (l1, x) ′ ( f , l2) ′ (l3, x), then there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that (l1αl3, x) ′
( f , l2) ′ (l1βl3, x);
(2) if ( f , l1) ′ (l2, x) ′ ( f , l3), then there exists β ∈ (0, 1) such that (l2, x) ′
( f , l1βl3), and moreover, when ( f , l1) < maxM or ( f , l3) < minM, there exists
α ∈ (0, 1) such that ( f , l1αl3) ′ (l2, x).
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A.3.1′. Monotonicity. Let x1, x2 ∈ X, f1, f2 ∈ F0 and l1, l2 ∈ L1 be given. Then
(1) (l1, x1) % ′(l2, x2) if and only if Ll1(x1) ≥ Ll2(x2);
(2) if ( f2, p) % l2 implies ( f1, p) % l1 for each p ∈ ∆(S ), then ( f1, l1) % ′( f2, l2).
A.4′. Neutrality. For any x1, x2 ∈ X, ( fx1 , lx2) ∼′ (lx1 , x2).
Axiom A.1′ is standard. We first look at A.3.1′. It says that for any objective lottery l,
the confidence of aspiring x from l depends on the likelihood to obtain x or better outcomes.
Note that here we implicitly assume that the preference over outcomes is induced by the
preference over degenerate lotteries. On the other hand, for each ( f , l) ∈ F0×L1, if p ∈ ∆(S )
and ( f , p) % l, then we say that p is a emphsupporting prior for ( f , l). Axiom A.3.1′ says
that for any ( f1, l1), ( f2, l2) ∈ F0×L1, if every prior supporting f2 to achieve l2 also supports
f1 to achieve l1, then the decision maker feels more confident to aspire l1 from f1 than to
aspire l2 from f2.
Next, to understand A.4′, let x1, x2 ∈ X be given. Note that with whatever prior, fx1
generates the degenerate lotter lx1 . If lx1 % lx2 , then the decision maker knows for sure that
fx1 can achieve something at least as good as lx2 , and thus he will have full confidence
to aspire lx2 from fx1 . If lx2  lx1 , then he knows for sure that fx1 can never achieve the
level of lx2 , so he will no confidence. Similarly, he has full confidence to aspire x2 from lx1
when lx1 % lx2 , and has no confidence otherwise. Since the confidence for both ( fx1 , lx2) and
(lx1 , x2) depends on the ranking of lx1 and lx2 , then it is natrual to assume that ( fx1 , lx2) ∼′
(lx1 , x2).
Finally, A.2′ is a standard continuity axiom. In fact, it is even weaker since it does
not require the right continuity in some cases. For example, if f is a constant act, then
as discussed above, for any l ∈ L1, the decision maker has either full confidence or no
confidence to aspire l from f . Suppose that f = fx for some x ∈ X and l3  lx ∼ l1, then
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he has full confidence for the aspiration level l1 and have no confidence for l3. In this case,
for any α ∈ (0, 1), l1αl3  lx, and thus ( f , l1αl3) ∼′ ( f , l3) since the decision maker has no
confidence for both l1αl3 and l3.
For each ( f , l) ∈ F0 × L1, let D( f , l) be the set of all supporting priors for ( f , l). Let
D = {D( f , l) ⊆ ∆(S ) | ( f , l) ∈ F0×L1}. Note that both ∅ and ∆(S ) belong to D. A capacity8
on D is a function c : D → R such that (1) c(D1) ≥ c(D2) if D1 ⊇ D2, and (2) c(∅) = 0,
c(∆(S )) = 1. A capacity c on D is upper continuous if lim
n→∞ c(Dn) = c(∩
∞
n=1Dn) for any
non-increasing sequence {Dn}∞n=1 of elements in D and ∩∞n=1Dn in D. It is lower continuous
if lim
n→∞ c(Dn) = c(∪
∞
n=1Dn) for any non-decreasing sequence {Dn}∞n=1 of elements in D and
∪∞n=1Dn in D. A capacity c on D is continuous if it is both upper and lower continuous.
Lemma 9. Suppose that % satisfies Axiom 1, 2.1 - 4.1, 5, and u is given as in Lemma 8.
The following statements are equivalent.
(1) % ′ satisfies Axiom 1′, 2′, 3.1′, 4′.
(2) There exists a unique continuous capacity c on D such that
V(·, ·) =

L(x) (l, x) ∈ L1 × X
c(D( f , l)) ( f , l) ∈ F0 × L1
represents % ′. Moreover, for each f ∈ F0, the robustness index v f : R → [0, 1] defined by
v f (t) = V( f , l) if Epu = t is continuous when v f (R) , {0, 1}.
Given f ∈ F0, if there exists l ∈ L1 such that ( f , l) < maxM∪minM, then we say that
f is an ambiguous act, and l is ambiguous for f . Otherwise, we call f an unambiguous act.
Denote by Fa the set of all ambiguous acts.
8The capacity is not defined on an algebra of ∆(S ) as usual, since first the sets not in D is irrelavant for
our purpose, and second the capacity can alwasys be extended to a whole algebra, but some of its properites
like continuity may lose.
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Given A ⊆ S , if for all x, y ∈ X, xAy is an unambiguous act, then A is called an
unambiguous event. LetU be the set of all unambiguous events. Note that ∅, S ∈ U.
Given a nonempty closed subset C of ∆(S ), we say that a capacity c on D is compatible
with the information set C if (1) c(D1) ≥ c(D2) when D1, D2 ∈ D and D1 ∩ C ⊇ D2 ∩ C;
and (2) for any f ∈ F0, c(D( f , l)) > 0 when max{( f , p) | p ∈ C}  l, and c(D( f , l)) < 1
when l  min{( f , p) | p ∈ C}. The underlying information structure captured by C is that
the decision maker believes that the true probability lies in C, but he cannot exclude any
prior in C. In particular, if C = {p} for some p ∈ ∆(S ) and D ∈ D, then c(D) = 1 when
p ∈ D and c(D) = 0 otherwise. In this case, the decision maker has a subjective probability
p. Moreover, every act and every event is unambiguous.
In the following, we would like to elicit more information of the decision maker’s sub-
jective information structure from his confidence order.
Given f1, f2 ∈ F0 and λ ∈ [0, 1], define their convex combination f1λ f2 to be an act
in F0 such that l f1λ f2(s) ∼ l f1(s)λl f2(s) for all s ∈ S . Rigorously speaking, f1λ f2 denotes a
family of such acts, but we do not need to distinguish among them for our purpose. Given
( f1, l1), ( f2, l2) ∈ F0 ×L1, if l f1 12 f2(s) ∼ l1 12 l2 for all s ∈ S , we say that ( f2, l2) is a complement
pair of ( f1, l1), and denote it by (− f1,−l1). Again a complement pair indeed denotes a
family of such pairs but they are treated as the same. Note that since X is connected and
unboundedness is assumed, then there always exist a convex combination of f1 and f2 in F0,
and a complement pair of ( f , l) in F0 × L1. Given f1, f2 ∈ F0 and u : X → R as in Lemma
8, it is easy to see that u( f1λ f2(s)) = λu( f1(s)) + (1 − λ)u( f2(s)) and u( f1(s)) + u(− f1(s)) =
El1u + E−l1u for all s ∈ S .
A.3.2′. Strong Monotonicity. Let x1, x2 ∈ X, f1, f2 ∈ F0 and l1, l2 ∈ L1 be given. Then
(1) (l1, x1) % ′(l2, x2) if and only if Ll1(x1) ≥ Ll2(x2);
(2) if ( f2, p) % l2 implies ( f1, p) % l1 either for each p ∈ ∆(S ) or for each p ∈
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D( f3, l3) where ( f3, l3) ∈ maxM, then ( f1, l1) % ′( f2, l2).
(3) if f ∈ Fa and l1, l2 ∈ L1 are ambiguous for f , then l2  l1 implies ( f , l1) ′
( f , l2).
A.5′. Belief Consistency. If ( f , l) ∈ maxM and l′  −l, then (− f , l′) ∈ minM. If
( f , l) ∈ minM and −l  l′, then (− f , l′) ∈ maxM. If ( f1, l1), ( f2, l2) ∈ minM and
λ ∈ (0, 1), then ( f1λ f2, l1λl2) ∈ minM.
Axiom A.3.2′ strengthens A.3.1′ in two aspects. First, if ( f3, l3) ∈ maxM, then the
decision maker have full confidence to aspire f3 to achieve l3, and it is as if that he believes
that the set of possible priors is contained in D( f3, l3). Axiom A.3.2′(2) simply assumes
that in this case, the decision maker does not worry about the priors outside D( f3, l3). Thus,
if for every prior p ∈ D( f3, l3) supporting f2 to achieve l2 also supports f1 to achieve l1,
then ( f1, l1) % ′( f2, l2). Second, if l1, l2 ∈ L1 are ambiguous for f ∈ Fa so that the decision
maker is not sure whether or not f can achieve them, then the a strictly higher aspiration
level corresponds to a strictly lower confidence level.
Axiom A.5′ is a belief consistency axiom. If ( f , l) ∈ maxM, then it is as if that the
decision maker believes that the true prior is in D( f , l). Since l′  −l, then D(− f , l) ⊆
∆(S ) \ D( f , l). Thus it is natrual to assume that he has no confidence to aspire l′ from − f .
Similarly, if ( f , l) ∈ minM and −l  l′, then D(− f , l′) ⊆ ∆(S ) \ D( f , l) and it is as if
that D(− f , l′) includes all priors which are possibly ture. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that the decision maker has full confidence to aspire l′ from − f . Lastly, if ( f1, l1), ( f2, l2) ∈
minM, then it is as if that neither D( f1, l1) nor D( f2, l2) contains any true prior. For any
λ ∈ (0, 1), since D( f1λ f2, l1λl2) ⊆ D( f1, l1) ∪ D( f2, l2), then ( f1λ f2, l1λl2) ∈ minM makes
sense.
Let N ∈ Z+ be give. For any a, a′ ∈ RN , a ≥ a′ (a > a′) if an ≥ a′n (an > a′n) for
all n = 1, ...,N. We say that T : RN → R is increasing (decreasing) if T (a) ≥ T (a′)
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(T (a) ≤ T (a′)) for all a ≥ a′ in RN , and that T is strictly increasing (strictly decreasing) if
T is increasing (decreasing) and T (a) > T (a′) (T (a) < T (a′)) for all a > a′ in RN .
Lemma 10. Suppose that % satisfies Axiom 1, 2.1 - 4.1, 5. The following statements are
equivalent.
(1) % ′ satisfies Axiom 1′, 2′, 3.2′, 4′, 5′.
(2) There exists a unique continuous capacity c on D such that
V(·, ·) =

L(x) (l, x) ∈ L1 × X
c(D( f , l)) ( f , l) ∈ F0 × L1
represents % ′. For each f ∈ Fa, v f defined in Lemma 9 is continuous and strictly decreas-
ing on v−1f ((0, 1)). Besides, there exists a unique nonempty closed convex set C ⊆ ∆(S )
such that c is compatible with the information set C. Moreover U is a λ-system and
U = {A ⊆ S | p(A) = p′(A) for all p, p′ ∈ C}.
Suppose the hypothesis of Lemma 10 and statement (1). It is easy to check that for any
f ∈ Fa, min
p∈C Epu( f ) < maxp∈C
Epu( f ). Moreover,
v f (t)

= 1 t ≤ min
p∈C u( f , p)
∈ (0, 1) min
p∈C u( f , p) < t < maxp∈C
u( f , p)
= 0 t ≥ max
p∈C
u( f , p)
and v f is strictly decreasing on (min
p∈C u( f , p),maxp∈C
u( f , p)). For any f ∈ F0\Fa, min
p∈C Epu( f ) =
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max
p∈C
Epu( f ), and
v f (t) =

1 t ≤ min
p∈C u( f , p)
0 t > min
p∈C u( f , p).
Let f ∈ F0 and l ∈ L1 be given. If Elu = min
p∈C Epu( f ), then we call l an essential
minimum of f and denote it by l f . If Elu = maxp∈C
Epu( f ), then we call l an essential maximum
of f , and denote it by l f . We call [El f u, El f u] the essential range of f .
3.5 Preference over F0
We consider the following axioms on the preference over F0.
A.2.2. Neutrality. If ( f , p) ∈ F1 generates lx for some x ∈ X, then ( f , p) ∼ fx.
A.3.2. Separability. For any f  g in F0, there exists l ∈ L1 such that f  l  g.
A.4.2. Bound independence. There exist α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any f ∈ Fa, g ∈
F0 \ Fa, and x ≺ y in X,
βg + (1 − β) fx % α f + (1 − α) fx =⇒ βg + (1 − β) fy % α f + (1 − α) fy, (6)
α f + (1 − α) fx % γg + (1 − γ) fx =⇒ α f + (1 − α) fy % γg + (1 − γ) fy. (6′)
A.6. Dominance. For any f1, f2 ∈ F0, if ( f1, l) % ′( f2, l) for all l ∈ L1, then f1 % f2. For
any N ∈ Z+, f , f1, ..., fN ∈ Fa, if max{l fn | n = 1, ...,N}  l f and max{( fn, l) | i =
1, ...,N} ′ ( f , l) for all l such that l¯ f % l  l f , then max{ fn | i = 1, ...,N}  f .
Axiom A.2.2 assumes that the decision maker is indifferent between a degenerate lot-
tery giving x ∈ X with probablity 1 and a constant act giving x in each state. Axiom A.3.2
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is in the same spirit of the separability axioms in the numerical representation for a prefer-
ence order (see eg. Debreu (1954)). Axiom A.4.2 is much weaker than the independence
axioms in the literature — Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s certainty independence axiom
and Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006)’s weak certainty independence axiom.
B.2. Certainty independence. For any f , g ∈ F0, x ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1),
f % g ⇐⇒ α f + (1 − α) fx % αg + (1 − α) fx. (3.2)
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) show that the certainty independence
axiom is equivalent to that for any f , g ∈ F0, x, y ∈ X and α, β ∈ (0, 1],
α f + (1 − α) fx % αg + (1 − α) fx =⇒ β f + (1 − β) fy % βg + (1 − β) fy. (3.3)
This equivalent statement clearly shows that Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s certainty
independence involves two types of independence: the independence with respect to mix-
ing with constant acts and the independence with respect to the weights used in such mix-
ing. Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) relaxes the second type of indepen-
dence and propose the weak certainty independence axiom.
C.2. Weak certainty independence. For any f , g ∈ F0, x, y ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1),
α f + (1 − α) fx % αg + (1 − α) fx =⇒ α f + (1 − α) fy % αg + (1 − α) fy. (3.4)
In both their works and our paper, along with other axioms, each act f is regarded as
a state-contingent utility vector u( f ) and is evaluated by a functional I on all such utility
vectors, i.e., I(u( f )). Let e ∈ RS be the unit vector which assigns 1 to each coordinate. For
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any f ∈ F0, λ ∈ R+ and t ∈ R, the certainty independence axiom implies that I(λu( f )+te) =
λI(u( f )) + t, while the weak certainty independence axiom implies that I(λu( f ) + te) =
I(λu( f ))+t. The translation invariance of I corresponds to the constant absolute uncertainty
aversion property of the preference. Positive homogenerity corresponds to constant relative
uncertainty aversion. Thus, B.1 assumes both constant and relative absolute uncertainty
aversion, while C.1 retains the absolute part and relaxes the relative part.
Our A.4.2 further relaxes constant absolute uncertainty aversion. It differentiating the
effects of a certainty part in different types of acts. Both (6) and (6′) allow the effect of
changing the certainty part in an ambiguous act to be different in magnitude from that in an
unambiguous act. For example, in (6), an improvement from fx to fy by 1 − α proportion
in an ambiguous act may equal to that by 1 − β proportion in an unambiguous act. More-
over, it allows a range of possible effects of improving a certainty part on ambiguous acts
rather than a particular one. While (6) implies that an improvement from fx to fy by 1 − α
proportion in an ambiguous act will not exceed that by 1− β proportion in an unambiguous
act, (6′) implies that the improvement will not be weaker than that by 1 − γ proportion in
an unambiguous act. Under the other axioms, the effects of changing a certainty part in
unambiguous acts are normalized, and they are used to measure the effects on ambiguous
acts in A.4.2.
From the perspective of the functional form, A.4.2 implies that there exist k, k′ ∈ R+
such that I(u( f )+te)−I(u( f )) ∈ [k′t, kt] for f ∈ Fa and t ∈ R+, while I(u( f )+te) = I(u( f ))+t
for f ∈ F0 \ Fa and t ∈ R. In A.4.2, if β = γ, then k = k′ and I(u( f ) + te) = I(u( f )) + kt for
f ∈ Fa and t ∈ R. If α = β = γ, then k = k′ = 1 and I(u( f ) + te) = I(u( f )) + t for all f ∈ F0
and t ∈ R, which is the case in Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006).
The following example shows different behavioral implication of their axioms and ours.
Example 3. Consider an urn containing 90 black and white balls in unknown proportion.
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A ball is drawn from the urn. The bet ft pays 50 + t dollars whatever happens, while gt
pays 100 + t dollars when it is black and t dollars otherwise, where t ≥ 0. See the following
table of payoffs.
Table 3.1 : Payoffs of ft and gt
t ≥ 0 Black White
ft 50+t 50+t
gt 100+t t
Clearly, ft is an unambiguous act for all t ≥ 0. Since the proportion of black and white
balls are unknown, it is reasonable to assume that gt is ambiguous for the decision maker.
Here, t is the ensured payoff by both acts and stands for the wealth level. We further assume
for simplicity that the decision maker is risk neutral. Both B.1 and C.1 imply that either
ft % gt for all t or gt % ft for all t. In other words, if the uncertainty is not acceptable when
t = 0, then it is not acceptable at any wealth level. Neither axiom allows one’s uncertainty
aversion varies with wealth, while A.4.2 does. Depending on the value of α, β and γ, A.4.2
can accommodates some situations where ft % gt for some t ≥ 0 and gt % ft for the other
t’s. In particular, it may incorporate the situation where there exists t¯ such that ft % gt when
t ≤ t¯ and gt % ft when t ≥ t¯.
Lastly, A.6 says that (1) for two acts f1, f2 ∈ F0, if at any aspiration level, f1 gives
weakly more confidence than f2, then f1 is weakly preferred, and (2) for any ambiguous act
f and any finite collection of ambiguous acts f1, ..., fN , N ∈ Z+, if the essential minimum of
some act in the collection is preferred to that of f , and if at any aspiration level, some act
in the collection gives more confidence than f , then the most preferred act in the collection
is preferred to f . This axiom is the key for our preference representation.
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Let w : R × [0, 1] → [−∞,∞) be given. We say w is normalized if w(u, 1) = u for
all u ∈ R. Let u : X → R and W : F0 → R be given. We say that W is bounded in
translation if there exists k, k′ > 0 such that for all f , g ∈ Fa and t > 0, u( f ) = u(g) + t
implies W( f ) −W(g) ∈ [k′t, kt].
Theorem 8. The following statements are equivalent.
(1) % satisfies Axiom 1 - 6, and % ′ satisfies Axiom 1’, 2’, 3.2’, 4’, 5’.
(2) (I) There exists a continuous function u : X → R unique up to a positive affine
transformation, a unique continuous capacity c on D and a greatest normalized increasing
and upper semicontinuous function w : R × [0, 1]→ [−∞,∞) such that
V(·, ·) =

L(x) (l, x) ∈ L1 × X
c(D( f , l)) ( f , l) ∈ F0 × L1
represents % ′ and
W(·) =

Elu l ∈ L1
max
t∈[El f u,El f u]
w(t, v f (t)) f ∈ F0
represents % , where v f is continuous and strictly decreasing on [El f u, El f u] when f ∈ Fa,
while W is bounded in translation.
(II) There exists a unique non empty closed convex set C ⊆ ∆(S ) such that c is compati-
ble with the information set C. Moreover,U is a λ-system andU = {A ⊆ S | p(A) = p′(A)
for all p, p′ ∈ C}.
The interpretation is that the decision maker treats every act as a trade-off between as-
piration and confidence, and he evaluates the act by the optimal combination of aspiration
and confidence level according to an aggregating preference on the aspiration and confi-
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dence two-criterion plane. It resembles the structure in the standard consumer theory. A
consumer evaluates a budget set on the two-commodity space by the optimal bundle as
determined by his preference over the commodity space.
One can show that if w(u, t) = −∞ for some (u, t) ∈ R× [0, 1], then w(u′, t) = −∞ for all
u′ ∈ R. This means that the decision maker has a threshold value of confidence level, below
which he regards it as unacceptable. The maximin expected utility (MEU) in Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) is an example. A MEU decision maker evaluates an act by its minimum
expected utility among a nonempty convex closed set of priors. This set is interpreted as
his information set in our framework, and his aggregating preference is
w(u, t) =

u t = 1
−∞ t < 1.
Hence, a MEU decision maker only consider the aspiration levels that corresponds the full
full confidence, among which the highest level is the minimum expected utility over C.
3.6 Appendix
Before proving Lemma 8, we provide an analogy of the classic expected utility representa-
tion result with the preference % defined on L1 = {l ∈ L0 | | supp(l)| ≤ |S |}. The following
axioms are standard except that here they apply to % when the relevant alternatives exist
in L1.
B.1. Weak Order. % is complete and transitive.
B.2. Independence. For any l1, l2, l3 ∈ L1 and λ ∈ (0, 1), l1  l2 implies that l1λl3  l2λl3
if both l1λl3 and l2λl3 exist in L1.
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B.3. Continuity. For any l1  l2  l3 in L1, if l1λl3 exists for some λ ∈ (0, 1), then
l1αl3  l2 and l2  l1βl3 for some α, β ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 11. A preference % satisfies B.1, B.2 and B.3 if and only if there is a function
u : X → R such that l % l′ ⇔ Elu ≥ El′u for all l, l′ ∈ L1. Moreover, u is unique up to a
positive affine transformation.
Proof. The necessity is obvious. We show the sufficiency in three steps. The proof is
based on that of Theorem 8.3 and 8.4 in Fishburn (1970). The only difference here is to
check which properties hold without the “mixture set" assumption and whether they are
sufficient to derive an expected utility representation.
Step 1. If % satisfies B.1, B.2 and B.3, then the following holds for all l1, l2, l3 ∈ L1.
C.1. Suppose that l1  l2 and 0 ≤ α < β ≤ 1. Then l1βl2  l1αl2 if they exist in L1.
C.2. Suppose that l1 % l2, l2 % l3 and l1  l3. If l1λl3 exists for some λ ∈ (0, 1), then
l2 ∼ l1αl3 for exactly one α ∈ [0, 1].
C.3. Suppose that l1 ∼ l2 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Then l1αl2 ∼ l1 if l1αl2 exists in L1.
C.4. Suppose that l1 ∼ l2 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Then l1αl3 ∼ l2αl3 if they exist in L1.
The proof of C.1 and C.2 is exactly the same as Fishburn’s proof. To check C.3, the
case when α = 0 or 1 is easy. Suppose that 0 < α < 1, l1αl2 exists in L1 and l1αl2  l1.
Then by B.2, we have (l1αl2)αl2  l1αl2. Since l1αl2  l2, by C.1, l1αl2  (l1αl2)αl2 which
is a contradiction. The case when l1  l1αl2 can lead to a similar contradiction. Hence,
l1αl2 ∼ l1.
For C.4, it holds obviously when α = 0 or 1, or l3 ∼ l1. Suppose that 0 < α < 1, l1αl3
and l2αl3 exist in L1, and l3  l1. Then by C.1, l3  l1αl3  l1. Thus l3  l1αl3  l2, and
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by C.1, l1αl3 ∼ l2βl3 for some β ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that β < α. By C.1, l2 βα l3  l2 ∼ l1. By
B.2, (l2
β
α
l3)αl3  l1αl3. Then l2βl3 = (l2 βα l3)αl3  l1αl3 which is a contradiction. Similarly,
it cannot be that β > α. Thus, l1αl3 ∼ l2αl3.
Step 2. Assume that lx  ly for some x, y ∈ X. Let lxly = {l ∈ L1 | lx % l % ly}.
Then there exists a function f : lxly → [0, 1] such that for all l, l′ ∈ łxly, (1) l % l′ if and
only if f (l) ≥ f (l′), and (2) for all α ∈ [0, 1], f (lαl′) = α f (l)+(1−α) f (l′) if lαl′ exists inL1.
For all l ∈ lxly, let f (l) to be the unique number in [0, 1] such that l ∼ lx f (l)ly. The
function f is well-defined by C.2. By C.1, lx f (l)ly % lx f (l′)ly if and only if f (l) ≥ f (l′).
Thus, (1) holds by the definition of f .
To check (2), the case when α = 0 or 1 is obvious. Suppose that 0 < α < 1 and
lαl′ exists in L1. Let z,w ∈ supp(l) ∪ supp(l′) be given such that lz % lr % lw for all r ∈
supp(l)∪ supp(l′). By repeatedly using C.1 or C.3, we have lz % l % lw. Thus by C.2 or C.3,
l ∼ lzβlw for some β ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, l′ ∼ lzγlw for some γ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that (lzβlw)αl′
also exists in L1. By C.4, lαl′ ∼ (lzβlw)αl′. Similarly, (lzβlw)αl′ ∼ (lzβlw)α(lzγlw). Hence,
lαl′ ∼ (lzβlw)α(lzγlw).
If l ∼ l′, then (2) holds trivially. Suppose without loss of generality that l  l′. Then
lz  lw, β > γ and f (l) > f (l′). Note that lx % l ∼ lzβlw  lw. By C.2, lzβlw ∼ lxβ′lw for
a unique β′ ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, lzγlw ∼ lxγ′lw for a unique γ′ ∈ [0, 1], and β′ > γ′. Note
that lzγlw = (lzβlw)
γ
β
lw ∼ (lxβ′lw)γβ lw = lx β
′γ
β
lw by C.4. Then the uniqueness of γ′ implies
that γ′ = β
′γ
β
. Hence, (lzβlw)α(lzγlw) = (lzβlw)α[(lzβlw)
γ
β
lw] = (lzβlw)[α + (1 − α)γβ ]lw ∼
(lxβ′lw)[α + (1 − α)γβ ]lw = (lxβ′lw)[α + (1 − α)γ
′
β′ ]lw = (lxβ
′lw)α(lxγ′lw).
Analogously, lxβ′lw ∼ lx f (l)ly and lxγ′lw ∼ lx f (l′)ly. Since lxβ′lw =
lx
β′−γ′
1−γ′ (lxγ
′lw) ∼ lx β′−γ′1−γ′ [lx f (l′)ly], lx f (l)ly = lx f (l)− f (l
′)
1− f (l′) [lx f (l
′)ly] and lx  lx f (l′)ly,
102
then β
′−γ′
1−γ′ =
f (l)− f (l′)
1− f (l′) by C.1. Hence, (lxβ
′lw)α(lxγ′lw) = lx
α(β′−γ′)
1−γ′ (lxγ
′lw) ∼
lx
α(β′−γ′)
1−γ′ [lx f (l
′)ly] = lx
α[ f (l)− f (l′)]
1− f (l′) [lx f (l
′)ly] = [lx f (l)ly]α[lx f (l′)ly]. Therefore, we get
that lαl′ ∼ [lx f (l)ly]α[lx f (l′)ly] = lx[α f (l) + (1 − α) f (l′)]ly, and thus by the definition of f ,
f (lαl′) = α f (l) + (1 − α) f (l′).
Step 3. There exsits a function u : X → R such that l % l′ ⇔ Elu ≥ El′u for all l, l′ ∈ L1.
If there are no x, y ∈ X such that lx  ly, l ∼ l′ for all l, l′ ∈ L1 by repeatedly using
C.3. Thus any constant u works. Suppose that there exists lx  ly for some x, y ∈ X.
For i = 1 or 2, let lxilyi = {l ∈ L1 | lxi % l % lyi} such that lxly ⊆ lxilyi . For both i, let
f ′i : lxilyi → [0, 1] be the function constructed as in Step 2, let fi be the affine transformation
of f ′i such that fi(lx) = 1 and fi(ly) = 0, and thus fi still satisfies (1) and (2) in Step 2.
Let l ∈ lx1ly1∩ lx2ly2 . If l ∼ lx or l ∼ ly, then f1(l) = f2(l). Otherwise, one of the following
cases must be true: lxi % l  lx  ly, lx  l  ly or lx  ly  l % lyi . Consider the first case.
Suppose without loss of generality that lx1 % lx2 . Then for both i, lx2 ∈ lxilyi , and lx ∼ lx2αly
for a unique α ∈ (0, 1) by C.2. Hence, 1 = fi(lx) = α fi(lx2) + (1 − α) fi(ly) = α fi(lx2) for
i = 1, 2. Since l ∼ lx2βly for a unique β ∈ (0, 1], then fi(l) = β fi(lx2) = βα for i = 1, 2.
Similarly, in the other cases, we also get f1(l) = f2(l).
For all l ∈ L1, let f (l) be the common value of fi(l) defined on every such lxilyi as
above. Since each pair of l, l′ ∈ L1 is contrained in some lxilyi , then f satisfies condition (1)
and (2) in Step 2. Define u : X → R by u(x) = f (lx) for all x ∈ X. Finally, for all l ∈ L1,
f (l) = f [
∑
x∈supp(l)
l(x)lx] =
∑
x∈supp(l)
l(x) f (lx) =
∑
x∈supp(l)
l(x)u(x) = Elu.
We complete the proof by checking the uniqueness property. Let v : X → R be such
that l % l′ ⇔ Elv ≥ El′v for all l, l′ ∈ L1. If there is no lx  ly in X, then u and v constant
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on X. Clearly, u is an affine transformation of v. Otherwise, fix some x, y ∈ X such that
lx  ly. Let u′(z) = u(z)−u(y)u(x)−u(y) and v′(z) = v(z)−v(y)v(x)−v(y) for all z ∈ X. Note that u′ and v′ are affine
transformations of u and v, so for all l ∈ L1, l % l′ ⇔ Elu′ ≥ El′u′ ⇔ Elv′ ≥ El′v′. Besides,
u′(x) = v′(x) = 1 and u′(y) = v′(y) = 0. Fix z ∈ X. Then one of the following cases is
true: lz % lx  ly, lx  lz  ly or lx  ly % lz. Using the similar argument as before, we get
u′(z) = v′(z) in all cases. Thus v(z) = v(x)−v(y)u(x)−u(y)u(z) + v(y) − v(x)−v(y)u(x)−u(y)u(y) for all z ∈ X. This
shows that v is an affine transformation of u.
Using Lemma 11, we can prove Lemma 8. Let Z+ denote the set of positive integers.
Proof of Lemma 8. The necessity part is easy. Let us check the sufficiency. By A.2.1, we
only need to show the analogous representation result for % on L1.
Clearly A.1 implies B.1. We show that A.3.1 implies B.3. Let l1  l2  l3 in L1
be given and suppose that ł1λl3 exists for some λ ∈ (0, 1). Let {λn}∞n=1 be a sequence of
elements in (0, 1) such that lim
n→∞ λn = 1. For any continuous real-valued function η on X,
lim
n→∞
∫
ηd(l1λnl3) =
∫
ηdl1. Hence, lim
n→∞ l1λnl3 = l1. Since l1  l2 and {l ∈ L1 | l  l2} is open
by A.3.1, then there exists N ∈ Z+ such that l1λNl3  l2. Similarly, pick a sequence {λn}∞n=1
of elements in (0, 1) converging to 0, then there is N′ ∈ Z+ such that l2  l1λNl3.
By applying Lemma 11, there exists a function u : X → R such that l % l′ ⇔ Elu ≥ El′u
for all l, l′ ∈ L1. Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation. To show
that u is continuous, suppose the contrary that there exist  > 0 and a sequence {xn}∞n=1 of
elements in X such that lim
n→∞ xn = x0, x0 ∈ X, and |u(xn) − u(x0)| >  for all n. Then there
is a subsequence {xn j}∞j=1 such that either u(xn j) > u(x0) +  for all j or u(xn j) < u(x0) − 
for all j. Assume the former case and let u = inf{u(xn j) | j ∈ Z+}. Pick J ∈ Z+ such
that u(xnJ ) < u + . Let l = lx0
1
2 lxnJ . For all j ∈ Z+, u(xn j) ≥ u and 12u(x0) + 12u(xnJ ) <
1
2 (u − ) + 12 (u + ) = u, so lxn j % l. For any continuous real-valued function η on X,
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lim
j→∞
∫
ηdlxn j = limj→∞ η(xn j) = η(x0) =
∫
ηdlx0 . Thus limj→∞ lxn j = lx0 . By A.3, lx0 % l, which
contradicts that u(x0) < 12u(x0) +
1
2u ≤ 12u(x0) + 12u(xnJ ). The argument follows analogously
for the case when u(xn j) < u(x0) −  for all j.
Lastly, if u(X) = R, then A.5 obviously holds. For the other direction, assume A.5
holds. Then we have lx  ly such that for all λ ∈ (0, 1), there exists z1 ∈ X such that
u(y) > λu(z1) + (1 − λ)u(x), i.e., u(z1) < 1λ [u(y) − (1 − λ)u(x)]. Thus, limλ→0 u(z1) = −∞.
Similarly, u(X) is not bounded above. Since u is continuous, X is connected and u(X) is
unbounded, then u(X) = R.
Proof of Lemma 9. Suppose that (1) holds. Fix x0, x1 ∈ X such that lx1  lx0 .
Step 1. If ly % lx (lx  ly) for all y ∈ supp(l), then (l, x) ∈ maxM ((l, x) ∈ minM). If
( f , p) % l (l  ( f , p)) for all p ∈ ∆(S ), then ( f , l) ∈ maxM (( f , l) ∈ minM).
By A.3.1′, if ly % lx (lx  ly) for all y ∈ supp(l), then (l, x) ∈ maxL1 × X
((l, x) ∈ minL1 ×X), and if ( f , p) % l (l  ( f , p)) for all p ∈ ∆(S ), then ( f , l) ∈ maxF0 ×L1
(( f , l) ∈ minF0 × L1). In particular, ( fx0 , lx0) ∈ maxF0 × L1, ( fx0 , lx1) ∈ minF0 × L1,
(lx0 , x0) ∈ maxL1 × X, and (lx0 , x1) ∈ minL1 × X. Combining these facts and A.4’, we get
that the desired results.
Step 2. For any ( f , l) ∈ F0 × L1, there is a unique λ ∈ [0, 1] such that ( f , l) ∼′ (lx1λlx0 , x1).
Note that (lx1αlx0 , x1) ′ (lx1βlx0 , x1) if and only if α > β in [0, 1]. Moreover,
(lx0 , x1) ∈ minM and (lx1 , x1) ∈ maxM. Hence, if ( f , l) ∈ minM ∪ maxM, then the
unique λ is either 0 or 1. On the other hand, if (lx1 , x1) ′ ( f , l) ′ (lx0 , x1), then by A.2′(1)
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there exists a unique λ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all α, β (0, 1) with 1 ≥ α > λ > β ≥ 0,
(lx1αlx0 , x1) ′ ( f , l) ′ (lx1βlx0 , x1). If (lx1λlx0 , x1)  ( f , l), then again by A.2′, there exists
µ ∈ (0, 1) such that (lx1λµlx0 , x1) ′ ( f , l), which is a contradiction since λµ < λ. Similarly,
it cannot be true that ( f , l) ′ (lx1λlx0 , x1). Hence, ( f , l) ∼′ (lx1λlx0 , x1).
Step 3. For all ( f , l) ∈ F0 × L1, define c(D( f , l)) = λ if ( f , l) ∼′ (lx1λlx0 , x1), λ ∈ [0, 1].
Clearly, c : D→ R is well defined and it is the unique function on D such that
V(·, ·) =

L(x) (l, x) ∈ L1 × X
c(D( f , l)) ( f , l) ∈ F0 × L1
represents % ′ onM. We would like to show that c is a continuous capacity on D.
First, c is a capacity on D. Note that c(∅) = c(D( fx0 , lx1)) = 0 since ( fx0 , lx1) ∼′ (lx0 , x1),
and c(∆(S )) = c(D( fx1 , lx1)) = 1 since ( fx1 , lx1) ∼′ (lx1 , x1). If D( f , l) ⊇ D( f ′, l′), then
( f , l) % ′( f ′, l′). Suppose that ( f , l) ∼′ (lx1λlx0 , x1) and ( f ′, l′) ∼′ (lx1λ′lx0 , x1). Hence, λ ≥ λ′
and thus c(D( f , l)) ≥ c(D( f ′, l′)).
To check c is upper continuous, let {D( fn, ln)}∞n=1 be a non-increasing sequence of sets
in D and ∩∞n=1D( fn, ln) = D( f , l) ∈ D. We want to show that limn→∞ c(D( fn, ln)) = c(D( f , l)).
Since c is monotone and bounded, then c := lim
n→∞ c(D( fn, ln)) = inf{c(D( fn, ln)) | n ∈ Z+} ∈
[0, 1]. Note that c ≥ c(D( f , l)). If c = 0, then c = c(D( f , l)) = 0. Suppose that c > 0.
Thus, D( fn, ln) , ∅ for each n. Pick pn ∈ arg min
p∈D( fn,ln)
Epu( f ) and let l′n = ( f , pn) for each n.
Clearly, l′n % l
′
m when n ≥ m, which means that D( f , l′n) ⊆ D( f , l′m) when n ≥ m. Moreover,
D( fn, ln) ⊆ D( f , l′n), since p ∈ D( fn, ln) implies that Epu( f ) ≥ Epnu( f ) = Elnu and thus
( f , p) % ln. Hence, D( f , l) ⊆ ∩∞n=1D( f , l′n).
In fact, D( f , l) = ∩∞n=1D( f , l′n). Suppose the contrary that there exists p′ ∈ ∩∞n=1D( f , l′n) \
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D( f , l). Thus l  ( f , p′). Pick l′ ∈ L1 be such that l  l′  ( f , p′). Thus p′ < D( f , l′).
We check that D( fn, ln) ⊆ D( f , l′) for some and thus for all sufficiently large n ∈ Z+.
Suppose that there exists p′n ∈ D( fn, ln) \ D( f , l′) for each n. The sequence {p′n}∞n=1 is
bounded, so there is a subsequence {p′n j}∞j=1 such that limj→∞ p
′
n j = p
∗ ∈ ∆(S ). For each
n ∈ Z+, p′n j ∈ D( fn j , ln j) ⊆ D( fn, ln) for sufficiently large j, and since D( fn, ln) is closed,
then p∗ ∈ D( fn, ln). Thus p∗ ∈ ∩∞n=1D( fn, ln). Since p′n < D( f , l′) for each n and l  l′,
then Ep∗u( f ) = lim
j→∞ Ep
′
n j
u( f ) ≤ El′u < Elu, and thus p∗ < D( f , l). This is a contradiction to
p∗ ∈ ∩∞n=1D( fn, ln) = D( f , l). Hence, D( fn, ln) ⊆ D( f , l′) for sufficiently large n. Next, note
that if D( fn, ln) ⊆ D( f , l′), then El′nu = minp∈D( fn,ln) Epu( f ) ≥ El′u, and thus l
′
n % l
′. Combining
the facts above, we have that D( f , l′n) ⊆ D( f , l′) for sufficiently large n ∈ Z+. Since p′ ∈
∩∞n=1D( f , l′n), then p′ ∈ D( f , l′), which contradicts with l′  ( f , p′).
Let c′ := inf{c(D( f , l′n)) | n ∈ Z+} = limn→∞ c(D( f , l
′
n)). Clearly, c
′ ∈ [0, 1]. For each
n ∈ Z+, by the definition of l′n, D( fn, ln) ⊆ D( f , l′n), so c ≤ c′. Since c(D( f , l)) ≤ c, then it
suffices to show that c′ = c(D( f , l)).
Suppose that D( f , l) = ∅. We want to show that D( f , l′n) = ∅ for sufficiently large n and
thus c′ = c(D( f , l)) = 0. To show that, assume the opposite that for all n ∈ Z+, D( f , l′n) , ∅
and thus El′nu ≤ maxs∈S u( f (s)). Let u = sup{El′nu | n ∈ Z+}. Then u ∈ R and there exists l ∈ L1
such that Elu = u. Moreover, D( f , l) = ∩∞n=1D( f , l′n) = D( f , l). For each n ∈ Z+, choose
pn ∈ D( f , l′n). Let {pn j}∞j=1 be a subsequence of {pn}∞n=1 such that limj→∞ pn j = p ∈ ∆(S ). Hence,
Epu( f ) = lim
j→∞ Epn j u( f ) ≥ limj→∞ El′n j u = u, and thus p ∈ D( f , l) = D( f , l). This contradicts
with D( f , l) = ∅.
Next, suppose that max
s∈S
u( f (s)) = min
s∈S u( f (s)). Then D( f , l) and D( f , l
′
n), n ∈ Z+,
are either or ∆(S ). Hence, if D( f , l) = ∅, then D( f , l′n) = ∅ for sufficiently large n; if
D( f , l) = ∆(S ), then D( f , l′n) = ∆(S ) for all n ∈ Z+. In either case, c′ = c(D( f , l)).
Lastly, suppose that D( f , l) , ∅, max
s∈S
u( f (s)) , min
s∈S u( f (s)), and c
′ > c(D( f , l)). Then
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D( f , l) , ∆(S ) as well. Choose λ ∈ (c(D( f , l)), c′). Then ( f , l′n) ′ (lx1λlx0 , x1) ′ ( f , l) for
all n ∈ Z+. By A.2′(2), for each n ∈ Z+, there exists βn ∈ (0, 1) such that (lx1λlx0 , x1) ′
( f , l′nβnl). Fix any N ∈ Z+. If there exists mN ∈ Z+ such that l′mN % l′NβNl, then D( f , l′mN ) ⊆
D( f , l′NβNl), and thus c(D( f , l
′
mN )) ≤ c(D( f , lNβNl)) < λ < c which is a contradiction. To
see that l′mN % l
′
NβNl for some mN ∈ Z+, suppose the contrary that l′NβNl  l′m for all m ∈ Z+.
Hence, D( f , l′NβNl) ⊆ D( f , l′m) for all m ∈ Z+, and then D( f , l′NβNl) ⊆ D( f , l). On the other
hand, since ( f , l′N) ′ ( f , l), then l  l′N and thus l  l′NβNl. Since D( f , l) is neither ∅ nor
∆(S ), and max
s∈S
u( f (s)) , min
s∈S u( f (s)), then Elu ∈ (mins∈S u( f (s)),maxs∈S u( f (s))]. Observe that
there must exist q ∈ ∆(S ) such that El′NβN lu < Equ( f ) < Elu. Thus, q ∈ D( f , l′NβNl) \ D( f , l)
which is a contradiction, as desired.
To check that c is lower continuous, let {D( fn, ln)}∞n=1 be a non-decreasing sequence
of sets in D and ∪∞n=1D( fn, ln) = D( f , l). Note that D( f , l) is the intersection of finitely
many half spaces, that is, it is a convex polytope. By the vertex representation of a
convex polytope, it can be written as the convex hull of finitely many points of it. Since
{D( fn, ln)}∞n=1 is a non-decreasing sequence of convex sets, then D( f , l) ⊆ D( fn, ln) for
sufficiently large n. This implies that D( f , l) = D( fn, ln) for sufficiently large n. Therefore,
lim
n→∞ c(D( fn, ln)) = c(D( f , l)).
Step 4. For each f ∈ F0, the robustness index v f : R → [0, 1] defined by v f (t) = V( f , l) if
Epu = t is continuous when v f (R) , {0, 1}.
Fix f ∈ F0. We first check that v f is well-defined. For any t ∈ R, there exists l ∈ L1
such that Elu = t, since u(X) = R. Suppose that l′ ∈ L1, l′ , l and E′l u = t. Hence,
D( f , l) = D( f , l′) and thus V( f , l) = V( f , l′). Note that v f is non-increasing, v f (t) = 1 when
t ≤ min
s∈S u( f (s)), and v f (t) = 0 when t > maxs∈S
u( f (s)).
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Next, suppose that v f (R) , {0, 1}, and we would like to show that v f is continuous.
In this case, it must be true that max
s∈S
u( f (s)) , min
s∈S u( f (s)). Suppose the opposite that v f
is not continous at t ∈ R. To begin with, we assume that v f (t) ∈ (0, 1). Then there exist
 > 0 and a sequence {tn}∞n=1 of elements in R such that limn→∞ tn = t and |v f (t) − v f (tn)| ≥ .
Thus there is a subsequence {tn j}∞j=1 such that tn j > t for all j ∈ Z+ or tn j < t for all
j ∈ Z+. Suppose the former case. Then v f (tn j) ≤ v f (t) −  for all j ∈ Z+. Let l ∈ L1
and ln j ∈ L1 for each j ∈ Z+ be such that Elu = t and Eln j u = tn j . Let λ = v f (t) − 2 .
Then ( f , l) ′ (lx1λlx2 , x1) ′ ( f , ln j) for all j ∈ Z+. By A.2′(2), there exists α j ∈ (0, 1)
for each j ∈ Z+ such that ( f , lα jln j) ′ (lx1λlx2 , x1). Note also that l  ln j and thus
lα jln j  l, j ∈ Z+. Fix J ∈ Z+. Since limj→∞ tn j = t, then there exists K ∈ Z+ such that
lαJlnJ  lnK  l. Hence, ( f , lnK ) % ′( f , lαJlnJ ) and thus ( f , lnK ) ′ (lx1λlx2 , x1), which
contradicts that (lx1λlx2 , x1) ′ ( f , ln j) for all j ∈ Z+. Suppose the later case where for
all j ∈ Z+, tn j < t so that v f (tn j) ≥ v f (t) + . A similar argument as above lead to
another contradiction. If v f (t) = 1, then v f (t′) = 1 for all t′ ≤ t. Thus tn > t for all
n ∈ Z+. Since v f (R) , {0, 1}, then there exists N ∈ Z+ such that v f (tN) > 0, and thus
( f , lN) < minM. Then A.2′(2) can be used similarly to derive a contradiction. If v f (t) = 0,
then v f (t′) = 0 for all t′ ≥ t, and thus tn < t for all n ∈ Z+. Again, a similar argument applies.
Conversely, suppose that (2) holds. Then A.1′, A.3.1′ and A.4′ are clearly implied. To
check A.2′, let x ∈ X, f ∈ F0 and l1, l2, l3 ∈ L1 be given such that l1λl3 ∈ L1 for some λ ∈
(0, 1). Assume that (l1, x) ′ ( f , l2) ′ (l3, x). Note that Ll1λl3(x) = λLl1(x) + (1−λ)Ll3(x) for
all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, there must exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that (l1αl3, x) ′ ( f , l2) ′ (l1βl3, x).
Assume that ( f , l1) ′ (l2, x) ′ ( f , l3). If either ( f , l1) < maxM or ( f , l3) < minM,
then v f (R) , {0, 1}, and thus v f is continuous. Hence, v f (R) is connected, and then there
must exist T ∈ R such that v f (El1u) > v f (T ) > V(l2, x) > v f (El3u). Since v f is non-
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increasing, then T ∈ (El1u, El3u). Therefore, we can find α ∈ (0, 1) such that El1αl3u, which
implies that ( f , l1αl3) ′ (l2, x). Next, consider a non-increasing sequence {D( f , l1 1n l3)}∞n=1
of elements in D. Note that ∩∞n=1D( f , l1 1n l3) = D( f , l3). Since c : D → R is continuous,
then c(D( f , l3)) = lim
n→∞ c(D( f , l1
1
n l3)). Moreover, v f (El3u) = c(D( f , l3)), and c(D( f , l1
1
n l3))
weakly decreases in n, so there must exist N ∈ Z+ such that V(l2, x) > c(D( f , l1 1N l3)).
Hence, (l2, x) ′ ( f , l1 1N l3).
Proof of Lemma 10. Suppose (1) holds. Since A.3.2′ implies A.3.1′, then the representation
for % ′, the uniqueness of c and the continuity of v f follow from Lemma 9. By A.3.2′(3),
for each f ∈ Fa, v f is strictly decreasing on v−1f ((0, 1)). We would like to show the rest
of (2). For any f ∈ F0, let x f , x f ∈ X be such that lx f % lx % lx f for all x ∈ f (S ). Let
λ f = sup{λ ∈ [0, 1] | ( f , lx fλlx f ) ∈ maxM}. Clearly, λ f is well-defined since lx f ∈ maxM.
Let l f = lx fλ f lx f . If λ f = 0, then ( f , l f ) ∈ maxM. If λ f > 0, then there is a non-
decreasing sequence {λn}∞n=1 of real numbers in [0, 1] such that ( f , lλn) ∈ maxM for each
n ∈ Z+, and lim
n→∞ λn = λ f . Thus {D( f , lλn)}
∞
n=1 is a non-increasing sequence of sets in D
such that D( f , l f ) = ∩∞n=1D( f , lx fλnlx f ). By the upper continuity of c, ( f , l f ) ∈ maxM. Let
C = ∩ f∈F0 D( f , l f ). Clearly, C is closed and convex since it is the intersection of a family of
closed and convex sets.
We introduce some notations which will be useful in the following proof. For any
( f , l) ∈ F0 × L1, let H( f , l) = {r ∈ R|S | | u( f ) · r ≥ Elu}, H( f , l) = {r ∈ R|S | | u( f ) · r ≤ Elu},
H
◦
( f , l) = {r ∈ R|S | | u( f ) · r > Elu} and H◦( f , l) = {r ∈ R|S | | u( f ) · r < Elu}.
In the following, we show that for all f ∈ F0, El f u = minp∈C Epu( f ), and as a result C
is non-empty. Fix f ∈ F0. Since El f u = minp∈D( f ,l f ) Epu( f ) and C ⊆ D( f , l f ), then El f u ≤
min
p∈C Epu( f ). Suppose the contrary that El f u < minp∈C Epu( f ). Hence, there exists l
′ ∈ L1 such
that El f u < El′u < minp∈C Epu( f ). We can assume without loss of generality that El
′u = 0.
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(Otherwise, consider f¯ ∈ F0 such that u( f¯ (s)) = u( f (s)) − El′u for all s ∈ S . It is easy to
check that λ f = λ f¯ , so El f u < El′u < minp∈C Epu( f ) if and only if El f¯ u < 0 < minp∈C Epu( f¯ ).)
Since El′u < min
p∈C Epu( f ), then either C = ∅, or for all p ∈ C, Epu( f ) > El′u and thus
Epu(− f ) < E−l′u. In both cases, D(− f ,−l′) ∩ C = ∅. In other words, for each p ∈
D(− f ,−l′), there exists g ∈ F0 such that p < D(g, lg), or p ∈ H◦(g, l) for some l ∈ L1
satisfying lg  l. Since D(− f ,−l′) is compact, there exist g1, ..., gN ∈ F0 and l1, ..., lN ∈ L1
such that lgn  ln for all n = 1, ...,N, and D(− f ,−l′) ⊆ ∪Nn=1H◦(gn, ln). Let x0, x1 ∈ X be
such that u(x0) = 0 and u(x1) = 1. Let S = {s1, ..., s|S |}, and let hm ∈ F0 be such that
hm(sm) = x1 and hm(s) = x0 when s , sm, m = 1, ..., |S |. Note that ∆(S ) ⊆ ∩|S |m=1H(hm, lx0),
and thus D(− f ,−l′) ⊆ [∪Nn=1H◦(gn, ln)]∩ [∩|S |m=1H(hm, lx0)]. Again without loss of generality,
we assume that Elnu = 0, n = 1, ...,N, otherwise we can change g1, ..., gN so that this holds
while the relations above remain the same. Next we quote Farkas’ lemma.
Lemma 12 (Farkas’ lemma). For any i × j matrix B and i-dimensional vector b, i, j ∈ Z+,
exactly one of the following two statements is true.
(i) There exists q ∈ R j such that Bq = b and b ≥ 0.
(ii) There exists r ∈ Ri such that BT r ≥ 0 and bT r < 0.
We consider u( f ) as a vector in R|S |, i.e., u( f ) = (u( f (s1)), ..., u( f (s|S |)))T . Let b = u( f ),
and similarly let B = [u(g1), ..., u(gN), u(h1), ..., u(h|S |)] be a |S | × (N + |S |) matrix. Suppose
that r ∈ RS and BT r ≥ 0. That is, u(gn)T r ≥ 0 for all n = 1, ...,N, and u(hm)T r ≥ 0, i.e.
rm ≥ 0, for all m = 1, ..., |S |. Thus, r ∈ [∩Nn=1H(gn, ln)] ∩ [∩|S |m=1H(hm, lx0)]. If r = 0, then
bT r = 0. If r , 0, then
∑|S |
m=1 rm > 0. Since u(gn)
T r∑|S |
m=1 rm
≥ 0 for each n = 1, ...,N, then
r∑|S |
m=1 rm
< D(− f ,−l′). That is, u(− f )T r∑|S |
m=1 rm
< E−l′u, and thus u( f )T r∑|S |
m=1 rm
> El′u = 0.
Therefore, (ii) does not hold, and there exists q ≥ 0 in R j such that Bq = b. If b = 0, then
El f u = 0 which contradicts with El f u < El′u = 0. Hence, b , 0, and then q , 0. Thus,
B q∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
= b∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
where
∑N+|S |
n=1 qn > 0.
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For all n = 1, ...,N, fix −g ∈ F0, −ln,−lgn ∈ L1 such that u(−g) = −u(g), E−lnu = −Elnu
and E−lgn u = −Elgn u. Since (gn, lgn) ∈ maxM and −ln  −lgn , then (−gn,−ln) ∈ minM
by A.5′, n = 1, ...,N. Let {xk}∞k=1 be a sequence of elements in X such that u(xk) < 0
for all k ∈ Z+ and lim
n→∞ u(xn) = 0. For all m = 1, ..., |S | and k ∈ Z+, fix −hm ∈ F0,
−lxk ∈ L1 such that u(−hm) = −u(hm) and E−lxk u = −Elxk u. Since (hm, lx0) ∈ maxM
and −lxk  lx0 , then (−hm,−lxk) ∈ minM by A.5′. By A.6′, (
∑N
n=1
qn∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
(−gn) +∑|S |
m=1
qN+m∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
(−hm),∑Nn=1 qn∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
(−ln) +∑|S |m=1 qN+m∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
(−lxk)) ∈ minM, k ∈ Z+. By the upper
continuity of c, (
∑N
n=1
qn∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
gn+
∑|S |
m=1
qN+m∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
hm,
∑N
n=1
qn∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
ln+
∑|S |
m=1
qN+m∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
lxk) ∈ maxM,
k ∈ Z+. Let f ′ ∈ F0 such that u( f ′) = u( f )∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
. Since B q∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
= b∑N+|S |
n=1 qn
and b = u( f ), then
( f ′, l′) ∈ maxM. Since Epu( f ′) ≥ El′u if and only if Epu( f ) ≥ El′u∑N+|S |n=1 qn = El′u, then
( f , l′) ∈ maxM. Since l′  l f , this contradicts the choice of l f .
Next we show that c is compatible with the set C. Suppose that D1 = D( f1, l1), D2 =
D( f2, l2) and D1∩C ⊇ D2∩C. If D2∩C = ∅, then El2u > maxp∈C Epu( f2). Fix − f2 ∈ F0, −l2 ∈
L1 such that u(− f2) = −u( f2) and E−l2u = −El2u. Thus, E−l2u < minp∈C Epu(− f2) = El− f2 u.
Since (− f2, l− f2) ∈ maxM and l− f2  −l2, then l2  −l− f2 and thus by A.5′, ( f2, l2) ∈ minM.
Hence, c(D1) ≥ 0 = c(D2). If D1∩C = C, then C ⊆ D1, that is, El1u ≤ minp∈C Epu( f1) = El f1 u.
Since ( f1, l f1) ∈ maxM and l f1 % l1, then ( f1, l1) ∈ maxM by A.3.2′. Hence, c(D1) = 1 ≥
c(D2).
Suppose that C ) D1∩C ⊇ D2∩C ) ∅. Let A = {r ∈ R|S | | u( f1)T r < El1u and u( f2)T r ≥
El2u}. If A ∩ ∆(S ) = ∅, then for each p ∈ ∆(S ), ( f2, p) % l2 implies that ( f1, p) % l1, i.e.,
D1 ⊇ D2. Thus, c(D1) ≥ c(D2). Suppose that A ∩ ∆(S ) , ∅. Thus, A , ∅, and it is easy to
see that the interior of A is non-empty. Since D1 ∩C ⊇ D2 ∩C, then A∩C = ∅. Therefore,
by a basic separation theorem (Dunford and Schwartz (1966), V.1.12), there exists a non-
zero linear functional I on R|S | and a real number λ such that I(r) ≥ λ ≥ I(r′) for all r ∈ C
and r′ ∈ A. Let en be a vector in R|S | that takes 1 in the n-th coordinate and 0 in the other
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coordinates, n = 1, ..., |S |. Pick f3 ∈ F0 such that u( f3(sn)) = I(en), n = 1, ..., |S |. Then
I(r) = u( f3)T r for each r ∈ R|S |. Pick l3 ∈ L1 such that El3u = λ. Since I(C) ≥ λ, then
min
p∈C Epu( f3) ≥ El3u, and thus ( f3, l3) ∈ maxM.
If ( f2, l2) ∈ maxM, then C ⊆ D2 by the construction of C. Thus C = D2 ∩ C which
contradicts our assumption. Hence, either v f2(El2u) ∈ (0, 1) or ( f2, l2) ∈ minM. In both
cases, there exists a sequence {l′n}∞n=1 of elements in L1 such that l′n  l2 for all n ∈ Z+, and
lim
n→∞ v f2(El
′
nu) = v f2(El2u). Fix n ∈ Z+. Fix p ∈ ∆(S ) such that ( f3, p) % l3 and ( f2, p) % l′n,
i.e., Epu( f3) ≥ λ and Epu( f2) ≥ El′nu > El2u. If p ∈ A, then p is an interior point of A, and
thus Epu( f3) < λ which is a contradiction. Hence, p < A, and thus ( f1, p) % l1. By A.3.2′,
( f1, l1) % ′( f2, l′n). Taking the limit, we get that c(D1) ≥ c(D2).
Let ( f , l) ∈ M be given. Suppose max{( f , p) | p ∈ C}  l and ( f , l) ∈ minM. Then
by A.5′ and the upper continuity of c, (− f ,−l) ∈ maxM. Note that E−lu > min
p∈C Epu(− f ) =
El− f u. Thus, −l  l− f which is a contradiction to the construction of l− f . Hence, ( f , l) <
minM and c(D( f , l)) > 0. Suppose l  min{( f , p) | p ∈ C}. Since El f u = minp∈C Epu( f ), then
by the choice of l f , ( f , l) < maxM. As a result, c(D( f , l)) < 1.
To check the uniqueness of C, suppose the contrary that there exists C′ ⊆ ∆(S ) satis-
fying the desirable properties. Suppose that q ∈ C′ \ C. Then there exists f ∈ F0 such
that q < D( f , l f ), and thus min
p∈C′ Epu( f ) ≤ Equ( f ) < El f u. Since c is compatible with C
′,
then c(D( f , l f )) < 1 which is a contradiction. Suppose that q ∈ C \ C′. By a separation
theorem (Dunford and Schwartz (1966), V.2.10), there exists a linear functional I on R|S |
such that I(q) < min
p∈C′ I(p). Pick f ∈ F0 such that u( f (sn)) = I(en), n = 1, ..., |S |. Hence, for
all p ∈ ∆(S ), I(p) = Epu( f ). Since q ∈ C, then min
p∈C Epu( f ) ≤ Equ( f ) < minp∈C′ Epu( f ). Let
l ∈ L1 be such that min
p∈C Epu( f ) < Elu < minp∈C′ Epu( f ). Since c is compatible with C, then
c(D( f , l)) < 1. Since c is compatible with C′ and D( f , l) ∩ C′ = C′, then c(D( f , l)) = 1,
which is a contradiction as desired.
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Next, we show that U = {A ⊆ S | p(A) = p′(A) for all p, p′ ∈ C}, which implies that
U is a λ-system. Suppose that A ∈ U. Let x0, x1, x′1 ∈ X be given such that u(x0) = 0,
u(x1) = 1 and u(x′1) = −1. Since A is unambiguous, then (x1Ax0, lx1λlx0) ∈ minM when
λ > λx1Ax0 . Thus, (x
′
1Ax0, lx′1λlx0) ∈ maxM when λ > λx1Ax0 . By the upper continuity
of c, (x′1Ax0, lx′1λx1Ax0lx0) ∈ maxM. Hence, λx′1Ax0 ≥ 1 − λx1Ax0 . Suppose λx′1Ax0 > 1 −
λx1Ax0 . Then lx0λx′1Ax0lx′1  lx′1λx1Ax0lx0 . Since (x1Ax0, lx1λx1Ax0lx0) ∈ maxM, then by A.5′,
(x′1Ax0, lx0λx′1Ax0lx′1) ∈ minM, which contradicts the choice of λx′1Ax0 . Hence, λx′1Ax0 =
1− λx1Ax0 . For any p ∈ C, p ∈ D(x1Ax0, lx1Ax0)∩D(x′1Ax0, lx′1Ax0). That is, p(A) ≥ λx1Ax0 and
−p(A) ≥ −(1 − λx′1Ax0) = −λx1Ax0 . Hence, p(A) = λx1Ax0 for all p ∈ C.
On the other hand, suppose that A ⊆ S and p(A) = p′(A) for all p, p′ ∈ C. Let x, y ∈ X
be given. Note that max
p∈C
Epu(xAy) = min
p∈C Epu(xAy) = ElxAyu. Fix l ∈ L1. If lxAy % l, then
(xAy, l) ∈ maxM. If l  lxAy, then D(xAy, l) ∩ C = ∅, and thus c(D(xAy, l)) = 0, i.e.,
(xAy, l) ∈ minM. Hence, A ∈ U.
Conversely, suppose that (2) holds. By Lemma 9, A.1′, A.2′, A.3.2′(1) and A.4′ holds.
To see A.3.2′(2), note that ( f3, l3) ∈ maxM implies that min{( f3, p) | p ∈ C} % l3, and
thus C ⊆ D( f3, l3). Hence, if ( f2, p) % l2 implies ( f1, p) % l1 either for each p ∈ ∆(S ) or
for each p ∈ D( f3, l3) where ( f3, l3) ∈ maxM, then D( f1, l1) ∩ C ⊇ D( f2, l2) ∩ C, so
that ( f1, l1) % ′( f2, l2). A.3.2′(3) follows from that v f is strictly decreasing on v−1f ((0, 1)) if
f ∈ Fa.
Finally, we check A.5′. Suppose ( f , l) ∈ maxM. Then C ⊆ D( f , l). If l′  −l,
then D(− f , l′) ∩ D( f , l) = ∅, and thus D(− f , l′) ∩ C = ∅. Hence, D(− f , l′) ∈ minM.
Suppose ( f , l) ∈ minM. Then l % max{( f , p) | p ∈ C}, and thus min
p∈C Epu(− f ) ≥ E−lu. It
follows that C ⊆ D(− f ,−l) ⊆ D(− f , l′) if −l  l′. Hence, (− f , l′) ∈ maxM. Suppose that
( f1, l1), ( f2, l2) ∈ minM and λ ∈ (0, 1). Then El1 ≥ maxp∈C Epu( f1) and El2 ≥ maxp∈C Epu( f2).
For any p ∈ C, Epu( f1λ f2) = λEpu( f1) + (1 − λ)Epu( f2) ≤ λEl1u + (1 − λ)El2u = El1λl2u. If
114
max
p∈C
Epu( f1λ f2) < El1λl2u, then D( f1λ f2, l1λl2) ∩ C = ∅, and thus ( f1λ f2, l1λl2) ∈ minM. If
max
p∈C
Epu( f1λ f2) = El1λl2u, then Elnu = maxp∈C
Epu( fn) for each n = 1, 2. Hence, max
p∈C
Epu( fi) >
min
p∈C Epu( fn) for each n = 1, 2, otherwise ( f1, l1), ( f2, l2) ∈ maxM. Let q ∈ arg minp∈C Epu( f1).
Then min
p∈C Epu( f1λ f2) ≤ Equ( f1λ f2) < λmaxp∈C Epu( f1) + (1 − λ) maxp∈C Epu( f2) = El1λl2u. Since
min
p∈C Epu( f1λ f2) < El1λl2u = maxp∈C
Epu( f1λ f2), then f1λ f2 ∈ Fa. By the continuity of v f1λ f2 ,
v f1λ f2(El1λl2u) = 0, i.e., ( f1λ f2, l1λl2) ∈ minM.
Proof of Theorem 1. We only check the preference representation result. Suppose (1)
holds. We gradually prove the results by establishing the following facts.
F.1. For all f ∈ F0 and l ∈ L1 such that l f (s) ∼ l for each s ∈ S , then f ∼ l.
Pick x ∈ X such that lx ∼ l. By A.2.2, fx ∼ lx and thus fx ∼ l. Since ( f , l) ∼′ ( fx, l) for
all l ∈ L1, then by A.6, f ∼ fx ∼ l.
F.2. For all f , g ∈ F0, if l f (s) % lg(s) for all s ∈ S , then f % g.
For any l ∈ L1 and p ∈ ∆(S ), (g, p) % l implies that ( f , p) % l, and thus ( f , l) % ′(g, l) by
A.3.2′(2). Hence, f % g by A.6.
F.3. For any f ∈ F0, there exists l ∈ L1 such that f ∼ l. Moreover, if f ∈ F0 \ Fa, then
f ∼ l f .
Let f0, f1 ∈ F0 be such that for all s ∈ S , l f0(s) ∼ l f and l f1(s) ∼ l f . By A.6, f1 % f % f0.
If f ∼ f0 or f ∼ f1, then f ∼ l f or f ∼ l f by F.1. Suppose that f1  f  f0. By A.3.2, there
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exist l′, l′′ ∈ L1 such that f1  l′  f  l′′  f0. Thus, l f  l′  f  l′′  l f . One can check
that there exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that l fλl f  f if λ ∈ (γ, 1] and f  l fλl f if λ ∈ [0, γ). If
f  l fγl f , then by F.1, f  f1γ f0. By A.3.2, there exists l′′′ ∈ L1 such that f  l′′′  f1γ f0.
Thus, l f  f  l′′′  l fγl f , and then l′′′ ∼ l fλl f for some λ ∈ (γ, 1) which is a contradiction
to the construction of γ. Similarly, it is not true that l fγl f  f . Hence, f ∼ l fγl f , as desired.
If f ∈ F0 \ Fa, then l f ∼ l f and thus f1 ∼ f0. Hence, f ∼ f0 ∼ l f .
Define I : RS → R by I(r) = Elu if where r ∈ RS , f ∈ F0 and l ∈ L1 satisfy r = u( f )
and f ∼ l. By F.2 and F.3, I is well-defined. Recall that e ∈ RS is the unit vector which
assigns 1 to every coordinate. It is easy to see that (1) I(u( f )) ≥ I(u(g)) if and only if
f % g, (2) I(te) = t for all t ∈ R, and (3) I(r) ≥ I(r′) for all r ≥ r′ in RS . For any f ∈ F0
and t ∈ R, let ft denote an act in F0 such that u( ft) = u( f ) + te. Note that for all f ∈ F0,
t, k ∈ R, v f (k) = v ft(k + t), and thus, El ft u = Elu + t and El ft u = Elu + t.
F.4. There exist k, k′ > 0 such that I(u( f ) + te) − I(u( f )) ∈ [k′t, kt] for all t > 0 and f ∈ Fa.
Suppose x0 ∈ X and u(x0) = 0. Let f ∈ Fa and t > 0 be given. Let α, β ∈ (0, 1)
be given as in A.4.2. Suppose x f ∈ X and f ∼ lx f . Note that x f always ex-
ists. Then I(u( f )) = I(u(x f )e) → I(α u( f )α + (1 − α)0) = I(β u(x f )eβ + (1 − β)0) →
I(u(α f ′ + (1 − α) fx0)) = I(u(βg′ + (1 − β) fx0)) where f ′, g′ ∈ F0 satisfy u( f ′) = u( f )α
and u(g′) = u(x f )e
β
. Hence, α f ′ + (1 − α) fx0 ∼ βg′ + (1 − β) fx0 . Let y ∈ X and
u(y) = t1−α . Since g
′ ∈ F0 \ Fa and y  x0, then β g′β + (1 − β) fy % α f ′ + (1 − α) fy. Thus,
β
u(x f )
β
+ (1 − β)0 + (1 − β) t1−α ≥ I(u(α f ′ + (1 − α) fy)) → I(u(βg′ + (1 − β) fx0)) + 1−β1−α t ≥
I(u( f ) + te)→ I(u(α f ′ + (1 − α) fx0)) + 1−β1−α t ≥ I(u( f ) + te)→ I(u( f ) + te) − I(u( f )) ≤ 1−β1−α t.
Similarly, I(u( f ) + te) − I(u( f )) ≥ 1−γ1−α t. Hence, k′ = 1−γ1−α and k = 1−β1−α .
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F.5. For any f , g ∈ F0, if f (s)  g(s) for all s ∈ S , then f  g.
Let t = min
s∈S [u( f (s)) − u(g(s))]. Note that t > 0 and u(g) ≥ u( f ) + te. By F.2, it suffices
to show that I(u( f ) + te) > I(u( f )), which follows from F.3 and F.4.
F.6. For all x ∈ X and f ∈ Fa, there exists t ∈ R such that ft ∼ fx.
Fix x ∈ X and f ∈ Fa. Pick t0, t1 ∈ R such that min
s∈S u( ft1(s)) ≥ u(x) ≥ maxs∈S u( ft0).
By F.2, ft1 % fx % ft0 . If ft1 ∼ fx or ft0 ∼ fx, then by A.2.2, we are done. Suppose
that ft1  fx  ft0 . Thus, t1 > t0 by F.2. Fix ft1λ ft0 ∈ F where λ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that
u( ft1λ ft0) = u( ft0) + λ(t1 − t0)e and ft0 ∈ Fa. By F.4, I(u( ft1λ ft0)) ≤ I(u( ft0)) + kλ(t1 − t0)
for some k ∈ R. Hence, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that fx  ft1λ ft0 . Similarly, there exists
λ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that ft1λ ft0  fx. Hence, we can find γ ∈ (0, 1) such that fx  ft1λ ft0 for all
λ ∈ [0, γ) and ft1λ ft0  fx for all λ ∈ (γ, 1]. Suppose that fx  ft1γ ft0 . When λ ∈ (γ, 1],
u( ft1λ ft0) = u( ft1γ ft0)+ (λ−γ)(t1− t0), and then I(u( ft1λ ft0)) ≤ I(u( ft1γ ft0))+k(λ−γ)(t1− t0).
Hence, there exists λ ∈ (γ, 1] such that fx  ft1λ ft0  ft1γ ft0 , which is a contradiction to the
construction of γ. Similarly, it is not true that ft1γ ft0  fx. Hence, fγt1+(1−γ)t0 ∼ ft1γ ft0 ∼ fx.
Suppose that Fa , ∅. For each x ∈ X, let Fx = { f ∈ Fa | f ∼ fx} and
Ux = ∩ f∈Fx{r ∈ R × [0, 1] | r1 ≥ El f u, r2 ≥ v f (r1)}. Note that Fx , ∅. Moreover, Ux is
closed in R × [0, 1] since v f is continuous when f ∈ Fa.
F.7. Suppose that Fa , ∅. For any x, y ∈ X, if fy  fx, then Ux ⊇ Uy.
117
Suppose that r ∈ Uy and f ∈ Fx. Then there exists t ∈ R such that ft ∼ fy.
Hence, ft ∈ Fy. Since r ∈ Uy and ft ∼ fy  fx ∼ f , then r1 ≥ El ft u ≥ El f u and
r2 ≥ v ft(r1) = v f (r1 − t) ≥ v f (r1). Hence, r ∈ Ux.
F.8. Suppose that Fa , ∅. For any x ∈ X, (u(x), 1) ∈ Ux, and thus Ux , ∅.
Fix f ∈ Fx. It suffices to show that u(x) ≥ El f u. Suppose the contrary that u(x) < El f u.
There exists t < 0 such that u(x) < El ft u. By A.6, ft % fx. Hence, f  ft % fx which is a
contradiction to f ∼ fx.
F.9. Suppose that Fa , ∅. Let x, y ∈ X be given. If fy  fx, then (u(x), k) < Uy for all
k ∈ [0, 1].
Since fy  fx, then there must exist f ∈ Fa such that u(y) > El f u > El f u > u(x).
Suppose that f ∼ fz. Thus, (u(x), k) < Uz for all k ∈ [0, 1], and fy  fz. By F.7,
(u(x), k) < Uy for all k ∈ [0, 1].
F.10. Let x, y ∈ X be given so that fy  fx. Suppose that f ∈ Fx and (k, v f (k)) ∈ Ux where
k ∈ [El f u, El f u]. Then (k, v f (k)) < Uy.
Since fy  fx ∼ f , then there exists t > 0 such that ft ∼ fy. If k = El f u, then k < El ft u,
and thus (k, v f (k)) < Uy. If El f u < k ≤ El f u, then v ft(k) = v f (k − t) > v f (k) by the
strict-increasing property of v f . Hence, (k, v f (k)) < Uy.
F.11. Suppose that Fa , ∅ and (r1, r2) ∈ Ux for some x ∈ X. If r′1 ≥ r1, then (r′1, r2) ∈ Ux.
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If there exists r′1 < r1 such that (r
′
1, r2) ∈ Ux, then there exists y ∈ X such that fy  fx and
(r1, r2) ∈ Uy.
If r′1 ≥ r1, then for any f ∈ Fx, r′1 ≥ r1 ≥ El f u and r2 ≥ v f (r1) ≥ v f (r′1). Hence,
(r′1, r2) ∈ Ux.
Suppose that there exists r′1 < r1 such that (r
′
1, r2) ∈ Ux. Let R = r1 − r′1. Let k′ > 0
be given as in F.4. By F.9, r1 > r′1 ≥ u(x). Suppose the contrary that for all y ∈ X such
that fy  fx, (r1, r2) < Uy. Pick y∗ ∈ X such that u(y∗) ∈ (u(x), r1] and u(y∗) − u(x) < k′R.
There exists f ∈ Fy∗ such that r2 < v f (r1), since r1 ≥ u(y∗) ≥ El f u. By F.4,
I(u( f )) − I(u( f−R)) ≥ k′R. Then I(u( f−R)) ≤ I(u( f )) − k′R = u(y∗) − k′R < u(x).
Hence, by F.5 and F.6, there exists 4R > 0 such that f−R+4R ∼ fx. Thus,
v f−R+4R(r
′
1) ≥ v f−R+4R(r′1 + 4R) = v f (r1) > r2, which is a contradiction to (r′1, r2) ∈ Ux.
F.12. Suppose that Fa , ∅ and (r1, r2) < Ux for all x ∈ X. Then for any r′1 ∈ R, (r′1, r2) < Ux
for all x ∈ X.
If r′1 ≤ r1, then by F.11, (r′1, r2) < Ux for all x ∈ X. Suppose that r′1 > r1. Let R = r′1− r1.
Let k > 0 be given as in F.4. Suppose the contrary that r′1 > r1 and (r
′
1, r2) ∈ Uy for
some y ∈ X. Pick x∗ ∈ X such that u(x∗) < min{r1, u(y) − kR}. Since (r1, r2) < Ux∗ and
u(x∗) < r1, then there exists f ∈ Fx∗ such that v f (r1) > r2. Note that I(u( fR)) ≤ I(u( f ))+kR.
Thus, I(u( fR)) ≤ u(x∗) + kR < u(y). There exists 4R > 0 such that fR+4R ∼ fy. Hence,
v fR+4R(r
′
1) = v( fR(r
′
1 − 4R) ≥ v fR(r′1) = v f (r1) > r2, which is a contradiction to (r′1, r2) ∈ Uy,
as desired.
Define w : R × [0, 1] → [−∞,∞) by w(r1, r2) = r1 if Fa = ∅ and
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w(r1, r2) = sup{u(x) | x ∈ X and (r1, r2) ∈ Ux} if Fa , ∅.
F.13. The function w is well-define and normalized.
The result is obvious when Fa = ∅. Suppose that Fa , ∅. To see w is well-defined,
just note that by F.9, {u(x) | x ∈ X and (r1, r2) ∈ Ux} is bounded above for any
(r1, r2) ∈ R × [0, 1]. The fact that w is normalized follows from F.8 and F.9.
F.14. Suppose that Fa , ∅ and w(r1, r2) = u(x) for some x ∈ X. Then (r1, r2) ∈ Ux.
Suppose the contrary that (r1, r2) < Ux. Hence, there exists f ∈ Fx such that either
r1 < El f u or r2 < v f (r1). If r1 < El f u, then pick t ∈ (0, El f u − r1) so that r1 < El f−t u.
Thus, (r1, r2) < Uy if fy % f−t. Hence, w(r1, r2) ≤ I(u( f−t)) < I(u( f )) = u(x), which is a
contradiction. If r2 < v f (r1), then pick t ∈ (0,min{v−1f (r2)}) so that r2 < v f−t(r1) and thus
(r1, r2) < Uy when fy % f−t. This leads to the same contradiction.
F.15. The function w is upper semicontinuous.
The case when Fa = ∅ is clear. Suppose that Fa , ∅. Note that Ux is a closed set for
any x ∈ X. Thus, it suffices to show that for each t ∈ R, w−1([t,∞)) = Ux if u(x) = t. Let
t ∈ R and x ∈ X be given such that u(x) = t. For all (r1, r2) ∈ Ux, w(r1, r2) ≥ u(x) = t. On
the other hand, suppose that w(r1, r2) ≥ t. Suppose also that w(r1, r2) = u(y), y ∈ X. Hence,
fy % fx and (r1, r2) ∈ Uy. Thus, (r1, r2) ∈ Ux.
F.16. If w(r1, r2) > −∞, r′1 > r1 and r′2 > r2, then w(r′1, r2) > w(r1, r2) and
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w(r1, r′2) ≥ w(r1, r2). If w(r1, r2) = −∞, then w(r′1, r2) = −∞ for all r′1 ∈ R.
The case when Fa = ∅ is easy. Suppose that Fa , ∅. Let r′1 > r1 and r′2 > r2 be
given. Since w(r1, r2) > −∞, then w(r1, r2) = u(x) for some x ∈ X. Then (r1, r2) ∈ Ux
and (r1, r2) < Uy for any y ∈ X such that fy  fx. By F.11, (r′1, r2) ∈ Ux, and there
exists y ∈ X such that fy  fx and (r′1, r2) ∈ Uy. Thus, w(r′1, r2) > w(r1, r2). The fact that
w(r1, r′2) ≥ w(r1, r2) is obvious. If w(r1, r2) = −∞, then (r1, r2) < Ux for all x ∈ X. By F.12,
w(r′1, r2) = −∞ for all r1 ∈ R.
F.17. For any x ∈ X and f ∈ Fx, there exists t ∈ [El f u, Elu] such that (t, v f (t)) ∈ Ux.
Fix x ∈ X and f ∈ Fx. For all g ∈ Fa Denote by Ug the set {(r1, r2) ∈ R × [0, 1] | r1 ≥
Elgu, r2 ≥ v f (r1)}. Suppose the contrary that for all t ∈ [El f u, Elu], (t, v f (t)) < Ux, i.e.,
(t, v f (t)) ∈ R × [0, 1] \ Ug for some g ∈ Fx. Note that G f := {(t, v f (t) | t ∈ [El f u, El f u]} is
compact and R× [0, 1] \Ug is open for all g ∈ Fx. Then there exist g1, ..., gN ∈ Fx such that
G f ⊆ ∪Nn=1(R × [0, 1] \ Ugn). Since v f (El f u) = 1, then lgn  l f for some n ∈ {1, ...,N}. For
any l ∈ L1 such that l f % l  l f , v f (Elu) < 1, and either Elu < Elgn u or v f (Elu) < vgn(Elu)
for some n ∈ {1, ...,N}. In the former case, we also get that v f (Elu) < 1 = v fn(Elu). Hence,
( fn, l) ′ ( f , l). By A.6, max{gn | n = 1, ...,N}  f , which is a contradiction.
F.18. The function W defined in Theorem 1 is well-defined and represents % . Moreover,
W is bounded in translation.
Suppose that Fa = ∅. Fix f ∈ F0. Then l f ∼ l f and W( f ) = w(El f u, 1) = El f u.
Moreover, by F.3, f ∼ l f . Clearly, W is well-defined and represents % . Suppose that
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Fa , ∅. If f ∈ F0 \ Fa, then f ∼ l f and W( f ) = El f u by F.8 and F.9. If f ∈ Fa, then by F.3
and F.10, there exists x ∈ X such that f ∈ Fx. By F.17, there exists t ∈ [El f u, Elu] such that
(t, v f (t)) ∈ Ux, and (t, v f (t)) < Uy for all y ∈ X such that fy  fx. Hence, w(t, v f (t)) = u(x).
For any t′ ∈ [El f u, Elu] such that (t′, v f (t′)) < Ux, F.7 implies that (t′, v f (t′)) < Uy. By
F.14, w(t′, v f (t′)) < u(x). Hence, W( f ) = w(t, v f (t)) = u(x), which implies that W is well-
defined and represents % . Lastly, since W( f ) = I(u( f )), W is bounded in translation by F.4.
F.19. If w′ : R × [0, 1]→ [−∞,∞) also satisfies the desired properties, then w′ ≤ w.
Suppose that contrary that w(r1, r2) < w′(r1, r2) for some (r1, r2) ∈ R × [0, 1]. Let
x ∈ X be such that u(x) = w′(r1, r2). If Fa = ∅, then u(x) > w(r1, r2) = r1. Since w′ is
normalized and strictly increasing, then r2 < 1 and w′(u(x), 1) = u(x) > w′(r1, r2), which
is a contradiction. If Fa , ∅, then (r1, r2) < Ux, and thus there exists f ∈ Fx such that
either r1 < El f u or r2 < v f (r1). In either case, there exists t < 0 such that v ft(r1) = r2 and
r1 ∈ [El f1 u, El f1 u]. Let W
′ : L1 ∪ F0 → R be the corresponding function defined as in
Theorem 1 by w′. Thus, W ′( ft) ≥ w′(r1, r2) = u(x). Hence, ft % fx, which contradicts that
fx ∼ f  ft.
Conversely, suppose (2) holds. We only check A.4.2 and A.6.
First, we check A.4.2. Since W is bounded in translation, then there exists k, k > 0
such that for any f ∈ Fa and t > 0, W( ft) −W( f ) ∈ [k′t, kt]. Pick α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1) such that
k′ = 1−γ1−α and k =
1−β
1−α . Fix f ∈ Fa, g ∈ F0 \ Fa and x, y ∈ X such that fy  fx.
Then βg + (1 − β) fx % α f + (1 − α) fx → I(u(βg + (1 − β) fx)) ≥ I(u(α f + (1 − α) fx))→
βElgu + (1−β)u(x) ≥ I(αu( f ) + (1−α)u(x)e)→ I(u(βg + (1−β) fy)) = βElgu + (1−β)u(y) =
βElgu + (1− β)u(x) + (1− β)[u(y)− u(x)] ≥ I(αu( f ) + (1− α)u(x)e) + (1− β)[u(y)− u(x)] =
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I(αu( f )+(1−α)u(x)e)+k(1−α)[u(y)−u(x)] ≥ I(αu( f )+(1−α)u(y)e) = I(u(α f +(1−α) fy)).
Hence, βg + (1 − β) fy % α f + (1 − α) fy. Similarly, one can check the other part of A.4.2.
To see A.6, first fix f1, f2 ∈ F0 such that ( f1, l) % ′( f2, l) for all l ∈ L1. For all t ∈ R,
v f1(t) ≥ v f2(t), and thus w(t, v f1(t)) ≥ w(t, v f2(t)). Hence, El f1 u ≥ El f2 u. If t ∈ [El f2 u, El f2 u] \
[El f1 u, El f1 u], then t < El f1 u, and thus w(El f1 u, 1) > w(t, v f1(t)) ≥ w(t, v f2(t)). Hence, for all
t ∈ [El f2 u, El f2 u], there exists t
′ ∈ [El f1 u, El f1 u] such that w(t
′, v f1(t
′)) ≥ w(t, v f2(t)). Thus,
W( f1) ≥ W( f2), i.e., f1 % f2.
Next fix N ∈ Z+ and f , f1, ..., fN ∈ Fa such that max{l fn | n = 1, ...,N}  l f and
max{( fn, l) | i = 1, ...,N} ′ ( f , l) for all l satisfying l¯ f % l  l f . Suppose that W( f ) =
w(t, v f (t)), t ∈ [El f u, El f u]. If t = El f u, then t < El fn u for some n ∈ {1, ...,N}. Thus,
W( f ) = t < El fn u ≤ W( fn). If t ∈ (El f u, El f u], then v f (t) < v fn(t) for some n ∈ {1, ...,N}.
It is easy to see that there exists t′ ∈ (El fn u, El fn u) such that (t′, v fn(t′)) > (t, v f (t)). Hence,
W( fn) > W( f ) as desired.
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